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ECOWAS AND THE REGULATION OF REGIONAL SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA: A LITERATURE REVIEW

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ABSTRACT

This paper examined the economic community of West African states (ECOWAS), and the regulation of regional security in West Africa methodologically, the study adopted content analysis of secondary data obtained from academic journals, and other internet sources. The study tried to provide answer to the questions to whether the transformation of the securitization strategy of ECOWAS from peacekeeping to peace enforcement brought about effective restoration of security in West African sub-region. The study revealed that ECOMOG was the mechanism adopted by ECOWAS to achieving regional peace and security. The study also found that due to the violent nature of most conflicts within the West African sub-region, ECOWAS had to use ECOMOG to change its security strategy from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. The study recommended the strengthening of democratic institutions in member countries, before a country is admitted into ECOWAS, and in order to achieve economic integration among member states.

Keywords: Ecowas, Regulation, Regional Security.

Introduction

The creation of Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) provided the regional framework for achieving such a goal but like other post-colonial projects, the process of economic integration was undermined by the strong link with the economies of the former colonies, which led more to dependence than independence; and the unfavourable and unequal international trade regime established did not provide any basis for African countries to develop (Maiangwa, 2015). Long years of single party and authoritarian rule coupled with frequent regime change through military coups d'état made it impossible to pursue development in any stable environment. Politics therefore undermined economic development because most leaders were more interested in maintaining the status quo through power struggle than pay serious attention to development that would benefit the citizens of the respective states constituting the region.

Countries of ECOWAS have faced some of the most daunting security challenges any region in Africa has had especially from civil wars. Like the rest of Africa the countries in West Africa seldom go to war with their neighbors despite Africa having some infamous irredentist wars. The war between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden in 1977, between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998, Libya and Chad over the Aouzou Strip, and Libya's border incursions into Egypt in 1977 were among the infamous. West African countries have avoided going to war because they have realized that the benefits accruing from going to war is inconsequential compared to the financial and human cost of waging that war. It was not surprising, therefore, that during Nigeria's and Cameroon's bitter disputation over Bakassi which is sandwiched

between southeastern Nigeria and southwestern Cameroon they avoided mobilizing troops for war. The two countries relied on the International Court of Justice's mediation to settle the dispute (Anyu, 2007).

The major security problem that continues to threaten West African countries has been internal squabbles breaking out among ethnic groups or between regions or ethnic groups with the central government over policy. A region or a group's disagreement with government often has been about feeling cheated by the manner in which government divides budget revenues, whereby a resource-rich region suspects the government diverting revenues away to poorly endowed regions. The institutions that sustain democracy are very weak in ECOWAS member states. Such weaknesses provide the avenues for authoritarianism in member states, and the implications are agitations and confrontations by marginalized and disenfranchised groups against the state, which in most instances transforms into civil conflicts. Democracy in most states has not strengthened institutional mechanisms capable of preventing that large-scale conflicts in West Africa. It explains the inability of ECOWAS to effectively confront the authoritarian currents that continue to run deep in West Africa. These challenges render ECOWAS as Jallow (2015) described, "an arena of mediocrity and dysfunction" in contemporary times. Despite the challenges, ECOWAS has significantly attenuated the effects of violence across other states in the sub region (Bah, 2005; Arthur, 2010). ECOWAS has the opportunity to improve on its capabilities in navigating between the principles of economic integration and development and the peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in West Africa

Statement of the problem

It is clear that main priority of ECOWAS as an inter-Governmental Organization was economic agenda. At the time, only a passing thought was given to the nexus between security and economic development because relationship between various countries was reasonably good and did not require signing a defence pact or defense agreement. Internal problems were easily contained within those respective countries. The critical challenges include member states internal insecurity, crime, illicit trading and smuggling across the borders. Also, ECOWAS security apparatus suffer from financial burden and political interference. ECOWAS forces receive insufficient training, lack of preparation and inadequate military equipment. Security threats to the governments of ECOWAS member states have centered mainly on internal rebellions that disenfranchised groups have started against ruling governments. One such rebellion which occurred in the late 1960s was Nigeria's Eastern Region pulling out in 1967 to form Biafra, eight years before ECOWAS formed. The horrific aftermath of the secession including the resultant war, undoubtedly, moved Nigeria to redouble its effort to spearhead ECOWAS formation. There have been sporadic border tensions between neighboring states, however, such as Nigeria and Cameroon, a non-ECOWAS member, over Bakassi, and Guinea seizing Sierra Leonean land along their common border.

Conceptual Review

Evolution of ECOWAS

The Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) was established as a regional initiative to facilitate economic growth and development in the West Africa (Adetula, 2019). As captured in the 1975 Treaty, the main aim of ECOWAS was: To promote cooperation and

development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of industry transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of its people, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent. In this effect, though there has been an argument that the issues of peace and security might not have been directly taken up in the treaty that gave birth to ECOWAS, yet it did not mean that such issues were altogether ignored by the founders of ECOWAS (Sessay, 2012). As the adoption of an ECOWAS Protocol on non-aggression underlines this fact, according to the Article 1 of the Protocol, member states were to refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression or from employing any other means inconsistent with the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity against the territorial integrity or political independence of other Member States. The early 1990s witnessed an upsurge in violent conflicts, instability and state failure in West Africa. Countries such as Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone were the adversely affected. The intensity and devastating consequences of the situation led to a major shift in the focus of ECOWAS from economic development to peace, security and stability. The intervention of ECOWAS in these countries opened a new vista for the organization as a critical vehicle for achieving regional security (Golwa, 2019). From the standpoint of ECOWAS involvement in Liberia, the notion of post-conflict rehabilitation in this paper attributes to the economic, social and economic transformation of the Liberian society. Wherein, the emphasis is placed on laying the foundation for durable peace, security, stability and development as a basis for averting a relapse to conflict. In most cases, ECOWAS took the lead in facilitating the implementation of policies and programmes supported by its member states, development partners, donors, civil society among others. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed in August 2003 laid the foundation for the involvement of ECOWAS in post-conflict Liberia. Prior to the CPA, ECOWAS played a significant and strategic role in containing the Liberian conflict through the establishment and deployment of an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL).

Evolution of ECOWAS Peacekeeping: ECOMOG

ECOWAS began as a collective quest for self-reliance and economic development. After some earlier attempts at a West African economic community in the 1960s, two heads of state, Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo played key roles in the signing of the ECOWAS treaty by fifteen member states in Lagos on May 28, 1975 (McGrew, 2018). Nigeria's role was based on the perceived linkage between regional peace, on one hand, and development and national stability and security on the other hand. This, along with some border skirmishes in the region, led to two protocols on defense and security: the Protocol on Non-aggression (PNA, 1978) and that on Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD, 1981). Their principles, among others, provided for an emergency "Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC)" but stopped short of providing for "a permanent ECOWAS standing army." However, as Aning notes, "by 1990, none of the procedural or integral decision-making aspects of the PMAD had been implemented. This was underlined by doubts among francophone states about Nigeria's real intentions in proposing the initiative as well as about the limited capacity of the ECOWAS secretariat at that time. Due to the politics and intraregional rivalries between the two language blocs in ECOWAS, the seven francophone states (except Guinea) signed a separate nonaggression defence pact (ANAD) in 1977, which also provided for a regional standby force. As Adebajo notes, several developments among the Francophone countries created divisions and weakened that bloc. These divisions turned out to be decisive when Nigeria used ECOWAS to form a regional

force to intervene in Liberia, whose civil war had begun in December 1989 when Charles Taylor led his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) across the border from neighboring Côte d'Ivoire through Nimba County in Liberia. Acting on an appeal from the Liberian President, Samuel Doe, to ECOWAS for help against NPFL insurgents, and drawing on the PMAD, Nigeria's then military head of state General Babangida made the case for regional mediation in the conflict at the May 1990 ECOWAS meeting in Banjul. ECOWAS set up a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) with Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo as its members to facilitate the mediation of the conflict in Liberia. The SMC called for a cease-fire and decided to establish a Cease-fire Monitoring Group ECOMOG. Nigeria played the prominent role in pushing for the establishment of ECOMOG, to monitor and to effect a cease-fire in Liberia as a step toward restoring law and order, setting up an interim government, and preparing the ground for elections. Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Gambia contributed troops. Much has been written on Nigeria and ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The personal interests of certain leaders, including Nigeria's military president, Ibrahim Babangida, were involved. However, the Nigerian-led ECOWAS initiatives were significant both in the broadening of the scope of ECOWAS's functions and in the shift away from the nonintervention norm in fostering a collective regional security culture/regime for West Africa. As a regional leader and in pursuit of its foreign policy toward West Africa, Nigeria provided an estimated 80 percent of ECOMOG's troops, provided 90 percent of the funding, and suffered an estimated one thousand fatalities. This was despite initial opposition to the peace enforcement operation by some francophone states and by a Nigerian public that felt that domestic priorities needed to take precedence over foreign adventurism. ECOMOG's performance was adversely affected by problems related to command and control, its ad-hoc nature, logistical shortcomings within the forces, poor coordination and harmonization between the contributing countries, poor coordination between ECOMOG field commanders and ECOWAS, weak political will, and lack of agreement about the nature and role of ECOMOG among West Africa's leaders. Other constraints included resource challenges, capacity and institutional weaknesses within ECOWAS, allegations of corruption and high-handedness against some ECOMOG peacekeepers, and confusion related to the need to anticipate and respond in a timely manner to the challenge of peacekeeping in West Africa.

On May 9, 1990 ECOWAS went ahead to set up a Five-Member Consultative Group on Liberia, appointed a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC). The Anglophone Francophone divide in ECOWAS was already a cause for concern as a quorum was hardly achieved especially on the issue of intervention in Liberia. To avoid further embarrassment, the SMC on Liberia that was chaired by The Gambia was predominantly Anglophone and comprised Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Guinea (the only Francophone country). The Consultative Group was further charged with the task of maintenance of peace and security in the sub-region, a mandate that transcended the Liberian conflict. The SMC held their first meeting with the Liberian warring factions in Freetown in July 1990 in the midst of a tense political and security climate in Liberia. But before the SMC could settle down to work, an NPFL spokesman, Tom Woewiyu reiterated their stance to accept neither a cease-fire nor any form of ECOWAS peacekeeping force which the rebel group qualified as an „invasion force“. The Freetown peace talks thus collapsed. The Summit of Heads of State of the SMC scheduled another meeting in Banjul, The Gambia at the behest of Sir Dauda K. Jawara from August 6-7, 1990 to revisit the Liberian dossier. The final communiqué which was approved by the Authority of the ECOWAS heads of State and Government on August 25, 1990 and copied the UN Security Council recommended the following key points.

Dimensions of West African Conflicts

By 2004, any objective observer of the sub-region would have had to concur with Peter Schwab (and notwithstanding his ominous 2001 book *Africa* (Osadolor, 2011)). A Continent Self-destructs that, indeed, West Africa was “on life support.” The most recent of its many conflicts, the civil war that all but partitioned cote d’Ivoire was in full gear with no end in sight, despite concerted efforts regionally, and continent-wide with the full support of the United Nations. The outcomes of the decade-old civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia were uncertain, the acute governance and security crises in Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Togo showed no sign of abetting, and even in countries where no openly tense situation prevailed such as Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Senegal, and Nigeria, low intensity security crises could be discerned. In the latter two an unmistakable low intensity internal warfare with occasional flare-ups existed. And denoting the frequent incidence of conflict in Africa, as of 2005, there were 14 peace missions of the United Nations in Africa, and three of them prominent in West Africa, namely in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire. Thankfully, by 2007, the situation in West Africa has markedly improved and, using Schwab’s allegory, the patient could be said to be breathing on his own and showing signs of steady improvement, even if any definitive prognosis must be reserved for the time being. The question, of course is what characteristics do all these conflicts and crises share, and relatedly, which of their common features are generated and sustained by domestic dynamics. There is a consensus among observers of conflicts and crises in Africa that typically, these stem from, and have a structural, policy related, or behavioral character.

An appropriate starting point to examine the internal dimensions of these conflicts seems to be the distinctive nature of the post-colonial state, the cardinal characteristic of which is its disjunction from the aspirations of the people it is supposed to serve. In all West African states in which these conflicts take place, the state has no legitimacy to speak of and no organic link with the populations who, decades after political independence, continue to view it as an alien, awkward institution of which they should not expect anything, and in which they have no stakes. Pita Agbese and George Kieh capture quite cogently this attitude when they observe the following (Ukeje, 2015):

“The typical African state is noted more as a repressive, brutal, corrupt and inefficient entity than as a mechanism for the promotion of the collective well-being of its citizens. Consequently, the modern state remains largely irrelevant to the needs, interests, and aspirations of the people. A telling evidence of the vote of confidence in the African state is the fact that even the African leader who serve as the custodians of the state have little faith in its ability to cater to their well-being”.

Agbese and Kieh (1991) illustrated this attitude toward the state of the very people who are in charge of running it. They use for their family and themselves virtually none of the service they are supposed to make available for their people (including education, health care, etc) and, of course, they invest the product of the loot of national resources in foreign bank accounts. The end result being that citizens have no faith in their leaders [who symbolize the state] and they entertain no illusion that the state would address their concern and material well-being. Given this widespread attitude toward the typical state, any challenge to it is welcome, indeed applauded, encouraged. Such challenges are often viewed by large segments of society as almost conducted on their behalf and deserving

succeed, at least when initially launched. This discontent with the state as a structure that failed to live up to the expectations of the peoples of West Africa can certainly be seen in many of the conflicts listed above. Liberia is of course the typical illustration of this phenomenon, although not a former colonial state in the usual sense, it shares, as Ebo argues, the same “neocolonial structures” with other neighboring states that estranged the state as an institutional and political presence, from the overwhelming majority of the population (Wæver, 2015). This alienation of the state from its people is of course widespread throughout the region where, because not only of its poor record of economic development, but repressive interaction with populations, the state is viewed more as a predatory and suffocating presence than a good Samaritan or even a useful tool. The crisis in Cote d’Ivoire has also been analyzed as one in a long series (not all as dramatic) and attributed to the utter failure of its successive leadership to seize upon numerous opportunities to create the appropriate connection between the post-colonial state and the people. The same can be said of nearly every other state of the sub region that found itself victim of intractable tensions, violence and war. All were caught up in the fundamental, eminently conflict-generating contradiction of societies at odds with the very tool supposed to ensure their security and provide for their other needs. A second, very much-related common internal dimension of all these conflicts is, across the board, a failure of governance on the part of regimes, more or less democratically elected. Even when, starting in 1990, the sub-region and the entire continent started to abandon the repressive policies that characterized earlier years, the outcome was more of the same failures, notwithstanding an opening up of the political space and the empowerment of more socioeconomic groups in society. Old habits are very hard to get rid of, and even the improvements made did not eliminate the proclivity of the political leadership not to adhere to basic tenets of democratic governance. In other words, the extreme tensions and conflicts West Africa has experienced over the last few years are also directly related to what can be referred to as a double deficit in governance (Tagowa, 2017). By failure of governance we mean, not only the mal-governance that has haunted the continent with repressive, ineffective leadership, exclusionary policies, but also the failure of the same leaders to anticipate and adequately address conflicts when they occur. In effect, political tensions and subsequent conflicts are often the result of the manner in which those who have been in power have run the affairs of the polity and treated those who share the same country and who are supposed to enjoy certain rights. When power is used to exclude, to repress, and to deprive some people of their human and political rights and of their birthright to the ‘pursuit of happiness’ as the cliché goes, the logical consequence is the creation of an atmosphere where violent conflict is only a matter of the next trigger. Because of this particular deficit in governance characteristic of so many of the countries affected by conflict (Cote d’Ivoire, guinea Bissau, Guinea notably and others), the conditions were so ripe for conflict that it took only, a coup attempt or some other challenge to the existing order to trigger the spiral of violence. Even more than engaging in such undemocratic and repressive practices, the most remarkable aspect of this deficit is the failure of the typical leadership in West Africa to appreciate perceptively the likely price of their policies. As Raymond Copson has pertinently noted in the mid-1990s, during a period of turmoil in the sub-region,

“mistakenly, leaders believed that they could undermine opportunities for participation without encountering significant opposition from within societies they governed. It turned out, however, that many states were far weaker than their leaders realized, and that in many societies there were sources of opposition with a strong indigenous base. These included factions with a political, ethnic, or clan origin; regionally

based opposition forces; religious movements; and local leaders and strongmen.” (Olukoshi, 2017)

Compounding this miscalculation were serious policy decisions made “with little or no attempt at consultation with affected groups and no genuine effort to accommodate the interests or obtain their consent,” The lines of fracture, be they religious, ethnic, regional or other are not a source of conflict per se, they can very rapidly become the locus of conflict, intentionally or not, as Ero and Temin (and many others) have shown. In an admittedly conflict prone environment with many fracture lines as typical for West African states. This forms the connection with the other governance deficit mentioned above. In Governance as Conflict management William Zartman has noted that “governance is conflict management. Governing a state is not only the prevention of violent conflict from destroying the country; it is the continual effort to handle the ordinary conflicts among groups and their demands which arise as society plays its role in the conduct of normal politics.” (Coning, 2017). As a direct result of these intangible aspects and dynamics of conflicts, a non-democratic government sees retaliatory violence and repression as the only appropriate means of addressing conflicts. In itself, the attitude in itself only exacerbates conflict rather than resolve it. A careful scrutiny of the measured, responsible answer of the democratic Malian government to the recent resumption of the conflict with the Touareg rebellion contrasts starkly with the earlier knee-jerk reactions of previous non democratic governments of the same country (and in neighboring Niger) to what is, after all, a conflict that can find its resolutions more by democratic means than all-out assault. The governance deficit resides also in the unwillingness or inability of many African governments to keep within bounds or adequately resolve and on a timely manner ‘normal’ conflicts and thereby allow them to escalate into even more complex and deadly confrontations. With lightening speed, these conflicts reach well beyond the given government’s ability to cope with them, even more so because it is not democratic to begin with, and has not developed popular and institutional capacity to handle the legitimacy and the confidence of the societal groups involved to increase the likelihood of success.

The problem of 'peacekeeping' in West Africa

The UN and the rest of the international community face seemingly insurmountable hurdles in trying to bring stability to conflict-ridden African states. The problem of effective intervention is almost as complex as the type of conflicts that demand efforts at amelioration, and the obstacles are conceptual, contextual, political, and practical in nature (Khobe, 2010). In the absence of political will and public support, of financial and other resources, and of a 'recipe' for success which is acceptable to their own populations and to Africa, luke-warm Western commitments to the resolution of African conflicts are fast growing cold. For the past decade, African conflicts have been characterised by the combination of an internal or international conflict with serious human rights violations and large scale suffering among the threatened civilian population, which has inevitably resulted in large numbers of refugees and displaced persons. Many of these conflicts have deep-rooted causes, such as: a lack of coincidence between nation and state, ethnic tensions and the suppression of minorities; corrupt and dictatorial regimes; support for such regimes by international arms traders; chronic poverty and underdevelopment; and a grinding debt burden. However erroneously, the resources and energies of the international community tend to be mobilised around the symptoms, rather than the causes of such conflicts particularly when these include genocide or civil war. The situation is further complicated by the fact that most of Africa's actual and potential conflicts are internal ones within the state, which impedes international attempts to broker peace. The perceived futility of attempting to solve African crises was finally realised

when the international community tried to save the people of Somalia from self-destruction in an operation which lasted from 1992 to 1995. The three-year UN intervention in Somalia cost the international community over \$1 685 million. A total of 150 peacekeepers died - 114 as a result of hostile acts. The death of eighteen United States soldiers on 3 October 1993 had an indelible impact on US policy on multilateral peace operations. In May 1994, the Clinton Administration's Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) decreed that the US would not intervene in future crises unless American national interests were clearly at stake, and the mission had clear and limited objectives, including a well-defined exit strategy. UN officials involved in the mission were left with a conviction that the use of force should be avoided in future peace operations, as the degree of destruction in Somalia was not matched by the achievement of overall (political) mission objectives (Obi, 2019). The US, on the other hand, ascribed mission failure to the fact that not enough force was used. The UN Secretary General was left with the black and white options of either defensive peacekeeping or high intensity enforcement. Somalia was thus the turning-point, at which the international community lost all desire to experiment further with 'middle ground' operations in Africa. Nowhere was this 'Somalia effect' so dramatically and tragically demonstrated as in the nearby tiny country of Rwanda. In the presence of a weakly supported and grossly under-resourced UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, as many as 500 000 civilians were killed between April and August 1994. Throughout the worst of the massacre, UNAMIR had fewer than 500 soldiers deployed. It is estimated that, of a total population of approximately seven million, a further three million were internally displaced, and more than two million fled to neighbouring countries. As the then UN Secretary-General observed, the international community's delayed reaction to the genocide in Rwanda demonstrated graphically its extreme inadequacy to respond with prompt and decisive action to humanitarian crises entwined with armed conflict in Africa (Arthur, 2010).

It is clear that the UN 'peacekeeping family' will remain extremely reluctant to intervene in African crises for the foreseeable future. A large part of this family is already immersed in the SFOR operation in the former Yugoslavia, and will likely remain engaged in the inevitable follow-on mission. European peace and security is, after all, far more pertinent to the major powers and traditional peacekeeping countries than resolving pernicious conflicts in Africa. Moreover, there is a perceived way out - through teaching select African soldiers basic military skills and the finer points of UN peacekeeping practices, and perhaps supplying them with a bit of equipment. Cynicism aside, there has been considerable progress over the past few years in building African capabilities for the conduct of peace support operations as evidenced by developments at the level of the OAU and in the conduct of major sub regional peacekeeping exercises. External powers have also begun to realise the necessity for co-ordinating bilateral training initiatives. However, the great flaw in African capacity-building initiatives is the very element that makes them more politically acceptable to Africans - the failure to establish a credible linkage between capacity-building and capacity utilisation. The alternative, of course, is for Africa to accept the necessity to form regional coalitions of the willing to take care of its peace support operations. But this requires a strong military alliance such as NATO in the former Yugoslavia, or a lead nation willing to play a role akin to that of Italy in Albania, Russia in the CIS, and Nigeria in West Africa. Beyond token participation in 'safe' UN missions, Africans will only be able to convert peacekeeping capacity into meaningful outcomes when the prevalence of national interests is openly acknowledged, when a measure of partiality is accepted, and when countries are willing to employ force against armed resistance to a legitimate mandate. Very few countries are willing to acknowledge this fact, let alone to make the sacrifices required by a more robust concept for intervention.

ECOWAS and Peace Building

Explaining the reduced involvement, several explanations can be offered for ECOWAS' inactive participation in international peace building efforts in West Africa. The first is that the organisation has inadequate financial capacity to undertake the major initiatives required to place post-conflict societies on the path to reconstruction (Engel and Gomes, 2016). This is especially the case with the rebuilding of collapsed infrastructure. Second and related to this is that ECOWAS lacks the technical capacity to support socio-economic and institutional infrastructure in a sustained manner. Indeed, the reality is that many ECOWAS member states are themselves ripe for pre-conflict peace building required to consolidate democracy and prevent an outbreak of violence. Notwithstanding these obvious challenges, ECOWAS has failed to capitalize on its true strengths which can potentially underpin the international peace building agenda in West Africa. The real value of ECOWAS lies in its superior knowledge of the region, deep commitment of many member states to regional security and integration, and a sound normative framework that can provide the basis for systematic peace building in the region. Indeed, the missing link in the external involvement in peace building in West Africa is precisely what ECOWAS has in abundance. Its commitment to relationship building, and a normative framework to implement a comprehensive peace building agenda. ECOWAS has not been able to make the best use of its own peace and security structures for sustained engagement in peace building. Indeed, the missing link for a long time has been the absence of a framework for translating its normative instruments into operational tools. Two of such instruments are particularly worthy of mention. The first is its Mechanism for handling conflicts, which was institutionalized by the 1999 Protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. The Protocol established a number of institutions to address peace and security. These include, for example, the Council of Elders (now Council of the Wise); the Authority of Heads of States and Governments; the Mediation and Security Council; the Defense and Security Commission; Special Representatives of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary; and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) all which perform different but inter-related functions.

The ECOMOG force remains an important component of the region's security architecture. Indeed, the 1999 Protocol called for the establishment of a stand-by force of a Brigade size consisting specially trained and equipped units of national armies ready to be deployed at short notices. All the 15 ECOWAS states pledged one battalion each to the proposed force. Under the Protocol, the force was mandated to be used under four conditions (Horsfall, 2011): (a) aggression or conflict within a member state; a conflict two or more member states; internal conflicts that threaten to trigger humanitarian disaster, pose a serious threat to sub-regional peace and security, result in serious and massive violations of human rights, and/or follow the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically-elected government; and any other situation that the Mediation and Security Council deems appropriate. Indeed, ECOWAS forward looking approach in institutionalizing ECOMOG is of great benefit to the continental body, the African Union, which established a peace and security architecture in 2003, including among other things, the African Standby Force, which composes five regional brigades and is to become operational by 2010.

ECOWAS and the Challenges of Regulation of Regional Security in West Africa

The ECOWAS efforts in peacekeeping and peace enforcement have not been without challenges. The coordination of ECOWAS in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations cover a wide range of territorial space that has poor transport and communication networks with several patterns of conflict dynamics across the states in West Africa. The

pattern of the conflicts in the West African sub region also motivated the changes in the pattern of ECOWAS security governance from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. The ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra-Leone marked the beginning of peace enforcement in entirely different ways. Before the conflicts in the Mano River region, the pattern of ECOWAS security governance has been on an ad-hoc basis or sealed in protocols (Adebajo & Adebajo, 2002; Integrated Regional Information Network for West Africa, 1998). These protocols framed the perceptions and responses to security challenges along external threats. For instance, the 1978 protocol on non-aggression signed in Lagos and the 1981 protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense signed in Freetown was based on the aforesaid prevailing security thinking of externalities of threats (Osadolor, 2011; Kabia, 2009). The post-Cold War security threats are more internal to West Africa because of the predominant use of small and light weapons among different ethnic groups, rendering the conflicts in the region highly intractable and far-reaching in terms of humanitarian consequences (Malu, 2003). These dynamics showed that ECOWAS misjudged the nature of the security challenges confronting West Africa (Ukeje, 2015; Howe, 1996). The new challenges of security governance in the sub region which most states are facing in West Africa informed the reason for ECOWAS not preferring to regard internal conflicts as internal affairs of member states. The Mano River region conflicts no doubt challenged ECOWAS to re-examine its security mechanism and ignore the noninterference in internal affairs of states doctrine by deploying the first contingents of the ECOMOG military intervention to bring peace and security to Liberia in the 1990s (Adebajo & Adebajo, 2002; Kabia, 2009). The level of violence in Liberia involving the ragtag military operation that had no regards for human rights with accompanied abuses of the rules governing war, led ECOMOG to change its mode of operation to peace enforcement (Kabia, 2009; Engel & Gomes, 2016). Despite the fact that the import of peace enforcement under the Nigerian leadership of ECOMOG was treated with suspicion, militarization appeared necessary to contain both real and potential violent threats to life and property in the region, its very nature becoming a threat to peace and notions of sovereignty and independence (Iwilade & Agbo, 2012). Another challenge ECOWAS is confronted with is the polarisation of member states along colonial history, which greatly undermines its capabilities of countering security challenges that the sub region faces. The impact of colonialism affects the effectiveness of ECOWAS, in that the division along Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone identities creates division among the Heads of States and Governments of member states, making it difficult for the supranational organisation to achieve a common front for West Africa. The differences in colonial history and languages in West Africa further influence the different patterns of ideological orientation of member states also because the Heads of States and Governments of ECOWAS are more disposed, sympathetic and passionate to issues and resolutions that affect their own people. The implication is mutual suspicion and distrust, which creates tension between some of the states (Iwilade & Agbo, 2012). The most disturbing aspect is that the majority if not all the Francophone countries have a French military base in their states, which France often uses to maintain authoritarian regimes that pledge loyalty to Paris in the sub region. The case of Cote d'Ivoire Crisis is an example (Kabia, 2009). Even though ECOWAS responded quite robustly to the changing security complexes in West Africa, it has yet to develop the capacity to effectively respond to the various conflict dynamics in the sub region. The ECOWAS still depends significantly on the logistical support of the international community, particularly of the Western countries, for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The support otherwise provided by the United Nations and France has had serious implications on the legitimacy of ECOWAS peacekeeping mission in the recent Cote d'Ivoire crisis (Obi, 2009; Maiangwa, 2015). Nevertheless, ECOWAS also depend on the willingness of regional hegemonic countries like

Nigeria to take the burden of the political, military and financial costs of peacekeeping or peace-enforcing in the sub region (Iwilade & Agbo, 2012). It also follows that Nigeria is confronted with the Boko Haram insurgency, which constrains its support for ECOWAS in responding to the West African security complexes (Maiangwa, 2015). Furthermore, one of the most silent but potent challenges of ECOWAS are institutional and democratic deficits.

Conclusion

This study was set out to respond to the pertinent question of; did of the transformation of the securitization strategy from peacekeeping to peace enforcement bring effective regulations of security in West Africa? What are the challenges deterring ECOWAS from achieving its goals? The study revealed that ECOMOG is a mechanism adopted by ECOWAS in the face of excruciating security challenges that have undermined its goals of economic integration and development. Particularly from the 1990s, West Africa experienced several internal conflicting relations among member states. There was the understanding that ECOWAS countries could not have engaged member states in meaningful and profitable relationship necessary for economic integration and development in an atmosphere heralded by insecurity, hence the adoption of ECOMOG as a mechanism to keep and enforce peace and security in West Africa.

Recommendations:

1. The regulations of peace and security should begin from the perspectives of the people after the culmination of the peacekeeping operation.
2. New member should work on their internal democratic institutional frameworks, governance and economic systems to measure up with the standard required before admitting them into ECOWAS.
3. The ECOWAS should encourage member states to work on their regulatory agencies and other institutions, whose weaknesses form the basis for the insecurity in the sub region and the reason for which peace enforcement efforts are deployed.
4. The rooted nature of the rule of law and the protection of fundamental human rights of the people, as well as the respect for and protection of the minorities should be a cardinal requirements for admission into ECOWAS.

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Transitivity, Power and Ideology in Selected Pentecostal Sermons in Nigeria

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Abstract

This paper is aimed at exploring the relations between linguistic structures and ideologies construed in religious texts. Premised on Halliday's transitivity framework based in Systemic Functional Linguistics, this study investigates and reveals how Pentecostal pastors manipulate language in their sermons in order to express ideological messages to their congregations from a semantic-grammatical point of view. Consequently, this paper seeks to investigate how ideology and persuasion are realized through the six process types (material, mental, relational, verbal, existential and behavioral) that constitute part of the ideational function. The selected sermons were divided into clauses and the process types (material, mental, relational, verbal, existential & behavior) were identified and compared. The analysis reveals that the preachers of the selected sermons give prominence to the use of material and relational processes seeming to focus exclusively on the actions of physical nature and make links between actions and actors with some qualities associated with them.

Key words: Transitivity, Power, Ideology

Introduction

Despite economic progress and development, religion still remains a significant part of people's lives. Religion is one of the most relevant factors that shape the worldview and lifestyle of every believer, and the relationships in the society in general. Every religion is based on belief in supernatural powers, organized worship of God or gods and the necessity to follow a certain set of rules and regulations prescribed to believers. In the modern world, the role religion plays is as important as it was a thousand years ago. However, nowadays, due to globalization, most weight is born by main world religions – Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, while ethnic religions are left with fewer followers. This is what is also typical of African continent in general and Nigeria in particular.

Religion, through its institutions, the church in particular, transfers its ideology to its followers and by this, molds their thinking, behavior, and relationships with other people, and consequently forms public consciousness. No other form of worldview can be compared to religion in its strength and depth of influence on minds and feeling of people. In recent decades, there have appeared numerous studies devoted to the analysis of linguistic elements

of religious discourse, and issues of its theoretic modelling. However, many aspects of religious discourse still remain unstudied or incompletely analyzed. One of them is the phenomenon of power and its linguistic representations in religious discourse even though religion has always been considered as a part of power relations and discursive practices that regulate people's lives (Foucault, 1980). Religious discourse is a specific type of discourse that is formed by regular sermons that are given based on particular doctrine – ideology. Thus, this research is based on the assumption that religious discourse is shaped by relations of power in society and is carried out in order to investigate such linguistic manifestations in Nigerian Pentecostal sermons.

This work is done in the stream of critical discourse analysis with religious discourse as its object of study, and is particularly premised on Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics. Through these devices it is possible to highlight power in religious discourse which is the main focus in the study, so it is likely to link social practice and linguistic practice as they are presented in the sermons. The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between language, power and ideology in Nigerian Pentecostal sermons by revealing the implicit intentions of the explicit linguistic elements and showing how various language structures reflect church ideology.

Literature Review

Power and knowledge enjoin together in discourse. According to Hutcheon (1981), discourse is not just an instrument of domination, instead, it is an instrument of power. It is widely known that power is an instrument for social construction of reality. In line with this, discourse is considered as a tool of power and ideological control. Foucault (1979) propounds that discourse conveys, produces, and maintains power. A preacher's power is a tool for social reproduction and domination in the church setting.

Systemic Functional Linguistics presents a powerful framework for Transitivity System. It is a kind of language analysis developed by Halliday (1985). While traditional grammar is concerned with the study of the function of linguistic entities within a sentence or a clause, Halliday's grammar, on the other hand, is concerned not with the grammatical functions of linguistic entities but with their social meanings. Zhuanglin (1988), cited in Wang (2010, p. 254), points out that "Functional Grammar aims at revealing that language is a means of social interaction and that the linguistic choices that people make when they speak or write are socially determined; they reflect how the participants in a given discourse see themselves, other people, and the world."

Within the framework of Systemic Functional Grammar, every language has three metafunctions: the ideational function, the interpersonal function, and the textual function (Wang, 2010, p. 255). For the purpose of the present research, the interest is the ideational function. The ideational function is concerned with the way the speaker or writer experiences the world. These experiences can be physiological or psychological, which means that it includes the speaker's or writer's actions, reactions, cognitions, and perceptions (Halliday, 1971, p. 332). By this function, the speaker or writer conveys new information, communicates ideas that their addressee does not know about. The ideational function is mainly represented by transitivity, which "specifies the different types of processes that are recognized in the language" (Halliday, 1985, p. 101). By "processes", Halliday means verbs or experiences of doing, happening, feeling, and being (Halliday, 1985, p. 101). The term "process" covers 'all phenomena... and anything that can be expressed by a verb: event whether physical or not, state, or relation' (Halliday, 1976, p. 159).

Transitivity is crucial in CDA as it is believed that different social structures and values require different patterns of transitivity. It means that it can demonstrate "how

speakers/writers encode in language their mental reflection of the world and how they account for their experience of the world around them” (Mehmood, et al., 2014).

Transitivity is not about the traditional grammatical classification of verbs into transitive verbs and intransitive ones; rather transitivity is a semantic concept which is concerned with meaning and it is a practical tool for examining how the speaker or writer sees or experiences the world. To put it differently, transitivity reveals the speaker’s mind-set, worldview, and ideology. Language is not a neutral medium; it is a tool through which people express their will to power and their desire to control the world around them. Language, argues Carter (1997, p. 12), is not isolated from “the power of those who use it or control its use or enforce its use on others.” In this respect, analyzing transitivity in language is an effective procedure to uncover the hegemonic and ideological aspects of its use.

The transitivity model consists of six processes: (i) material processes, (ii) relational processes, (iii) mental processes, (iv) verbal processes, (v) behavioral processes, and (vi) existential processes. These processes represent the actions of doing, being, sensing, saying, behaving and existing respectively.

Thus, the aim of this study is to analyze how various transitivity processes affect the realization of ideology and persuasion in Nigerian Pentecostal sermons. In line with the aim, the following objectives have been adopted:

1. to analyze the distribution of the six transitivity processes in Nigerian Pentecostal sermons;
2. to assess their role in the realization of ideology and persuasion in Nigerian Pentecostal sermons.

The paper seeks to answer the following research questions:

1. How are the six transitivity processes distributed in Nigerian Pentecostal sermons?
2. What role each of the processes play in the realization or ideology and persuasion in Nigerian Pentecostal sermons?

Methodology

The population of this study consists of Pentecostal sermons from preachers of some megachurches in Nigeria regardless of their location since the sermons will be collected from websites, TV broadcasts, or where possible, and live services. Geographically, the research has not been restricted to a particular city, state or zone. It is aimed to have a broad overview of Nigerian Pentecostal discourse with representation from various Pentecostal churches which have their headquarters all over the country.

Thus, six sermons of six different Pentecostal churches from various parts of Nigeria were selected for this study:

1. “Wisdom for Abundance” by Pastor David Ibiyeomie, Salvation Ministires (Part-Harcourt, Rivers State);
2. “When Money Fails” by Apostle Johnson Suleiman, Omega Fire Ministries International (Auchi, Edo State);
3. “Prosperity” by Rev. Biodun Fatoyinbo, Common Wealth of Zion Assembly, or COZA (Abuja, FCT);
4. “Godly Principles of Supernatural Success” by Pastor David Enenche, Dunamis International Gospel Centre (Abuja, FCT);
5. “Steps to Kingdom Prosperity” by David Oyedepo, The Living Faith Church a.k.a. Winners’ Chapel (Ota, Ogun state);
6. “You can’t Afford to Be Poor” by Pastor Chris Oyakhilome, Christ Embassy (Lagos, Lagos State).

There are three stages of analysis in this work. First of all it is to transcribe the selected sermons from audio from audio or video formats to words. For the purpose of analysis, five sermons were used. All of them are sermons on wealth and prosperity delivered by Pentecostal preachers of some mega churches in various parts of Nigeria. The second stage comprises of examining the causal structure of the sermons and identifying transitivity verbs in them. The quantitative results of this stage will be presented in form of a table. Here, it should be noted that certain rules must be followed to calculate the number or verb processes (Halliday, 1971, p.1) only finite clauses are going to be included in the analysis: adverbial clauses, object clauses, non-defining relative clauses; 2) non-finite clauses – to-infinitive, present and past participle clauses; and embedded clauses – subject, predicative, appositive and defining relative clauses, are excluded from the analysis. Finally, the third stage presupposes interpretation of various functions of processes of each type taking into account the social and cultural background of the discourse and their role in establishing power relations between the speaker and the audience

Results and Discussion

Table 1: Distribution of the Six Processes as Presented in the Selected Sermons

Sermon 1	Relational	Material	Mental	Verbal	Existential	Behavioural
	26%	24.5%	22.6%	21%	3.1%	2.8%
Sermon 2	Relational	Material	Mental	Verbal	Existential	Behavioural
	34%	32.1%	14.7%	14.1%	3.3%	1,8%
Sermon 3	Material	Relational	Mental	Verbal	Existential	Behavioural
	34.4%	33.3%	15%	13.1%	3.5%	0.7%
Sermon 4	Material	Verbal	Relational	Mental	Existential	Behavioural
	30.8%	23.2%	20.4%	18%	5.3%	2.3%
Sermon 5	Relational	Material	Mental	Verbal	Existential	Behavioural
	41%	24.2%	18.2%	12.3%	3.8%	0.5%
Sermon 6	Relational	Material	Mental	Verbal	Existential	Behavioural
	38%	28.5%	16,4%	12%	4%	1.1%

The table above shows how the six transitivity processes are distributed in the sermons under analysis. Having analyzed the sermons, it was found that Nigerian preachers use particular strategies to guide their audience to accepting the ideas that they want to transmit to them, and the content of the sermons obviously shows the outcomes of one accepting and practicing those ideas, and those who reject them.

Analysis of Material Processes

What role do material processes play in the realization of ideology and persuasion in the analyzed sermons?

Material process is one of the two most frequently used process types in the selected sermons. Material process shows the outer world of people. They also show various physical actions and happenings of events (Rehman, 2020). In most of the cases the examples of material clauses are taken from the stories from life that the pastor is using to illustrate his teachings. They imply patterns of actions that are undergone or carried out by their actors: *One day pandemic **hit** them... how come this disease **did not hit** Africa like that; You **go and handle** Sunday school; Some people **would have collected** that money; You **are walking** on the road...*

In some of the cases of material clauses, we observe how the pastor criticizes people, to show that what they do is not always right according to his understanding. Some of them are used to paint a bleak picture, show a negative outcome of what people do. These clauses can refer to some characters from Apostle's stories, to his audience, or generally to everyone (with the actor 'you'): *You **get** everything in a hurry; You **are working** for a car. You **are working** to buy a house; ... when you **go after** money...; When you **take** what is not yours; ... and you **were given** money for constituency project... **Do** the project...; Money **can be gotten** illegally through robbery.*

Material processes are used to denote future happenings, instructions: *...that today every yolk of life **shall be destroyed**; so you **don't look for** money, you **look for** wisdom; you **can't build** a sanctuary in poverty. No poor man **can build** a house of God.*

There were identified a number of material process with God as its Agent. It gives audience impression that God is a living God, performing actions that can also be experienced in their lives, and give a sense of security: *God **has given** us all things to enjoy; Jesus **came** only for sin, but he also **came** to bring you out of poverty. Jesus **came**...; I'm [God] **gonna do** the same thing to you; God **blesses** you...*

Material processes performed by the pastor are used to describe his actions at the moment of speaking, thus drawing the audience closer to himself: *I'm **taking** you to that realm; I **lift** my hands towards you...*

There are also examples of sequences of material processes. These show how acts succeed one another, which enhances the dynamics of the narration and creates a dramatic atmosphere: *And the man **went** to the shop. He **did** everything.... They **loaded**... They **were loading and loading**. He **sent** his account. They **credited** it...; When you **rob** people, when you **defraud** people, when you **collect**, what is not yours, you **chance** people, you **take advantage** of people. You **take advantage** of people; They **give** people money to go for health care, health check and the rest. And she never **went** for it. They **gave** people hospital allowance. She **didn't go**, and she **came back** and **refunded** the money.*

There are several instances of material clauses that talk about abstract notions: *When you **begin to avoid** what is not yours, you **open** door for what is yours. When you **start closing** door to what is not yours, you **open** the door to what is yours.*

A lot of material processes with abstract nouns as their actors are present in the sermons. Some of them carry revelational ideas, other simply express some future events: *Quality of spirituality **affects** quality of destiny; ... spirituality **establishes** sensitivity; they **have passed** the test of time. So those principles **will succeed** irrespective of time frame.*

A high number of material processes in the sermons indicates that the texts are to a great extent concerned with tangible physical actions, doings, happenings, movements and event, and the people who perform those actions. (Awuku, 2018)

Material processes address various social issues such as stealing, assisting people in need, etc. Besides, the analysis suggests that the clauses of material process are not descriptive clauses, but those with directed actions (Awuku, 2018). In these clauses the position of participants is taken by various people, including God, money, and other abstract notions. The preachers rarely use the universal you as the actor of material process, rather

they talk about other people and their experience, however the audience can easily understand whether those actions are approved of by the preacher, or not.

A high frequency of material process in the sermons creates a sense of occurrence and actions (Awuku, 2018). It also has to do with the fact that Christian religion is linked to actions, doings, happenings and movement. Besides, sermons instructs the followers of Christ on what to do and what not to do, which also predetermines a lot of actions.

Material processes are used to create pictures of situations of how things would not be done, or vice versa, how one should act. Preachers often present a world of one vice or another: stealing, being stingy, etc. Material processes are also used for this purpose. Normally, the actors of such activities are imaginary characters. Material processes are engaged to depict various religious issues: seeking God, sowing seed, etc.

Analysis of Relational Processes

What role do relational processes play in the realization of ideology and persuasion in the analyzed sermons?

Relational process is another most frequently used process type. It is the process of being and having. It construes the relations between things, facts, ideas without assistance from within. (Rehman, 2020) Relational processes were used to

1. introduce, identify and define phenomena, locate the position of things or people: *We **are** still in the month of wisdom...; Where **is** wealth found?; So wealth **is** a by-product of wisdom; Wisdom **is** knowing the scriptural way to go, the scriptural steps to take and the scriptural things to do.*

2. to give attributive characteristics to things, people, actions, ideas, etc.: *Any need I meet **is** supernatural; Those horns **represent** satanic forces; ... abuse **is** inevitable; after thousands of years Israel still **has** the wealth...*

3. to address the audience and express wanted or unwanted behavior and characteristics of the congregation: *... many of us **are** deceived; I **can't** be poor; ... you **will** never **be** poor in the name of Jesus; ... **don't** be religious*

4. to mock certain actions: *I **don't** need this kind of teaching [...] I'm comfortable. I **have** an appointment. I **have** some money.*

5. to transfer the ideas of positive thinking and promises that everything is going to be good if you are with God. Most of them are related to money, since this is the topic of the sermon: *You **are** a child of the most high God; You **have** a destiny of prosperity with God; [wisdom] that **guarantees** you escape route from financial shame; ... where you **will not** **lack**; ... it is not in God...*

6. to convince the audience of certain ideas, and make them believe that things should be considered as such. The speaker says them bluntly, without any sign of hesitation attributes things particular characteristics that render them either good or bad: *Money **is** not your God; Money **can** become valueless. Money **can** become worthless. Money **can** become useless; The essence of money **is** to help the poor. The essence of money **is** your community; Collecting what is not yours **is** not smartness; Because stinginess **is** loud.*

7. Introduce and identify various phenomena: *One of the major reasons why Jesus Christ died **was** to give us quality relationship with his father...; Our objective, [...], **is** knowing the godly qualities that guarantee supernatural financial success; The principles [that can make a person to succeed on earth] **will be** the principles [that will guarantee his success in eternity]; The first harvest **is** the harvest of finance. The second harvest **is** the harvest of miracles. The third harvest **is** the harvest of soul; Kingdom prosperity **is** a work, not a game; Prosperity in the kingdom **is** a results of our work with God in the covenant, not an issue of chance or luck*

Relational processes are also used to establish relationships between known and unknown, spiritual and physical. In the data for this study, relational process depicts God's relationship with people, and focuses in the relationship that already exists or should exist among people.

Both the attributive and identifying categories of relational process were discovered. The relational process that is used to present one phenomenon in terms of another one is called identifying relational process and is also abundantly presented in the selected sermon. Relational identifying clauses are used to present the world of suffering. As it is stated by Wierzbicka (2001), suffering is considered a major problem of human existence. This is why it is not surprising that people suffering one affliction or another are addressed in the sermons. However, if one follows the word of God and those principles laid out by Him in the Bible, the suffering will be aborted, and one will be blessed, comforted and will be shown mercy instead. Attributive relational clauses make texts more descriptive, they are used to describe what the life of Christians is expected to be: *You **are** a giver; Your goal, your vision, your pursuit **should be** the kingdom; **Be** content. **Be** satisfied; **Be** patient! Shortcut is the longest cut. **Be** patient.*

Most of the examples of relational processes in the sermons are used to show the existence of some relationship between an object and its identity or quality: *I'm broke; You **become** a victim; The church today **has become** the body of Christ; The house **is looking** ugly. The house **is looking** terrible; ... he **is** a generational asset; **Is** your prayer life solid?*

Generally speaking, the relational transitivity process in the sermons represent the major aim of religious texts: to show the relationship between the current state of life and the glory that is going to be revealed later if all the principles and commandments are adhered to (Awuku, 2018).

The relational process was observed to be used by preachers to obtain power through the process of self-identification. It is also observed how they portray themselves positively, while highlighting the negative feature of their audience: *If I be a man of God...; I **was** in one of the best churches. I **was** on the two TV stations. I **was** on the billboard; ... and we **didn't have** a house. We **didn't have** our own property. But we **had** some money.*

Analysis of Mental Processes

What role do mental processes play in the realization of ideology and persuasion in the analyzed sermons?

Mental process is one of the major types generally (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004), and in almost all the analyzed sermons it takes the 3rd position. The list of mental process verbs include such as: *think, understand, discover, get acquainted, get to know, remember, want, consider, believe.*

Preachers also assume that the people they are addressing with their sermon are aware of certain things, and alludes to them during the preaching. The audience are also reminded of the things they are expected to do: *What **do** you **need to know** about buoyancy or spirituality?; Honor Him! Honor Him!; ...**appreciate** Him for His faithfulness, **appreciate** Him for His mercies...; Preachers are also aware of what people might have in their minds, the emotions, and feelings they might experience, the perceptions of the world their audience might have: *Now you **understand** the reason...; By now you **should understand** the way...;**

*By now you **should know**...; Some people think...* So based on this, preacher are able to introduce new ideas to their congregations, transfer the new visions and create a new world view.

Thus, preachers emphasize on certain things that are relevant for their congregation, and calling upon their cognition and feelings in order for them to embrace the new knowledge transferred to them. These verbs of mental process construe a world where people

are stimulated to think, know, and remember. It means that the congregations are not expected to take the message as it is, rather they are free to think it through, remember certain things and make connections that will help them create their understanding of what is being taught.

The point here is that the preacher use the current knowledge and perceptions of their audience in order to give them something new which goes in accordance with their own vision, Christian outlook and ideology. In bringing their knowledge and experiences to their congregations, preachers were able to draw a line between what the audience have been told before and their current knowledge, and what they, preachers, have come to tell their congregations.

Mental processes were used in the sermons to activate the minds and emotions of members of the church, make them change their behavior and attitude, a general world outlook: *You must understand; Do not like! Do not desire!; So don't only think...; You are deceiving yourself..* Often, we can observe that preachers talk about their own feelings, cognition, sensing, attitudes: *I hate what is not my own. Anything that is not mine, I hate it. I hate it with passion; I have learnt...; and I will enjoy life.* (Liu & Jia, 2020)

The mental process depicts a high level of emotionalism in the sermons under analysis (Awuku, 2018). The preachers, being the most commonly used sensor of the mental process, are depicted as provokers and at the same time, being provoked by emotions (Awuku, 2018).

Analysis of Verbal Processes

What role do verbal processes play in the realization of ideology and persuasion in the analyzed sermons?

Verbal processes in the selected sermons were one of the most numerous groups of processes. They involve such verbs as: *say, talk, speak, command, read, preach, quarrel, give testimony, testify, advise, claim, mention.* Such a high number of verbal clauses can be explained by a high level of intertextuality of the sermons. Preachers exhibit their knowledge of the Bible. The recurrent citations of biblical verses make the texts of the sermons credible, and maintain the authority of the preachers as the main carriers of the Word of God.

Verbal processes were applied in order to shower praises or request for. Preacher use verbal process to tell (*Let me share with you in brief...; I'm telling you a true story of which people can verify here*), command (*Don't just talk anyhow. Cry out! Speak with boldness; shout 'Amen' like thunder!; Say with me, ...!; Tell your neighbour...*), direct the congregation to take particular actions (*I'm not talking about cutting corners, I'm talking about cutting covenants*), or to caution them against certain things (*I've advised you...*), express possibility talk (*Let me prophesy...*).

Verbal processes are usually realized by direct and indirect quotation. Direct quotation means that the speaker cites the words from prominent people in his text. Its aim is to enforce the credibility of his text by using the words of prominent people (Liu & Jia, 2020). Preachers cite these words from Bible to make his speech more reliable and consolidate his authoritative status (Zhang, 2017), Indirect speech is used to express opinions indirectly by paraphrasing the speech of others (Liu & Jia, 2020)

Verbal processes also reflect mental operations: preachers quote those speeches that they find relevant for the audience to hear. This also increases credibility of the content (Liu & Jia, 2020).

Analysis of Behavioral and Existential Processes

What role do behavioral and existential processes play in the realization of ideology and persuasion in the analyzed sermons?

Behavioral process is generally considered a minor process (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004) and is barely represented in the sermons. The verbs of behavioral process include such examples as look, cry, laugh

There are just a few existential processes spotted in each of the analysed sermons, which is normal as existential clauses are usually very low in number in most of the texts (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004). Existential processes are those of ‘being’, and define existence of an entity. One of their functions is to introduce new information which is easy to identify due to the typical structure of existential clauses. These type of clauses lack flexibility and richness in expressing ideas, this is why they are rather unpopular in the analyzed texts (Shi & Fan, 2019), even though the information conveyed in them might be valuable for the audience: *There is a law of seedtime...; In Malachi chapter 3, there is a thing...; There is no future in a career, but there is a future in a covenant; There is a supernatural dimension of rest.*

4. Conclusion

The analysis of sermons based on critical analysis has shown that transitivity theory is an effective tool of CDA (Shi & Fan, 2019). By means of sermons preacher educate their audience, spread their values and ideologies which are reflected in the process selection of the transitivity system.

Material and relational processes, with strong power and determination, take up the largest portion of all the clauses with more or less equal distribution in the text. Prevalence of material and relational types of processes reveal a more physical nature of the sermon as compared to conscious unravelling and psychological revelations. Examples from the sermons reveal that the relational process is a useful means of describing and clearly stating the attributes of a Christian and contrasting them to those alien to the Christian teaching. Relational processes are also a effective means of attracting listeners’ attention and enlivening the atmosphere.

A lot of definition have been expressed with help of relational clauses that aid pastors in transmitting their visions, ideas to the audience. It is also used to explain some complex relationships between abstract items in such a way that they become definite and more tangible for the listeners and enables the audience to relate to them. Relational processes, especially those of being, elaborate the relations between the speaker’s ideals and beliefs, which allows the audience to naturally accept and internalize them. Relational processes, as a convenient way of expressing opinions, are used to affect people’s cognition and indicate relations between two terms or phenomena. Which demands for a careful selection of words.

It was revealed that audience presents one of the most prominent entity participating in all the processes of the sermons. Preachers represent their congregations as being directly engaged in the process of their sermons, which is not unexpected. It is vital for the preacher to construct with the help of lexico-grammatical tools and later maintain their solidarity with the audience. This is especially relevant for “creation and maintenance or a religious community” (Ingold, 2014, p. 95).

The analysis also revealed that irrespective of the choice of linguistic forms by the preachers, all of them serve for the same theme of the discourse, and are used to influence listeners’ perception, attitudes, values and behavior. Therefore preachers’ linguistic choices become “a potentially powerful site for the dominance of mind” (Teo, 2000, p.9). Preachers manipulate their congregations to interpret the information in a particular way, as the language and linguistic forms they use are infused with certain ideologies.

Recommendation

It is recommended that further research is undertaken in this area that will study several sermons of the same pastor in order to see whether the distribution of processes is consistent in different sermons and how it affects the realization of ideologies of the preacher and contributes to his/her persuasive strategies.

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Ideology Propagation and Language of Selected Nigerian Agitation Groups

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Abstract

Working within the tenets of Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA), this study investigates linguistic resources employed by three selected Nigerian agitation groups in propagating their respective ideologies. Several research works have been carried out previously by scholars in the area of language/identity, but to the best of our knowledge not much has been done on the language of militancy in the propagation of group ideology. It is against this background that the present study explored the tenets of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyse language for ideology as used by the selected Nigerian agitation groups: the Niger Delta Militants (NDM), Boko Haram sect (BH) and Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). As a qualitative research, content study was used as research design to critically explore linguistic devices evident in warnings and threats directly issued by the selected agitation groups. Data for the study comprised three direct speeches credited to the groups' spokespersons as published by Nigerian newspapers and the groups' websites between 2007 and 2019. These direct speeches were downloaded electronically between August-November 2019. These collated speeches were used as data for this study. Findings of the study revealed that ideology of the groups are indexed in the linguistic choices made by the spokespersons of the selected agitation groups. Results of the analysed data revealed that the IPOB's ideology centres on perceived marginalisation and self-determination. The BH propagates a religious ideology which centres on islamisation. The NDM's ideology revolves around fiscal federalism and restoration of 'our motherland'. The result revealed that

CDA is a useful tool in analysing ideological positions of agitation groups. The study concluded that writers/speakers, through language resources, communicate both individual and collective ideological positions in consonance with socioeconomic circumstances prevalent in the macro society.

Key Words: Ideology, agitation, language

Introduction

Whether as individuals or groups, language is predominantly used to express whatever people or claim to be and whatever their belief systems they uphold. In other words, various forms of linguistic expressions are employed by groups to communicate their ideology. According to Okoh (2006), “it remains an integral and crucial component of man’s life, indeed his very quintessence; it constitutes some kind of true mirror of how we think, see...” (p.4). Its indispensable role and position remains indispensable in human communication. Jowitt (1991) and Obi-okoye (2008) aver that language is used in social context of communication, in mass media, interpersonal relations, religion and education, etc. Besides other numerous functions, language is useful in political emancipation and group liberation or freedom. It is used to persuade, motivate or convince people.

Different groups use language in diverse ways in the society. This implies that one’s group membership or affinity goes a long way in defining or influencing the way they use language in communication. However, the present study looks at what three selected agitation groups in Nigeria: the Niger Delta Militants (NDM), Boko Haram sect (BH) and Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) do with language. The study investigates how these agitation groups use language in achieving their goals and pressing home their demands

The Niger Delta region of Nigeria became the epicentre of conflict and agitation between 2005 and 2010 in Nigeria. The agitation was a form of resistance against perceived neglect and marginalisation of the indigenous people of the region; an ugly situation which the International Crisis Group (2015) described as a paradox, rich in resources but poor and racked by insecurity. Eastern and Northern Nigeria nevertheless, had their own share and upswing of unrest, violence, tension and agitation between 2010 and 2019. This is consequent upon the activities of agitation groups in those regions and acts of resistance against perceived marginalisation, acts of injustice, insincerity, unfair treatment and violence meted out against the groups. Obviously, there were and there are reasons for these acts of agitations. However, whatever the reasons were or are, the activities of these groups drew attention of the press and the media, analysts and social commentators, as well as the local and international communities. In the academia, the upswing of the agitation created a fertile ground for researchers and language scholars as well as researchers in other disciplines.

One of the reasons for the selection of these three agitation groups is the geographical locations presently occupied by these groups in the Nigerian geopolitical space vis-à-vis the six geopolitical zones: North-Central, North-East, North-West, South-South, South-West and South-East. Activities of these agitation groups during the period under review, created tensions, social apprehension, unrest, security and economic challenges. The Federal Government’s declaration of the IPOB proscription and its counter declaration by the group seem to have heightened the intensity and density of the group’s agitation. The implication of this is that their use of language will expectedly change in order to reflect resistance against perceived socio-political trends that threaten their existence and aspirations. Indeed, the language of resistance changed relatively, and apparently, became harsher as aspersions were/are being cast through the group’s spokespersons, Emma Powerful, and others who

officially speak for the IPOB group. In similitude, the Boko Haram sect's as well as the Niger Delta Militants' ideology appear relatively obvious. Whereas the Niger Delta Militants appear to primarily struggle for resource control, the Boko Haram sect's set agenda seem to revolve around a religious ideology of islamisation of the northern part of Nigeria and probably the entire country subsequently. The preoccupation of this study therefore, is to carry out a critical discourse study of the language used by these groups in communicating their ideology to the public.

Statement of the Problem

Several authors have written on the circumstances surrounding the agitation and ways of curbing the agitations that threatened the unity, stability and peaceful co-existence of the 'multi-ideological' people in a multi-cultural nation. From the linguistic perspective however, not much has been done on the linguistic expressions and choices of words used in the language of communication employed by the selected Nigerian agitation groups in propagating their ideology. In other words, much attention has not been given to linguistic mechanisms directly employed by these groups in communicating their respective ideologies as indexed in their language of communication. Therefore, the present study investigates how selected agitation groups in Nigeria propagate their ideology through the instrumentality of language.

Aim and Objectives of the Study

The aim of this study is to investigate how the three selected agitation groups employ linguistic features in propagating their respective ideologies. Objectives of the study are to;

- i. identify various forms of expressions employed by the agitation groups in propagating their respective ideologies,
- ii. explore the extent to which ideological variations and positions of the groups are indexed in their language,
- iii. investigate institutions or people whom the threats and warnings are directed.

Research Questions

This study finds the answers to the following questions:

- i. What various forms of expressions are employed by the agitation groups in the propagation their respective ideologies?
- ii. To what extent are ideological variations and positions of the groups indexed in language of the Nigerian agitation groups?
- iii. To what institutions or people are the agitation groups' threats and warnings directed.

Literature Review

Critical Discourse Analysis is fundamentally, a literary theory which was given 'birth' by the scholarly contributions of Fairclough, Norman; Wodark, Ruth; Van Dijk Tuen; and Chilton, Paul in 1980s. The quartet were the major proponents this theory which is now widely used as an analytical theory in several disciplines. According to Bloor and Bloor (2007), Critical Discourse Analysis shares interests with other areas or disciplines that study groups such as social groups. This makes it multidisciplinary in nature. As a theory, CDA is both interdisciplinary and subsuming. It examines social practices to describe how they work as well as provides a critique of such practices. It is necessary therefore that the critical

discourse analyst should understand the event or what is going on in such events. Specific areas should be identified and studied in an event. Such could be suffering, danger, injustice, etc. In their words, ‘...it is now widely accepted that many social problems arise from the injudicious use of language or other forms of communication ... CDA can help to raise and point people in the direction of change’ (p.3). Again, CDA shares common features with a similar field, known as critical social research. The concern this field is not only to seek out or trace the origins of social problems but to find fruitful ways of analysing these problems.

As a result of the interdisciplinary nature of CDA, there exists in the literature, different approaches to the theory. However, the Fairclough’s three-dimensional approach is adopted in the present study to analyse the language of the Nigerian agitation groups selected for the study. The CDA approach takes into account: ‘Text’ which accounts for speech, writing, visual image or their combination; ‘Discursive practice’ which has to do with text production and consumption; and ‘Social practice’ which takes into account, the social context. The social context is necessitated by surrounding social circumstances.

Chiluwa (2012) studied how language is instrumentally used in the propagation of group ideological war/position. The study focused only on ideological war or debate between the militant group and the press which the agitation groups perceived as agents of government. Using CDA as one of the theoretical frameworks, the study perceived choice of words and other forms of lexical variations used in identity projection as the ‘live ammunition’ whereas language is the “gun” or ‘carrier’ of the ammunition. However, the study did not investigate how other agitation groups in Nigeria use language to propagate their ideology and possible variations in their language use.

Similarly, studies carried out by the International Crisis Group conducted a study in 2015, Obi, C. (2001), CNN Library (2019), Counter Extremism Project (2019), and Immigration and Refugee Board (2019) showed that the Niger Delta, in southern Nigeria, is a paradox; rich in resources but poor and racked by insecurity. The studies chronicled activities of the groups and lamented on the notion of people ‘suffering in the midst of plenty’. They revealed that language and identity of the insurgents show that the militia groups ‘have clear ideologies and far reaching radicalism. Summary of the findings in these studies revealed that violence in the Niger Delta may soon increase unless the Nigerian government acts quickly and decisively to address ‘long-simmering grievances’.

Methodology

Data for the study was sourced directly from online newspapers and websites of the groups. Direct speeches issued by the spokespersons of the groups were published by the online media. The online warnings/threats were downloaded electronically between August and September 2019. From the collated data, three texts (one for each of the three groups) were selected for analysis using content analysis as research design. The tenets of the theoretical framework, CDA was extensively to analyse the data in order to find out how group ideology are indexed critically, in the language of the selected Nigerian agitations groups.

Excerpts from the three selected texts used as data for the study are presented below:

- *We have been raped for long*
- *Nigeria is a racist construct*
- *Book Haram latest threats*

Discussion of Findings

Text 1: **We have been raped for long**

Textual analysis

The title of this text is ideologically laden. 'We' aligns members alongside group ideology. It defines the speaker and others who share same ideology with them. Other pronouns and determiners such as 'ours, this and us' are used by the speaker/text producer to evoke and present the group ideology as being 'our ideology.' In other words, the speaker presents group idea as everyone's idea. 'We' creates a 'collective others' in the text.

This resonates Quirk & Greenbaum (2000) and Bloor & Bloor (2007) positions that pronouns are used for purposes of either exclusion or inclusion. Machin & Meyr (2012) added that the devices can align us either for or against a particular ideology by creating 'others' who Bloor & Bloor (2007) described as 'collective others'. The collective others in this text include 'President Muhammadu Buhari, his tribesmen, conflict merchants' and all who do not share the group ideology of Niger Delta people. The text uses a lot of declarative sentences. This is aimed at stating the group's opinions as facts.

The phrase 'raped for too long' evokes feelings of physical and mental torture. This torture has lasted for too long. Beyond the literal crime of forcefully having sex with someone against their wish, the phrase connotes socioeconomic torture. 'Too long' means that the region, 'we' have suffered this cruelty, oppression and slavery for decades. The text alleges that the 'president is an ethnic and religious bigot'. This suggests unreasonable beliefs of the addresses and the uncomplimentary manner in which he 'discriminately handles national affairs'. The text frowns at the federal government resort to decisive military action in addressing agitation in the region. The phrase 'rather than' suggests 'the road not taken'. The 'central government' should have trodden the path of the peace; not overheating the system. The group makes known its ideological position in resisting the federal military presence against the region. In their words "no amount of military action and surge will stop us...." It also portrays group social ideology of 'restoring our land' and economic ideology of resource control and fiscal federalism. It shows group determination to sustain, re-define, reawaken and reconfigure the perennial struggle towards the liberation of 'our motherland'.

Discourse practice

Metaphorically, the nature of socioeconomic degradation, strangulation and dehumanisation prevalent in the Delta region is metaphorically described as 'rape'. The victim, of rape suffers trauma from rape experience. The Niger Delta people are the ideological victims of the rape. The social injustice, oppression and dehumanisation prevalent in the region represent the traumatic experience of the raped. Again, the mental and physical picture of 'rape' portrays two partners or participants – the rapist and the raped. Whereas the raped is the region, the rapist is the 'Nigerian government' as well as its partners in the crime of rape. The federal government has allegedly raped the region by taking their God-given resources 'forcefully' without her consent. Meanwhile, the group insists that 'We want to control our resources...' The rape has lasted for 'too long' and the group must resist the rape (the daylight robbery) at all cost even if it entails eliminating the rapist. This ideology is at the base of the perennial agitation/agitation.

The economic and political ideology of the group is foregrounded through transitivity, verb processes and other strategies in the text. This ideology is typically portrayed through material, mental and existential processes. The verbs 'to be' is used with verb 'to have' to allow us gain insight into the feeling of raped participants, people of the region. 'Have been' is an example of existential process which expresses a state of being. This verbal group helps to bring out the aesthetic and intended meaning or effect of the main verb, 'rape'. In other words, the process helps in achieving the intended message of torture which the group

intends to communicate. The material process which involves the actor and the goal, contributes to the realisation of the ideological significance of 'rape'. The text reveals the 'actor', the 'rapist' as the Federal Government and representatives of the multinational corporations. The 'goal' is the attacked people of Niger Delta, the 'raped'. This captures the mental image of rape – the raped and the rapist, an ideology which the group intends to communicate.

Similarly, transitivity analysis of the text shows the agent and object positions in the text. This analysis plays a key role in meaning making of the discourse. According to Machin, D. and Mayr, A. (2007 and 2012), agents reveal 'the doers' and 'the done-tos'. Whereas the doers are, the 'rapists', the done-tos are the 'raped'. The 'done-tos' are at the receiving end. The agent elements include the military action, government agencies, conflict merchants, president, and the cohorts. The 'circumstance' aspect of transitivity involves social circumstances surrounding the act of rape. Two instances of these circumstances are deliberate politicisation of the Niger Delta struggle by those tribesmen and conflict merchants emphasizing 97% versus 5% development and ...underdevelopment of the North and the Niger Delta, respectively. Transitivity and verb analysis of this text reveals the group's unrelenting and fierce determination to resist the rapist and uphold its economic ideology of fiscal federalism.

Social Practice

Brig. Gen. Mudoch Agbinibo, the spokesperson of the Niger Delta agitation group handed down this message (text 1) that communicates the ideology of the group to the local and international community. It is a message from a people that has been rapped since 1914.' It reveals to the outside world how the Niger Delta people have been raped for too long' by metaphorical rapists. The group uses presupposition to challenge president Muhammadu Buhari to 'think like a leader'. This allegedly suggests to the public that the 'president does not act the way a leader should think'. 'Warlords, and conflict merchants have hypnotised him...'

Again, the group allegedly informed the general public that the president has abdicated the responsibilities of governing Nigeria since May 2015'. The assertion echoes the IPOB's allegation that the presidency has abdicated its responsibilities to certain group of politicians. The assertion that the 'peace has been sustained in the region' before the president's 'assumption of office' presupposes that his predecessor, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, who is from the region, sustained peace until his exit from office. The group cautions that peace-making with 'this government' is compared to a metaphorical combustible vehicle'. This connotes danger mingled with carefulness. It suggests that the government cannot be trusted hence, the groups determination to use violence as an effective vehicle to sustainable liberation and 'restoration of our motherland'.

Text 2: **Nigeria is a racist construct**

Textual Analysis

The text begins with a declarative sentence. It simply states that the country is a 'racist construct'. It uses pronouns to create 'collective others'. The 'others' are different from "we" and "I". In 'this is why I...', the 'I' refers to the speaker, the leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra. 'They all know' refers to Nigerians, who do not share same ideology with the IPOB. A mental picture of slavery or imprisonment is created in '.... *could be set free*....' This evokes feeling of oppression and bondage. It suggests that the group is in bondage and must to be set free. Interrogative sentences are used in the second paragraph which are

entirely questions asked by the speaker. These questions arouse secession consciousness of the group members. Again, average readers are prompted to look at the probing questions the second time with a view to making researches into Nigeria history in order to provide answers to speaker's questions.

The text traces and establishes the century-long forced-annexation process as a construct that has kept succession movement alive. '*This Lugardian creation of 1914*' is used for emphasis and discontent. It reinforces the idea that the Nigeria we see is a Lord Lugard's one-man creation. It becomes ideologically significant to question or reason why and how a one man's creation would give birth to a country as densely populated as Nigeria. The sentences and statements are constructed to induce disconnection and rejection of the 'racist construct' and uphold the spirit of secession that would engender socio-economic emancipation of Biafraland.

This text explicitly uses a visual language to lend credence to the linguistic text discussed above. The text vividly supports the proposition that Nigeria is a 'zoo' inhabited by animals. Here we see animals (monkeys) seated on a set of furniture in a greenish background. This setting obviously portrays a session/sitting arrangement akin to a parliamentary session. The Nigeria National House of Assembly has two legislative chambers: the upper chamber (senate) and the lower chamber (House of Representatives). These chambers are often referred to as the red and the green chambers, respectively. Considering the choice of greenish background here, the setting, as well as the labelling of Nigeria as a 'zoo' upon a Nigerian map courtesy of the text producer, the IPOB, it is therefore safe to identify the lower chambers of the National Assembly as the institution under serious sarcastic attack in this visual text. The seated parliamentarians are sarcastically represented here by 'monkeys' with fingers of banana in their hands.

This despicably thought-provoking representation employed in this text portrays the supposedly hallowed green chambers in a derogatory light before the global community. The banana here is suggestive of the 'national cake' which is allegedly shared unfairly and unjustly by the satirised lawmakers and other public servants in Nigeria. This sarcastic visual text is highly metaphorical and lends credence to the IPOB's perception and declaration that 'Nigeria is a zoo.'

Discourse practice

The text is ideologically laden. Its ideological mission is to reawaken inter-group consciousness in outright rejection and condemnation of the alleged racist construct. Several ideological and identification strategies are employed in the text through representations. The (wild) animal metaphor '*Zoo*' connotes derogation, mental primitivism, irrationality and incivility. This shapes the understanding of readers and makes them join the liberation movement from the alleged 'evil grips'. No one would like to be associated with a zoo. Again the 'evil grips' is used to describe the aftermath of the 'forced-annexation and Lugardian creation of 1914.' The grips are evil in nature and 'needs to be abolished'. Similarly, the 'evil castle' is referred to Nigeria. The densely populated country called Nigeria is reduced to just a castle 'where evil reigns supreme'. The evil castle is 'founded on lies and deceit'. This suggests that the foundation of the castle is deception and falsehood.

The expression the 'so-called Nigerians...' is a signalling device which according to Goatly (1997) draws attention to metaphor usage. This device is used by text producers when they want to draw reader's attention to representations in a text. The expression is meant to renew group consciousness and cast aspersions on the 'zoo'. The effect is that group members would treat with disdain, the Lugardian creation 'which has brought absolutely nothing but misery upon misery....' The adverb absolutely denotes complete/total misery. The repetition

of 'miseries, racist/racism and creation' emphasise group ideology and perception of 'the evil creation called Nigeria'.

Social practice

This text is a direct speech credited to Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, leader of IPOB worldwide. It challenges public misconstrued perception of both the IPOB and the 'zoo' which is described as a 'racist construct' and an 'evil castle called Nigeria'. It declares to the whole world that the foundation on which Nigeria is built is deceitful. The social implication is that the Biafrans and Nigerians would align with the IPOB ideology. No human being in right frame of thought would like to be identified with the zoo label. The text also mocks the perceived unity of Nigeria which is described as 'deceptive' in the text.

Again, this text polarises two groups along ideological lines. Whereas one group believes in the abolition of the racist construct/racism, the other has inclination to even commit murder just to 'defend and retain the deceptive unity of Nigeria...' Again the text distinguishes social actors in the discourse into two: The Lugardians and the anti-Lugardians. Whereas the former are pro-racist and 'Neo-colonialists', the latter are championing the course for the abolition of the racist construct. The Lugardians advocate for Nigeria unity. They are also labelled agents of racism. The pro-Lugards are identified as 'Animals in zoo'. On the converse, the anti-Lugards are agents of abolition of the construct. The anti-Lugards portray inclinations to suffer martyrdom in defence of the secession movement. They are in the business of extending the frontiers of anti-racism and the political ideology of secession/self-determination.

Text 3: **Boko Haram latest threats**

This text is short and has three paragraphs. It begins with the preposition, 'to'. Like most prepositions, it shows direction. It is directed to an addressee, who is identified as Lt. col. Sager Musa. The second paragraph begins with "we". The first person plural pronoun refers to the Islamic sect, Boko Haram. Though the leader of the sect is the speaker here, 'we' is used to express an action carried out by the members in general, not just the speaker. In the third paragraph we see a similar reference to "we"- "we have". In the second paragraph, the speaker uses 'we packed'. Thus, we packed. 'We have' shows some level of coordination and fortified defense. This is expressed in the phrase '... enough for us...'. On the other hand, pronouns such as 'they, him, his' etc are used to refer to the 'others' who hold a different ideology. The conjunction "but" is used here for contrast. It is used two times in the same paragraph. Again, it is regularly foregrounded by being placed at the beginning of two close sentences in the paragraph. It expresses a different and contradictory opinion about an information which is known to have happened and published by the media in Borno State. The goal is to show how deceptive the "others" is, as echoed in 'But Sagir Musa should continue to deceive the world...'. This portrays the Nigeria military in negative light of falsehood and deception. This means the government's claims in the fight against terrorism, by extension, should not be accepted as truth by local and international community. This is the mental picture which the group intends to express in the discourse, thereby seeking the 'others'' alignment with the group's ideology.

Discourse Practice

The text uses numerous devices to portray ideology of the group. One of the devices is metaphor. The phrase 'in our trap' is used to portray the group's tactical mechanism put in place to apprehend the army Lieutenant. The expression 'and we will deal with him' amplifies the meaning and intention of the trap in the discourse. Again, the text uses

overlexicalisation of items to express emphasis, derogation and ideological contention. ‘The little brat’ for instance, is overlexicalised for derogation. LT. Col. Sagir with his troop, JTF want the world to believe that they are winning the war against terrorism in the North. The troop claims to have ambushed, killed several and made away with vehicles belonging to members of the Islamic sect. These claims are persuasive strategies aimed at making the public believe in the troop’s expertise, military professionalism, tactics and mastery of the battlefield. However, the agitation group contends and labels the claims as mere deception, mediocrity and all lies ‘unbecoming of a soldier’. The sect projects its bravery and gallant achievements so far recorded in extending the frontiers of its mission and ideology which is to islamise the region, Nigeria and the world. The group declares, ‘contrary to Musa’s account, members of the sect easily invaded the army barracks in Mungolo and killed an unknown number of soldiers’. This sings praises of victory and gallantry. It shows the groups claims of winning the war against the ‘other’ and resistance in the battle. It suggests that the military will continue to lose the war while the agitation group will continue to win. Actors in the discourse are polarized by pronouns and determiners. This polarisation is manifested in the ‘us, we, our’ and ‘they, them, you, he, and his’. Whereas the agitation group is represented by the ‘us, we and our’, the soldiers are referred to as ‘they.’ The polar opposites are amplified in the following instances:

- ...we burnt down...
- ...we packed arms and ammunition...
- ...the soldiers we killed in Monguno barracks...
- ...none of our members died...
- ...we know your movements...
- ...we have enough for ...
- ...we have 15 Browning rifles...
- ...in our armoury now...
- ...we killed unknown number of soldiers...
- ...our vehicles...
- ...we will deal with him...
- ...we have his photograph with us...
- ...in our trap, etc.

These are polarised by

- ...our claims...
- ...your troops...
- ...they left...
- ...he would fall ...
- ...you will have no place to hide ...
- ...you shall see, and you shall see... etc.

The choice of linguistic items made in the text shows some patterns of ideological stance which the group projects. The words that occur together with the of pronouns inclusion, for instance carries some positive meaning or positiveness as in:

- We have *enough* arms to bring down the entire Borno state (much or more than is wanted).
- We *killed* unknown (numberless) number of soldiers (gallantry/ enemies are defeated by us).
- None of our members died (but we killed soldiers).
- We *easily invaded* the army barracks and killed them etc.

On the contrary, words that occur with the collective others carry some negative sense as in:

- He would *fall in our trap* (he will be dealt with).
- You will have *no place to hide* (you are not safe or you are miserable and destitute).
- You shall see, and you shall see (emphatically, you shall meet your waterloo) etc.

These illustrations or analyses of the text show the groups propagation of ideology of resistance, fierce determination to accomplish its mission and victory over the ‘enemies’ – the collective other who attempt to truncate the mission.

Social practice

This text is a threat handed down through the leader of the dreaded Boko Haram sect, Abubakar Shekau text communicates achievements so far recorded by the group in the Jihad; the group wants the world to know that the ‘we’ are on the winning side of the war. It uses hyperbole in its threats to give the public enough reasons to believing that the group is not only fearful but difficult to deal with. It is grossly exaggerating to claim that arms can destroy an entire state. Again, the group communicates deception and weakness of the soldiers. According to the group, “Sagir Musa should continue to deceive the world’. The soldiers’ claims that ‘members of the Islamic sect are not only ambushed, but killed in their number’, is evidently ‘shameful lies unbecoming of a soldier’ and deceptive. The text challenges the claim made by the army and the government that the Boko Haram sect is losing the battle for supremacy. The phrase “unknown number (of soldiers) and unknown (quantum of arms and ammunition)’ are meant to communicate facts on the numerous number of soldiers and arms recovered from their adversary. Again the indefinite adverb” unknown” is used to quantify the casualties recorded against the enemy.

Conclusions

From the analysis of the texts, we conclude that several linguistic devices are used by text producers in projecting and propagating group ideology. Spokespersons of the agitation groups employed overlexicalisation, metaphors, verb processes, hyperboles, persuasive and other linguistic constructions in their language of communication for ideology propagation. Whereas the collective others are perceived as ‘metaphorical rapists’, ‘offspring of racist’s constructs’ and ‘deceptive elements’, members of the groups are aligned with respective group ideology which they claim to hold tenaciously. Some group ideologies propagated in the study include social ideology, economic ideology, political ideology and religious ideology. Ideological variations of the groups are communicated through language. Ideology of the IPOB is fundamentally self-determination. The Boko Haram group upholds and propagates an irrevocable religious ideology with propensity to armed violence in the struggle. The Niger Delta Militant group propagates social ideology of liberation, economic ideology of fiscal federalism.

Recommendations

The study recommends that the Federal Government’s understanding of the aims, demands, warning bells and security threats issued by these agitation groups in Nigeria as embodied in their language, is supposed to be of prime concern in decision and policy making. More work needs to be done in the linguistic analysis of the language of the agitation groups in Nigeria just as several works have been done on militancy in Nigeria by literary scholars, economists and public analysts. Finally, English for specific purposes should be developed on Militancy in Nigeria.

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THE PROGRESSIVE IN ENGLISH AND ÓGBÀ: A CONTRASTIVE STUDY

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Abstract

This study is a contrastive analysis of the progressive of English and Ógbà. Ógbà, is an Igboid spoken in south-southern Nigeria language. The aim of the study is to compare the progressive of English and Ógbà in order to find out the extent to which Ógbà L₂ learners of English can acquire the progressive of English. The design of the study was descriptive survey. The results of the study showed that the progressive is instantiated morphologically in English, but lexically in Ógbà. The mean score of above 60% obtained by the 112 participants in the study showed that they had acquired the viewpoint aspect of English to a fairly high degree. A performance analysis of the participants' scores revealed that only about 58.51% of the participants in the PL1 group and 55.56% of the participants in the PL2 can correctly interpret the progressive up to a level of 50% and higher.

Keywords: Progressive, Situation, Ógbà

Introduction

Aspect is one way of expressing time in natural language. However, it does not relate the time of an event or a situation to a particular time-point as does tense. It has to do with the

internal temporal organisation of an event or a situation. Comrie (2001, p.3) defined aspect as the “different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation.” This implies that aspect is the means by which we see the internal temporal structure of a situation. Gabriele, Martohardjono and McClure (2005, p.808) defined aspect as “the internal temporal properties of an event.” By the internal temporal properties, they meant temporal features that show whether a situation is ongoing or has reached an endpoint. Smith (1997, p.1) defined aspect as the “semantic domain of the temporal structure of situations and their representations.” Her definition suggested that aspect concerns the meaning expressed by the temporal feature of situations.

There are two types of aspect – grammatical and lexical aspects. However, this division of aspect into two components has not been a consensual one as linguists have viewed the aspectual phenomenon differently. The narrow view, such as that held by Kortmann (1991), is that aspect consists of a grammatical component which is expressed in the grammaticalised distinctions between complete (perfective) and incomplete (imperfective) situations. Some other linguists such as Binnick (2006), Comrie (2001), and Smith (1997) espoused a wider view. The wider view is that aspect is made up of grammatical and lexical components. This view had certain implications for the study of aspect. One of such implications was that aspectual meaning came to be seen as compositional. This means that the aspectual meaning of a sentence is not found in the verb alone, but in the verb and its complements. The present study adopted the wider view simply for reasons of currency, but the main focus of the study is the progressive which falls under grammatical aspect.

Grammatical aspect (also known as viewpoint aspect or verbal aspect) refers to the “marking of the different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation.” (Binnick, 2006, p.247) Binnick’s definition here suggested that grammatical aspect has to do with how the internal temporal meaning of situations is marked. Yang, Shi & Xu (2018) said that grammatical aspect deals with how the speaker views an eventuality. They noted that the speaker can look at an eventuality from a perfective or an imperfective standpoint. They also pointed out that, in most languages, the distinctions in these two viewpoints are encoded in inflectional morphemes. Smith (1997) described viewpoint aspect as the means by which the situation expressed in a sentence becomes visible, just like the lens of a camera makes visible the object to be photographed. She emphasised that viewpoints can focus all or part of a situation. In other words, viewpoints can present a situation in its entirety or only in part (this idea is discussed in more details later on in this work). Smith (1997, p.66) asserted that “viewpoint aspect is expressed by a grammatical morpheme that is associated with the main verb of a sentence.” Grammatical morphemes that express aspectual meaning may be bound or free (Yang, Shi & Xu, 2018). From the foregoing views on grammatical aspect, one can say that it concerns expressing the internal temporal meaning of a situation through grammatical morphemes.

To explicate Smith’s (1997) definition of viewpoint aspect further, it is pertinent to consider what she means by saying that viewpoint focuses on all or part of a situation. When the viewpoint focuses all of a situation, it presents the situation in its entirety with its beginning, middle, and end all rolled into one unanalysable whole (Comrie, 2001). No emphasis is placed on any particular stage of the situation. That way, we are able to see a situation that began and reached a point of completion or termination. For example, in (i), the verb *cooked* does not only entail that the situation reached an endpoint, but also that it began, progressed for a period of time, and reached an endpoint. The focus, therefore, is not on only one stage of the situation but on all three stages at once.

- (i) My friend cooked some rice.

When the viewpoint focuses part of a situation, it looks at a situation from within, not specifying its beginning or endpoint. For example, in (ii), the verb phrase *was cooking* does not specify when the situation began or whether it reached a point of completion. It rather focuses on the middle of the situation.

- (ii) My friend was cooking some rice.

Binnick (2006) and Comrie (2001) identified two kinds of the imperfective, and they are progressive aspect and habitual aspect. The present study focused on the progressive aspect. The progressive expresses an ongoing situation, one whose endpoint is not indicated. Binnick (2006) sees it as expressing an eventuality in its course. The habitual, in Binnick's (2006) view, expresses an eventuality as a series.

Some studies have been done on the L2 acquisition of the English progressive. For example, Christensen (2009) focused on adult Japanese-speaking and Arabic-speaking second language (L₂) learners of English. Gabriele, Martohardjono and McClure (2005) examined adult native speakers of Japanese learning English as a L₂. Ionin (2008), a cross-linguistic study as well, focused on Russian-speaking children who were learning English as a L₂. The problem of this study, therefore, is that extant research has not investigated the acquisition of the progressive by Ọgbà L₂ learners of English. The aim of the study is to compare the progressives of English and Ọgbà in order to determine the extent to which Ọgbà L₂ learners of English can acquire the progressive of English. Two research questions have been designed to guide this study. They are: (1) to what extent does the progressive of English and Ọgbà contrast? (2) to what degree can Ọgbà L₂ learners of English acquire the English progressive?

The Progressive in English

The progressive in English is marked by the verb *be* and a main verb in the *-ing* form. The situations presented in the following sentences are in the progressive.

- (1) Jane was swimming in the pool.
- (2) Keith was building a dog house.
- (3) The baby was coughing.
- (4) The leaves were falling.

As noted by Smith (1997), the progressive in English usually has an open interpretation. This is because it presents situations as ongoing. The situations presented in (5) to (7) have *ongoing* interpretations, indicating that they lack endpoints or were terminated at some arbitrary points.

- (5) The telephone was ringing.
- (6) Alice was baking a cake.
- (7) The train was arriving.

An important fact to note about the English progressive is that it is typically available only to non-statives. Sentences (5) to (7) express non-stative situations. The progressive can, sometimes, have a marked use with statives, and at other times, it is completely odd with statives. Sentence (8) illustrates a marked use of the progressive with a stative, while (9) shows a situation where the progressive is odd with a stative; the question mark before (9) indicates the sentence is semantically ill-formed.

- (8) The children were loving the fun.
 (9) ? Rob was knowing the answer.

The progressive in Ógbà

The progressive in Ógbà, as in English, presents situations as ongoing. The progressive of non-statives in Ógbà is expressed by *jè dā* followed by a main verb in the simple form. *Jè dā + V* is the past progressive marker in Ógbà, and serves as the equivalent of the English past progressive marker *be-past + V-ing*. *Jè dā* has an open interpretation, and as such does not make visible the endpoint of a situation. Sentences (10) and (11) illustrate on-going situations.

- (10) Àdá jē dā jé áhiā.
 [Ada pst-prog.marker go market]
 Ada was going to the market.
 (11) Ézē jè dā rí ȳĩ.
 [Eze pst-prog.marker eat yam]
 Eze was eating yam.

Generally, statives in Ógbà are incompatible with the progressive. The stative verbs *òmnrá* (to know), *òyí* (to resemble), and *ònwé* (to have), to mention but a few, do not occur in the progressive – sentences (12b) and (13b) illustrate (a question mark before a sentence shows semantic ill-formedness). A few statives, however, can be used in the progressive. Stative verbs like *írú ukà* (to doubt), *ígètā úgwō*, and perceptual verbs such as *ìhnú uzò* (to see) and *ìshnì ishnì* (to smell), to mention but a few, can occur in the progressive as sentences (14b) and (15) show.

- (12) a. Àdá mnrā dī íshí írnī.
 [Ada know-pst asp-aux to cook food]
 Ada knew how to cook.
 b. ? Àdá jé dī dā mnrā íshí
 írnī.
 [Ada pst-prog-part asp-aux pst-prog-part know to cook
 food]
 ? Ada was knowing how to cook.
 (13) a. Ñkēm nwé dī òkpú.
 [Nkem have-pst asp-aux hat]
 Nkem had a hat.

- b. ? Ñkěm jé dī dā nwē
 òkpū.
 [Nkem pst-prog-part asp-aux pst-prog-part have hat]
 ? Nkem was having a hat.
- (14) a. Ùdó gétà dī m ùgwō.
 [Udo owe-pst asp-aux me debt]
 Udo owed me (some money)
- b. Ùdó jé dī m dā gétá
 ùgwō.
 [Udo pst-prog-part asp-aux me pst-prog-part owe
 debt]
 ? Udo was owing me.
- (15) Ímínō ñnyē jé dā shnì ishni.
 [Room the pst-prog.marker smell smell]
 ? The room was smelling.

Literature Review

Christensen (2009) studied the acquisition of perfective and imperfective aspect by Arabic and Japanese learners of English. The aim of his study was to find out whether the imperfective aspect of English is difficult for L₂ learners due to transfer from the L₁ or whether it is generally difficult to acquire irrespective of how it is expressed in the L₁. He examined 17 adult L₁ speakers of Arabic and 16 adult L₁ speakers of Japanese, all of which were learning English as a L₂ in the university. He discovered that irrespective of the similarities in the meaning of the progressives of the three languages, the subjects found it difficult to correctly interpret the past progressives of the L₂. He attributed the learners' difficulty not to L₁ transfer but to the semantic complexity of the imperfective. Christensen's study is relevant to the present study as it focused on the L₂ acquisition of the progressive. However, while his study focused on Arabic and Japanese L₂ learners of English, the present study focused on Ógbà L₂ learners of English.

Ionin (2008) did a cross-sectional study of the child-L₂ acquisition of the English progressive aspect. In the study, she examined interpretation of the bare *-ing* and *be + -ing* verb forms in the L₂-English of L₁-Russian children. Her sample size comprised 11 US-based Russian children whose ages were between 5 and 11 years. The data obtained from the children through the reports they gave of their daily activities, past vacations, hobbies, and arrival in the US were used with some picture description tasks to assess the children's use of the progressive. Ionin found out that most of the children used both the bare *-ing* and *be + -ing* verb forms, giving both forms an ongoing interpretation. She noted one child neither used both forms correctly nor assigned an ongoing interpretation to them. The result indicated that even though the children had not fully acquired the *be* auxiliary, most of the children could correctly interpret the *-ing* verb form. Ionin asserted that in keeping with the Uniqueness Principle, the children, after acquiring the *be* auxiliary, were supposed to limit the use of the

bare verb to appropriate contexts. Contrarily, as she observed, most of the children continued to use bare *-ing* after acquiring *be + -ing*, but later restricted bare verbs to non-progressive contexts. Only one child did not show a restrictive use of the bare verb even after acquiring the *be* auxiliary. Ionin suspected that this may have been caused by the child's knowledge of an additional language, Azerbaijani; she was the only one who knew another language in addition to English and Russian. Though Ionin's study is similar to the present study in being a cross-sectional one, they differed in area of the linguistic background of the subjects. Again, she used fewer subjects than those used in this study – she used 11 subjects, whereas the present study used 112. However, her study differed from the present study in the sense it used fewer subjects.

Narinasamy, Mukundan, and Nimehchisalem (2013) studied the use of progressives among Malaysian L₂ learners of English, specifically learners in Year 5, Form 1, and Form 4. Their study, being a corpus-based study, utilised data from what they called the EMAS corpus. The corpus contained over 1500 essays generated from 'Picture-Based' and 'The Happiest Day of My Life' essays. The purpose of their study was to ascertain whether the English progressive was difficult for Malaysian L₂ learners. Their study aimed at finding out the frequency of the progressives used by the group of learners they examined. They found that the Form 4 learners had a higher use of the progressive than the Year 5 and Form 1 learners. The Year 5 learners used the past progressive a lot, and in 'The Happiest Day of My Life' essay. According to Narinasamy, Mukundan, and Nimehchisalem, this meant that the learners may not have fully understood the progressive and how to use it. They also noted that the Form 1 learners had only 50% accuracy in their use of the progressive, implying that they, too, have not fully mastered it. They observed that even though the Form 4 learners had a higher use of the progressive, only 47.46% of their productions were correct. This also showed that the Form 4 learners had not fully grasped the correct use of progressive. Based on the fact that the use of the progressive increased in frequency through Year 5 to Form 4, they concluded that the learners were developing in their use of it. Narinasamy, Mukundan, and Nimehchisalem's study is similar to the present study in revealing the extent to which the learners have acquired the progressive. However, the fact still remains that their subjects were from a linguistic background other than Ógbà.

From the studies reviewed, it is obvious that studies on the L₂ acquisition of aspect, particularly the progressive by Ógbà learners of English are yet to be done. This study, therefore, fills this gap.

Theoretical Framework

This study was carried out within the theoretical frameworks of Contrastive Analysis (henceforth CA). Fisiak (1985) stated that the principles of CA were first put forward by Fries in his 1945 work, *Teaching and Learning English as a Foreign Language*. Then in 1957, Lado made the principles popular in his work, *Linguistics Across Cultures*. According to Crystal (1987), CA is the systematic comparison of L₁ and L₂ that is done in order to predict areas of greatest learning difficulties. Nwala (2015), with reference to this definition given by Crystal asserted that one of the aims of CA is to predict learning difficulties which are helpful to both the L₂ learners and teacher. Gast (2012) stated that contrastive studies often involve the comparison of languages that are 'socio-culturally linked.' In Gast's view, the languages to be compared should be such that they exist side by side, classically by way of (natural or instructed) bilingualism. His suggestion was that CA is supposed to be done

only with languages in contact. Based on the foregoing, CA can be defined as a systematic comparison of two or more co-existing languages in order to identify their similarities and difference and to discover how those similarities and differences affect the learning of the languages.

The approach of CA used in this study was the structural approach. A summary of the assumptions that motivate the structural approach is found in the contrastive analysis hypothesis (CAH) which posits that: (i) the L₁ is the major source of difficulty in learning the L₂; (ii) a systematic study of the structures of both the L₁ and the L₂ would reveal areas of differences between them; (iii) and these areas of differences would help analysts to predict the difficulties the L₂ learner would face in the course of learning the L₂ (Brown, 2007 as cited in Chidi-Onwuta & Oluikpe, 2016; Keshavarz, 2012). Although this approach as used in Lado's 1957 work, *Linguistics Across Cultures*, may appear to be a dated approach, it was the only approach found that focused on the learner's interlanguage. In the researchers' opinion, the learner's interlanguage has observable features that can be assessed to know how the learner is faring with the L₂. Error analysis (EA) has often been the tool used with CA to assess the learner's interlanguage (Sridhar, 1985). EA explains learners' errors, but emphasises errors too much. Correct productions are also important in L₂ learning as they how productive learners have become in the L₂, hence the use of performance analysis (PA) instead of EA in this study. PA gives an account of a learner's whole performance (Johansson, 2008). It takes into account both errors and correction productions.

Methods

The research design used for this study was a descriptive design. A descriptive design was essential for this study because contrasting the progressives of English and Ógbà includes describing their similarities and differences. Furthermore, one of the steps in a CA is description Keshavarz (2012).

Purposive sampling was used to draw a sample of 120 Senior Secondary School Three (SSS3) students, native speakers of Ógbà-Ègnī, from a population of about 806 SSS 3 students at the time of this study. Only 112 of the students out of the 120 qualified to participate in the study. These students were divided into two groups, Proficiency Level 1 (PL1) and Proficiency Level 2 (PL2), based on the results a proficiency test administered to determine their general proficiency in English. Students who scored 50% and above were assigned to PL1 group (94 students in number), while those who scored below 50% were put in the PL2 group (18 students in number).

English data for this study was obtained from existing advanced grammar textbooks and research articles on English aspect. In order to make the sources verifiable, only textbooks and articles with full publication details were used. Some illustrative language samples of English aspect were obtained from the bilingual intuition of the researchers. Ógbà data were basically got from the native-speaker intuition of the researcher. English Aspectual Proficiency Test (EAPT), an instrument that was developed by the researcher was used to obtain primary data. The method of data collection used for the study was cross-sectional research method. To analyse the secondary data, the researcher did a one-to-one mapping of the formal, syntactic, and semantic properties of the progressive of English and Ógbà. The data obtained from the EAPT were analysed with descriptive statistics such as mean, standard deviation, and percentage. The results of the PA were presented in multiple bar graphs. EAPT

contained nine different types of tasks. Part of the viewpoint task required the students to identify the progressive sentences.

Contrastive Analysis/Data Analysis/Performance Analysis

The progressive in English is marked by the verb *be* and a main verb in the *-ing* form. For the purpose of this study, the researcher used the past form of the progressive, *be (past) + V-ing*. The progressive in *Ọgbà* is expressed by *jè dā* followed by a main verb in the simple form. *Jè dā + V* is the past progressive marker in *Ọgbà*, and serves as the equivalent of the English past progressive marker *be-past + V-ing*. The following examples illustrate.

- (16) Jack *was building* a doghouse.
 (17) Kate *was strolling* in the park.
 (18) Àdá *jè dā* *jé* áhiā.
 [Ada pst-prog.marker go market]
 Ada was going to the market.
 (19) Ézē *jè dā* *rí* ȳȳ.
 [Eze pst-prog.marker eat yam]
 Eze was eating yam.

The italicised phrases in (16) to (19) are the progressive markers of the situations expressed.

In both English and *Ọgbà*, the progressive has an open interpretation, indicating ‘ongoingness.’ All the situations expressed in (16) to (19) represent ongoing situations.

The progressive in English and *Ọgbà* are typically available only to non-statives. However, in English, the progressive can, sometimes, have a marked use with statives, and at other times, it is completely odd with statives as (24) and (25) respectively illustrate. Sentences (20) to (23) are non-statives and are compatible with the progressive. It is important to note, however, that in (22) the progressive shifts the achievement into an activity. Hence *was landing* does not denote the instantaneous event of the plane touching the ground, but a process leading to that. Also, the progressive in (23) shifts the semelfactive into a multiple activity. Hence *was coughing* does not denote a single cough, but a series of coughing events. In *Ọgbà*, a few statives are compatible with the progressive, but their equivalents in English are incompatible with the progressive. The situations expressed in (26) and (27) are non-statives, and they are compatible with the progressive in *Ọgbà*; (28) is a stative that is incompatible with the progressive in *Ọgbà*, while (29) and (30) are statives that are compatible with the progressive in *Ọgbà*.

- (20) Mary was baking a cake.
 (21) Sam was swimming in the pool.
 (22) The plane was landing.
 (23) The baby was coughing.
 (24) The children were loving the fun.
 (25) ? Rob was knowing the answer.
 (26) Ùgnò *jè dā* *gù* mínī yā ògnò.
 [Ugno pst-prog.marker swim water in stream]
 Ugno was swimming in the stream.
 (27) Èméká *jè dā* *rnū* ūlò.
 [Emeka pst-prog.marker build house]

- (28) Emeka was building a house.
 ? Ñkēm jé dì dā nwē ōkpū.
 [Nkem pst-prog-part asp-aux pst-prog-part have hat]
 ? Nkem was having a hat.
- (29) Ìrni ònyē jè dā sō ēhūwē ēhùwè.
 [Food the pst.prog.marker taste not nice not nice]
 ? The food was not tasting nice.
- (30) Ùdó jé dì m dā gètá úgwō.
 [Udo pst-prog-part asp-aux me pst-prog-part owe debt]
 ? Udo was owing me.

Table 1. Mean Performance Scores of Students on Progressive Judgment Task

Aspectual Category	PL1 (n = 94)		PL2 (n = 18)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Progressive	3.07 (61.40%)	1.57	3.22 (64.40%)	1.40
Fillers	0.49 (9.80%)	1.17	0.33 (6.60%)	0.69

Table 1 shows the mean scores of the students and their standard deviations in the progressive judgment task.




Figure 1.1 Performance analyses of PL1 participants in the progressive judgment task.




Figure 1.2 Performance analyses of PL2 participants in the progressive judgment task.

Figure 1.1 showed the PA of the PL1 students in the progressive judgment task. Only 58.51% (55) of the students scored up to 50% and higher in the task; 41.49% (39) of the students scored below 50%. Only 7.45% of the students correctly identified the fillers. Figure 1.2 showed the PA of the PL2 students. In this group, only 55.56% (10) of the students scored 50% and above in the task; 44.44% (8) scored below 50%. None of the students in this group correctly identified the fillers.

Results and Discussion

The results of the study showed that the progressive is morphologically instantiated in English, while it is lexically instantiated in *Ọgbà*. This means that the two languages have different ways of expressing the progressive. Christensen (2009) also revealed differences in the encoding of the progressive between English and Arabic; Arabic used the simple present or the temporal marker *gaaʕd* (still) where English used inflectional morphology.

The results of this study revealed that the progressive in both English and *Ọgbà* always has an open interpretation. In other words, it always presents situations as ongoing. This implies that the semantic interpretation of the progressives of both languages is similar. Christensen (2009) also found that progressives of accomplishments and achievements in English and Arabic usually have ongoing interpretations. However, he noted that unlike English and Arabic, Japanese progressive achievement verbs entail completion. The findings of the study were that the progressive in English and *Ọgbà* are typically compatible with non-statives. They can be used some statives, but the number of such statives are really small. Also, some statives that are compatible with the stative in *Ọgbà*, display incompatibility with the stative in English.

The results of this study indicated that the students had a mean score of above 60% in the progressive judgment task. Their PA showed, however, that only a little above of the students could correctly identify the progressive to a level of 50% and above. These imply that even though the students have acquired the English progressive to a fairly high degree,

not many of them have. The reason for this above-average performance could be that which has been echoed by other researchers that the progressive is difficult for L₂ learners. Christensen (2009) and Narinasamy, Mukundan, and Nimehchisalem (2013) all found out that the subjects of their study had difficulty in correctly interpreting the progressive.

Conclusions

From the results of the study, the progressives of English and Ógbà displayed a lot of similarities, indicating that they are similar to a large extent. However, they were found to be dissimilar in the way they are instantiated. Based on the mean scores of the students as well as their PA, it can be concluded that they are fairly productive in the use of the English progressive. Future studies on Ógbà L₂ acquisition of progressive can focus on more advanced learners to find out whether they will perform higher.

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**CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, INFORMAL POLICING AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
AKWA IBOM STATE: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS**

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Abstract

This paper examined the role of informal policing in mitigating the effects of victimization on social order in Akwa Ibom State. This investigation became a necessity because literatures reviewed have shown that the inefficiency of the formal security structure has left much to be desired in terms of undermining social order in the State. This study adopted the collective efficacy theory by Sampson Robert and colleagues for its theoretical framework. It also depended on secondary literature from journals, articles and books. The findings of this study revealed that the informal policing structure has contributed immensely to controlling victimization and consequently maintaining the social stability in Akwa Ibom State. The

paper recommended among others the legalization of informal policing through an Act of parliament.

Keywords: Criminal Victimization, Informal Policing, Social Order

Introduction

Brown and Okorie (2015) observed that there is no universal crime control measure which can yield effective results everywhere due to peculiarities in environmental, spiritual and social factors. For instance, those in the coastal regions understand crime control differently from those in the upland, those in the rural areas often device their means of checking criminality in the absence of access to robust law enforcement presence as compared to those in the urban settings. However, in Akwa Ibom State, the focus which crime control practice places on a particular law enforcement agency - the police seem to drown the effectiveness and relevance of other crime control mechanisms. The actual need to explore crime control mechanisms beyond the services that the police force has so far offered in Akwa Ibom State arises from the many loopholes created by this formal policing structure. The police have left much to be desired in terms of general efficiency manifested in fraudulent activities, incompetence, sense of injustice, excessive use of force, maltreatment, harassment, extortion and other human rights abuses, use of reactive rather than proactive measures of controlling crime, extrajudicial killings, etc.. Apart from creating room for a higher level of victimization from criminal elements, these unpopular gestures from the law enforcement agencies also constitute a greater level of secondary victimization compared to other mechanisms of crime control.

Gbenemene and Adishi (2017) opine that a lot of notorious criminals supposed to be remanded behind bars are often seen parading the streets engendering more atrocities few days after they were apprehended because of the corruption of the police and some judicial officers. This opinion lays bare a strong connection between the prevalence of criminal victimization, measures of crime control and the existence or absence of social (dis)order. This obvious consistency of criminal activities not only shows the weakness of crime control but also institutionalizes victimization with a significant threat to social order and the disintegration of the state. Niger Delta weekly (2022) observes that why this is of a serious concern is that “the emerging situation could cause a total breakdown of law and order which could result in hooliganism, spontaneous victimization, reprisal killings and deployment of repressive measures by security forces.” In search of a way forward, this work interrogates the role of informal policing in mitigating the effect of criminal victimization on social order in Akwa Ibom State as an alternative to formal policing.

Theoretical Framework

This study employs the collective efficacy theory propounded by Sampson, Robert J. and colleagues (Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997). The theory deals with the process of translating social ties in the neighbourhood into achieving common goals such as social order or crime control. Collective efficacy theory has its roots in the tradition of social disorganization theory, but with a positive outlook that neighbourhood ties apparently facilitate the social control of crime; where social disorganization is conceived as the breakdown of social institutions such as the family, schools, churches or political groups of a community meant to preserve social order and control (Sutherland, Brunton-Smith & Jackson, 2013). Conversely, collective efficacy argues that the common bond, strong social ties and the social capital derived from these ties are indeed resources for crime control.

Hence, for Sampson (2006) collective efficacy is “the activation of social ties to achieve shared expectations for action”, unlike social disorganization model characterized by dense social ties yet not harnessed to control crime. Collective efficacy therefore becomes a mechanism through which social capital confers benefits on the community.

Conceptual Framework

Criminal Victimization: refers to the losses, injuries, harm or death suffered for reasons of criminal or illegal acts. Garkawe (1993) defines the concept of victimization as an unequal relationship characterized by abuse, pains, parasitism, destructiveness and unfairness. It is the bodily, mental harm or monetary loss suffered as a result of illegal activities of others. Victimization is first of all measured by the plight of the victim, that is, the effect of the harm, losses or injuries inflicted on the target by the offender. Cares, Haynes & Ruback (2015) see victimization as the real harms that victims of crime suffer which include damage and loss of property, physical injury and emotional stress. Kleinfeld (2013) understands victimization as the act of preying on the vulnerability or innocence of a party who becomes a victim of another’s wrongdoing on account of these qualities. Cassell & Erez (2011) classify victimization into primary and secondary victimizations. The first type of victimization involves primary victims of murder, rape, assault or fraud, et cetera. The Secondary otherwise known as ancillary victims include those most proximate to the primary victims or those who suffer the effects of victimization indirectly due to their unique connections with direct victims, for instance, family members, friends, professionals who look after victims or other forms of ties to primary victims. According to their view, the harm experienced by the secondary victims is only an outcome of the harm inflicted on the direct victim.

Informal Policing: Is a non-state community-based system of security where group of individuals without statutory authority take up the task of protecting lives and property. Udoma (1987) in Pratten (2008) narrates that the emergence of informal policing system in Nigeria came swiftly as a result of redundancy and disbandment in the labour force after the civil war. Again, there was rapid increase in the incidents of armed robbery which its first occurrence in Akwa Ibom was reported in Uyo with the slang “*Amauke*” (Your money or your life!). Pratten (2008), reports that the vigilante movement then became a common response to this outbreak of crime especially within local communities where the Armed Robbery and Firearms Decree of 1971 promulgated by Gowon had limited effect. Following this incidence was the emergence of more forms of privatized security with support of the federal government in the 1980s, to boost the image of the police. Pratten (2008) adds that there was also a resurgence of high crime wave in the second half of the 1980s consequent upon the structural adjustment policies. Hence, the state welcomed local government byelaws for the legalization of vigilante groups. Well-known among these community established security groups in Nigeria were the earliest established groups such as O’odua People’s Congress in the South-West, the Bakassi Boys in the South-East and Hisbah, an Islamic vigilante in the North (Inyang & Abraham, 2013; Zumve, 2012). Fourchard (2008) observes that the term ‘vigilante’, popularized in mid-1980s is credited to the Nigeria Police Force who named these emerging groups after the ‘night guard’, a local policing structure existent in the colonial era. According to Fourchard (2008), this is in the light that, the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) and other vigilante groups in the country replicate the activities of those night guards who were much closer to the people during the colonial administration. This is true to the extent that the vigilante made use of familiar methods such as charms as part of their crime control measures which was very practical among the aboriginal population in the 20th century. When such night watch guards caught criminals they handed

them to the charge of the native authority, who worked directly with the colonial masters, for what they may have considered legal action. Unfortunately, many political elites have taken advantage of these groups, forming them into nationalistic movements and using them as tools of political and ethnic violence (Denis, 2020).

Rotimi & Ikuteyijo (2012) affirm the role of the vigilante organizations in Nigeria in assisting their respective state governments at various areas and times directly or indirectly in the preservation of security of lives and property. Okereafoezeke (2003) corroborates this assertion, explaining that the Bakassi Boys were reputed as very efficient in checking crime in the area of identification of criminals despite any effort to hide identity. They fished out criminals from one community to the other, apprehending and punishing them. This view concludes that they reduced crime and in a very significant manner to the praise of the general public.

Ogbozor (2016) argues that informal policing system like the vigilante groups play several vital roles in African communities but unfortunately, research has often focused on the negative effects of their actions like the violation of human rights, without emphasis on the beneficial roles that these security actors play in maintaining the safety and security of communities in Nigeria. Hence, while it is imperative to address the abuses by vigilante groups, their positive roles must be recognized along with these negative impacts. Consequently, Alemika and Chukwuma (2004) appraise the existence of informal policing structures noting that its basic tenets agree with the socio-cultural and political practices of their native African communities. For instance, these vigilante policing groups are organized on the foundations of traditional practices such as the masquerade cults, divination and age-grade. They, however, decry that the nomenclature ‘informal’ is only a product of comparison between these groups and the western law enforcement system, consequently, they contend that this may be understandable since such a security apparatus is likely to be perceived differently by different people as a result of their lived experiences.

Social Order: Social order is a condition of well-being in which individuals within the society live peacefully with one another and their lives and properties well secured. According to Lasisi & Rekiya (2019), social order is “the state of social existence in any society where very minimal crises exists amongst and between groups in their everyday social interaction”. For Ekeopara & Obonnaya (2014) it is a situation of well-being in the society whereby persons co-habit at peace with one another with an assurance of safety of their lives and property. It has also been defined as a state in which the situation and every aspect of the society is controlled as it ought to be so that individuals carry out their appropriate functions within the society. Social order also entails a harmonious living, orderliness and relative peace untouched by civil disorder and instability. It involves a peaceful regulation of life within the society in accordance with established traditional norms, structures, customs, values and traditions which constitute the society.

Mboho & Udoh (2019) conceive social order as basic concept in sociology which refers to the way the various constituents of the society’s social structure and institutions, social interactions, social relations, behavior and cultural characteristics such as beliefs, norms and values work together to sustain the status quo. They further opine that social order is also used as a term outside the field of sociology to mean condition of stability and agreement that exists in the absence of chaos and upheaval.

Criminal Victimization, Informal Policing and Social Order in Akwa Ibon State

The prevalence of criminal victimization in Akwa Ibom State is consequentially a failure of the Nigeria Police Force to deliver their mandate which should assure the public of an adequate protection against crime. This apparent failure has evoked diverse informal and semi-informal policing structures operating in parallel with the police force in Akwa Ibom State. This is supported by the view of Hills (2014); that alternative security providers emerged to fill the gap left by the obvious failure of the Nigerian Police Force whose activities are noticeably identified with brutality, corruption and ineffectiveness. The group has been alleged to play a crucial role in providing critical security services to Akwa Ibomites especially in rural settings where the people have a common problem of lesser presence of government security network. Findings revealed that there is a very strong presence of informal policing system in Akwa Ibom state, in the form of vigilantism whose origin has been traced to traditional age-grade system, hunter-guard or night-guard system, pointing out that it has been in existent before western civilization. Presently, the head office of the vigilante group in Akwa Ibom State is said to be located along the Industrial Layout by Champion Breweries, Uyo, which shows clearly that vigilantism is resident in Akwa Ibom state as a medium of crime control. This evidence of long presence is corroborated by David Pratten (2008) who noted that the vigilante has been a popular native response to theft, armed robbery and other security hazards. The people's sense of collective security is further strengthened by the homogenous nature of these rural settings. Accordingly, the vigilante groups have been considered functional in providing services such as general security, early warning alerts, intelligence gathering, dispute settlements and facilitating community development programs in Akwa Ibom State.

The low quality of partnership that has been evident between the police and members of the public in the fight against crime in Akwa Ibom State has been remarkably bridged by the informal policing structure. It is true that the people seem to have much confidence in the capacity and willingness of the vigilante to safeguard the community than the police. The government security apparatus is almost hijacked by the few well-to-do individuals, especially government officials at the zenith, multinationals, banking institutions, and other government establishments while the poor masses are abandoned to their fate thereby catering for their own security. This neglect has resulted in mob actions, restiveness, protests, migration from crime prone areas, congestion of particular localities, and very many other forms of behaviour or actions that implies social disorder. Hence, the formation of informal social and crime control groups by these poor communities to protect their selves to these mitigate these arbitrary actions.

Conclusions

This study has submitted that informal policing has contributed immensely to crime control in Akwa Ibom State, thereby preventing the social disorder that would have arisen as a result of a higher rate of criminal victimization. This contribution can never be overemphasized especially when a thought is given to big lacuna created by the inefficiency of the formal policing structure. Presently, one of the problems facing the existence and operations of the vigilante groups in Akwa Ibom state is the failure of the police to accept them as partners in progress in the fight against crime; rather they are looked upon as threats or competitors in the use of monopoly of violence. This is to say that their activities are perceived as undermining the legitimacy of the police. For instance, Geschiere and Nyamnjoh (2000) observes that since the federal law still concentrates police authority at the centre and prevents the institution of regional or state police, state and local government support for the vigilante groups has come to be perceived as a way of substituting for independent state government police force. According to Rotimi and Ikuteyijo (2012), this brings about

repeated clashes between the unofficial policing institutions and the state-police institutions. Hence, the formation of the vigilante is not well pronounced in many communities around Akwa Ibom state as a formal security group. Rather most of what is obtainable is community-arranged night guards where few young men are selected or volunteer to keep watch over the community mainly at night. However, their success of the vigilante is said to be recorded in the areas of preventing armed robbery and uncovering homicide in the communities. But though they are zealous and ready to work for a crime free community, they are not properly mobilized and remunerated, since many of them tend to give the services out of passion and love of the community even when little or nothing waias paid them by the community.

Pointing out the drawbacks of informal policing structure, Fourchard (2008), notes that it was not uncommon for suspects to be subjected to inhumane handling and extrajudicial killings. However, despite the numerous challenges of the informal crime control structure, it reflects the need to consistently provide for the inadequacies of the police force so as to salvage the society from impact of these deficiencies.

Recommendations

Deducing from the above conclusions, the following recommendations are made:

- i. Rather than identifying the informal policing as a sheer reaction to increased rate of crime and the related inability of the police to achieve reduction in criminality and improve security; it ought to be understood and structured as an elementary attempt at crime prevention.
- ii. The vigilante should never be established as an independent structure, but rather, should combine effort with the police force to establish a formidable community policing scheme that would lead to a radical reduction in criminal victimization.
- iii. Members of the vigilante should be well remunerated not just through community generated revenue but by the government to enhance effective output.
- iv. There should be a formal legalization of informal policing through a national law so that their presence in each state can gain full support from the federal government.
- v. Both the leaders and all members of the various informal policing groups should be trained on the basics of fundamental human rights and their violation.
- vi. Women should also be recruited into the informal policing structure so as not to project a picture of subjecting women to male domination.

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Environmental Pollution, a Violation of Human Rights

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Abstract

The aim of this study is to examine and find explanation with regards to how environmental pollution translates to violation of human rights by critically examining the causes, and effects of a degraded and polluted environment on individuals, groups and state sources of economic growth and development. The consequences of a degraded and polluted environment on the Nigerian economy are of great concern to citizens, and cannot be overlooked, because it violates the constitutional provisions of citizens' rights to a clean and productive environment. The study adopted the qualitative method, secondary data was collated from journal articles, text books, newspapers, and internet materials. These Data were thematically and content analysed to establish the link between environmental pollution and human rights violation. This work addresses a fundamental question; How does environmental pollution amount to human rights violation in Nigeria. It uses the role theory to ascertain how failure to discharge individually assigned role responsibility in society contribute to the dynamic failure of the constitutionally prescribed rights that assures a sustainable environment for inclusive arrangement. The viability of this article lies in establishing that environmental pollution is not just an ecological occurrence, but also caused by individual, groups and state desire for economic expansion, thereby violating fundamental economic rights of other citizens. The various forms of environmental pollution such as air, water, and soil pollution were content analysed, it underlines the detrimental impact it has on the human health, livelihoods, and quality of life. Consequently, the article highlights the importance of recognizing the link between environmental pollution and human rights violations, both at an individual, groups, multinationals and state levels. The article concludes with an emphatic request on the need for strategic policy formulation, implementing effective strategies, adhering to environmental rules and regulations to address this national issue.

Keywords: Environment, Pollution, Human Rights.

Introduction

Chapter 2, Section (20) of the 1999 Constitution as amended states that, "The State shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard the water, air and land, forest and wild life of Nigeria". The environment is strategically positioned in the affairs of man to play a critical role in the economic and developmental processes of man. Any distortion or violation of the environment has negative and dangerous consequences and citizens must pay dearly for it. The environment is the mainstay of human activities for agricultural, industrial, commercial, technological and tourism development of any society (Ogbonna, & Uchenna 2016). Due to the strategic position the environment occupies in human, economic and capital development, environmental problems have now become a matter of public discourse at both national and international levels. According to Ojoye (2018) Nigeria took environmental issues seriously after the dumping of toxic waste at Koko community in Delta State in 1988 by an Italian company, in connivance with a Nigerian accomplice. They brought in over 3,500 tons of toxic waste, which caused unpalatable consequences for the inhabitants of the area, including sudden deaths. Nwafor (2006) states that, environmental degradation, and desertification threaten food security and the nation's ecological integrity, and they are drivers of population displacements and the deterioration of urban environmental quality.

The environment is polluted and degraded because of the economic, and technological activities of man and his interactions with the environment. The increase in human population necessitated an increase of the exploitation of the environment to sustain the population and provide shelter, feeding and clothing, which in-turn also increases the degree of pollution and degradation of the environment. Isife (2012) maintains that, the environment provides all life support systems with air, water, and land as well as the materials for fulfilling all developmental aspirations of man. If this support system is truncated as a result of the

economic advancement of anyone, it becomes a violation of the rights of others to enjoy the provisions of the environment. Ignorantly, the natural environment has been un-protectively used due to ignorance, poverty, overpopulation, selfishness and greed amongst the people, which has led to the degradation of the environment. Isife (2012) noted that the Nigeria's environmental problems are characterized by soil erosion, high population pressure and increasing congestion in urban centers, which are further compounded by unplanned growth, and increasing problems of domestic and industrial waste disposal and pollution. Since the 1980s, human related activities especially in the development projects of the oil and gas sector, have led to the acceleration in the loss of topsoil and deforestation; loss of habitat, species and biodiversity; and degradation of, wetlands (NEST 1992).

The problems of a degraded and polluted environment have caused a lot of concern to both individuals, organisations and Governments, locally, regionally and internationally. This study will enable concerned individuals, groups, organisations and government to take proactive and necessary steps to tackle these problems in order to retain a cleaner green environment for the good of all. It will enable policy makers, environmental protection agencies/authorities, human rights advocates and other stakeholders to fully appreciate environmental concerns that promote and protect human rights and policy implementation.

Literature Review

In an effort to identify and find solutions to environmental problems in Nigeria, the work of Isife (2012) posits that, society's constant and endless attempts to adjust their wants and desires for food, shelter, recreation, infrastructural and other land resources available to them has resulted in the deterioration of urban and rural environmental quality in Nigeria. Isife (2012) stated that, some of the identified deteriorations of the environment are shortage of portable drinking water and floods that play a major role in the transmission of communicable diseases. Nwafor (2006) stated that, environmental degradation causes drought and desertification which is a potent threat to food security and a nation's ecological integrity, and are drivers of population displacements. Isife (2012) in a dedicated attempt to find solutions examined the impacts of man's interaction with his natural environment with a view to outlining their contribution to environmental problems, also examined the much environmental policies in Nigeria have been implemented to control the negative impacts by man on the environment. The work finally suggested, re-designing the objectives and strategies of the now defunct Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA). Environmental protection techniques need to be cultured, home-grown and the framework should be "bottom-up". A number of communities should be grouped together from the (political) ward level to local government level. Environmental protection agencies at the local government level should be empowered to punish offenders (Isife 2012). However, the work suggested what needs to be done to protect the environment, but fall short of pinning the environmental actions of men as a violation of the environmental rights of others, most of whom relied on the same environment that has been degraded for their daily livelihood.

In the study of sustainability of the environment, Abah, and Uchenna (2016) agreed that, the effects of environmental pollution and its consequences on the economic and health status of Nigerian citizens are of great concern and cannot be overlooked by any right-thinking citizen. They situate their work squarely on environmental pollution, causes, effects and sustainable development in Nigeria. Ogbonna & Uchenna (2016) agreed that, the ideas of sustainability for so long has been associated with preserving of natural resources and safeguarding the environment. If the environment is not preserved and protected the future of man to sustain in an unproductive and polluted environment will become a mirage. The environmental health

challenges Nigerians face according to Hyellai et.al (2021) can be attributed to climate change, low air quality, water contamination, and natural hazards like floods, storms, and drought, all of these negatively affect human health. Therefore, the health of the environment should be a priority to be protected through enabling laws and policies, and all relevant stakeholders should endeavour to consider the health of the environment as they continue to exploit it.

As the human population increases, it places increasing demands for energy, food, clothing, housing, etc. This has led to increase in waste generation which places additional stress on the environment (Smart 1998). Accordingly, Nwafor (2006) confirmed that, as humans are busy pursuing a better life, their activities have continued to pollute the environment through technological expansion, agricultural and industrial activities, noise generation, population increase, urbanisation, deforestation, bush burning and so on are all pressures on the environment. He stated that, man has directly and indirectly created problems which has caused environmental degradation and several other hazardous effects such as widespread of diseases; reduction and destruction of natural habitats; and has led to low socio-economic development of Nigeria as a nation. The work recommends a better and more sustainable environment to be bequeathed to future generations to inherit. That, environmental and sustainable development should be everybody's concern. Individuals and organisations must develop interest and do more to safeguard the environment.

The Environment

They have been numerous literature on the concept of the environment, and how it has affected and impacted the lives of citizens. According to Efobi (1994), the environment is the sum total of all conditions that surround man at any point on the earth's surface. Accordingly, Porteous (1977) clearly captured the concepts and usage of the terms in various disciplines in his statement; thus; the multiplicity of the usage and concept of the term environment have resulted in a variety of adjectival forms which include social environment, molar environment, physical environment, home environment, psychological environment, behavioural environment, and geographical environment. For the purpose of this study, we shall be dealing squarely with the 'physical environment'. Consequently, Bain (1973) defined the physical environment as all the external and non-personal conditions and influences that determine the welfare of a people in a given area. The Nigerian Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA, 1989) defined the physical environment to include water, air, land, plants, animals, and human beings living therein, and the inter-relationships that exist among them. According to Isife (2012) the environment can be viewed as all physical, non-physical, external, and non-living situations surrounding an organism that determine its existence, development and survival at a particular time. Orisakwe (2019) defined the environment as the total living and non-living surroundings any organism would need for life and sustainability.

Economically, environmental degradation poses serious threat to national security and subsequently undermines human rights protection, studies available maintained that the capacity of a degraded environment cannot agriculturally provide adequate produce to cater for the needs of citizens. Knowlton (2011) stated that, a healthy Environment is the proof of a viable interconnection between people and their environment by which human health finds a balanced unpolluted environment for the good of human society. Hyellai et.al (2021) state that, "Environmental health reciprocates in two ways, which include environmental factors affecting human health and human activities affecting environmental quality". The priority of this study is to ensure environmental sustainability is preserved and promoted to guarantee the availability of a healthy environment for economic, political and environmental stability

(Marcus, 1998; Aribigbola, 2008). The barrels of the gun are powerless to protect anyone from the scourge of disease and death emanating from the degraded environment. This goes to show that a polluted environment is a violation of citizen's fundamental human rights, more so, if the environment is degraded for the economic benefits of private individuals, multinational organisations or the state.

Environmental Pollution as Violation of Human Rights

Environmental pollution is the introduction of any substance at a rate faster than the environment can take care of either by breakdown, dispersion, or storage in any harmless form into the environment (Okonkwo & Eboatu, 1999). Pollution is the introduction of contaminants into the natural environment that causes adverse change. Pollution is grouped into air, water, land or soil (Ogbonna & Uchenna, 2016). Miroslav & Bashkin (1998) maintain that Air pollution is caused by the emission into the atmosphere of particulate matter such as smoke, dust, soot, greenhouse gases, noise, etc. Whereas water pollution is caused by the dumping of the following into the water bodies; municipal wastes, leaching of agricultural chemicals such as pesticides, herbicides, insecticides, fertilizers, wastes from industries, medical wastes, agricultural wastes, acid rain, sediments from erosion, oil spillage, etc. While land or soil pollution are caused by dumping or introduction of plastics, tires, cans, papers, soaps, old vehicles, solid waste from homes and industries, industrial and agricultural wastes/effluents, etc. to the soil.

Cohen (1987) maintains that, "the environmental, physical, chemical, and biological factors and their related behaviours impact health in one way or another". The World Health Organisation's (WHO) report indicated that globally 85 out of 102 categories of diseases and injuries are influenced by environmental factors (WHO, 2020). Consequently, WHO maintained that, "the interactions between humans and the environment affect the quality of life, health disparities, and a healthy life span. Making the environment healthier can prevent about 13 million deaths yearly and avoid 13%–37% of the world's disease burden, such as 40% of deaths from malaria, 41% of deaths from lower respiratory infections, and 94% of deaths and diarrhea. Wuso (2012) stated that, when a state participates in human rights violations, various state actors and institutions can be involved in such practice. For instance, the police, military, judiciary, state prosecutors, government officials etc. can be involved either directly or indirectly. The state is directly involved when it fails to protect vulnerable people and group from the scourge of environmental pollution and devastation which is a violation of the rights of others. (<https://www.humanrightscareers.com/issues/what-are-human-rights-violations>). Human rights violations centre on any action that limits or denies citizens their rights to life, liberty, freedom, economic, environment and political rights etc.

Natural Disaster versus Man-Made Disaster

Whilst we talk about environmental pollution, devastation and degradation, it is pertinent that we distinguish between natural disaster and man-made disaster (which is a result of man's economic and technological expansion for profit and also development purposes). It is such an event that causes and distorts the natural processes of the earth and causes widespread destruction to the environment and loss of human life. Interestingly, the questiondelet to ask is, 'what are the substantive differences between these concepts? It can be stated that, natural disasters are mostly beyond the immediate control of man to forestall its occurrence. Natural disasters are catastrophic events that result from any of the Earth's natural phenomena such as floods and hurricanes to tsunamis, earthquakes, wildfire, tornedos, rain fall, excruciating sun and so on. Man-made disasters are extreme hazardous situations that are caused by human beings. Some examples of man-made disasters include chemical spills, hazardous material spills, explosions, chemical or biological attacks, nuclear blasts, train accidents,

plane crashes, groundwater contamination, flooding, bush burning etc. (Rhyley, 2021). Man-made disasters are considered the immediate making of man, it should be considered as a violation of human rights, because it is the result of the activities of man for economic, political, developmental, social, spiritual and any other interest that contributes to the pollution, devastation and degradation of the environment.

Nnimmo (2017) stated that pollution is no longer news on the epic struggles on our waters; while our fishing communities struggle to catch the aquatic beings, the aquatic beings struggle not just to escape the nets and hooks, but also to breathe as they are suffocated by myriad pollutants and poisons. It is very imperative for us to state that pollution could be caused by natural disasters and some are man-made. The UN Conference (1972) stated that, globally human-made pollutants from combustion, construction, mining, agriculture and warfare are increasingly significant in the air pollution equation. Pollution could be said to mean the introduction of contaminants into the natural environment that cause adverse change.

In their views, Akpodiogaga, & Odjugo (2010) maintain that, “Problems such as air pollution, water pollution, solid waste management, urban poverty, deforestation, desertification, wind erosion, and flooding increase cause more risk to the environment”. Bradley et.al. (1992) posits that, the deterioration of the environment has led to infectious diseases, thereby reducing human health quality, which is a violation of the rights of the citizens. In the same vein, WHO (2022) identified polluted air, poor sanitation, polluted water, unhealthy housing and global environmental change as some of the environmental factors affecting and violating human health. Environmental health is now an emerging challenge Nigeria is experiencing, the same as other countries of the world. Some of the common emerging environmental health issues in Nigeria include climate change, which influences infectious disease patterns, air quality, and the severity of natural hazards such as droughts, storms, and flood. Hazardous wastes and toxic substances are yet to be fully recognised, and research to appreciate how these risk factors impact health is underway (Mbamali et.al., 2012). However, finding solutions to reduce such risk factors still continues in Nigeria and other parts of the world.

Healthy Environment as Human Rights Protection

Prevention and management of environmental pollution and degradation are the solutions to human rights protection and sustainable development; accordingly, John & Craig (2014) maintains that, it is important economically and environmentally to reduce the input of materials and energy, minimize the amount of waste for treatment and disposal and make sure the wastes that are produced can be reused or disposed of easily without harm to the environment. According to the Public Trust Doctrine of National Policy on the Environment, “Environmental Right ensures that every Nigerian has a right to a clean and healthy environment”, it went further to state that Environmental Offsetting requires a general obligation to protect threatened or endangered species and natural systems are very important to sustain life, provide livelihoods, or general well-being”. Environmental Pollution Prevention Mechanism’ (PPM) is considered beneficial to society better, than ‘Pollution Management Mechanism’ (PMM). In the application of the doctrine, it is advisable to key into ‘Pollution Prevention’. This encourages industries to invest positively to prevent pollution, because, trying to solve the problems of pollution when it occurs, is more challenging than preventing it. The laws must be very strict in stopping organisations from doing business that undermines the health and well-being of the environment. According to Allen (2012), “oil drilling companies still discharge associated water into the seas in Nigeria

unchecked by government officials at the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR)”, a gross violation of the environmental health of citizens.

The health challenges faced by citizens as a result of the polluted environment is a violation to their right to life, and more demeaning than the economic and political hardship citizens are exposed to on a daily basis. The poorest people in the world are the ones that suffer most from the health effects of environmental pollution (Ogbonna & Uchenna, 2016). Consequently, diseases and many other harmful effects related to the polluted environment reduces economic development which is a violation of people’s right. Non-communicable diseases which are on the increase such as heart diseases, stroke, and, cancer, can reduce economic development by pushing people into poverty due to loss of productivity and cost of long-term medical treatment (WHO, 2011). Nationally, the goal of the Nigeria National Policy on the Environment is to “ensure environmental protection and the conservation of natural resources for sustainable development”. It outlines some strategic objectives to coordinate environmental protection and natural resources conservation for sustainable development. They are thus: “securing a quality environment for good health and well-being; promoting sustainable use of natural resources and the maintenance of the biological diversity; promoting an understanding of the essential linkages between the environment, social and economic development issues; encouraging individual and community participation in environmental improvement; raising public awareness and engendering a national culture of environmental preservation; and building partnership among all stakeholders on environmental matters ensuring that gender is mainstreamed at all levels and times”.

Environmental human rights violation in this context is the violation of others’ rights by the activities of other citizens, groups and organisations that result to the damage of the environment such as, land degradation, pollution of the rivers due to oil exploitation activities, air pollution due to gas flaring, sooth and other deadly chemicals emitted into the atmosphere that reduces the opportunities and privileges of citizens to good health. When citizens lose the possibility of meeting their present and future needs through the various components and aspects of the environment due to environmental damage which is under the total control of the government whose duty it is to protect, preserve and promote the environment, then citizens’ rights of survival could be said to have been violated. For instance, the oil spill in December 2021, a blowout at a non-producing well owned by a Nigerian firm, Aiteo, went uncapped for more than a month, before the United States of America-based oil-well specialist Halliburton Boots & Coots was brought in to “kill the well” by injecting cement into it (Mongabay 2022). We can only imagine the number of families whose economies and health must have been affected as a result of an individual’s business racketing, such economic affliction is a complete violation of the rights of such citizens.

The Universal Declaration on Human Rights stipulates that, Human rights are rights which all human beings have by virtue of their humanity, such as the right to life, dignity of human person, personal liberty, fair hearing and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Consequently, this enabled them to provide a common standard of behaviour among the international community for the good of all men. The Declaration maintains that these rights are, “natural, rational, inviolable and unalterable; the deprivation of which would constitute a grave affront to one’s sense of justice”. Rights, according to Maurice (1973), Osita (1984) and Adetokunbo (1998) are generally understood as, “moral-political claims which by contemporary consensus, every human being has or is deemed to have upon his society or government,” claims which are recognized “as of right” and “not by love or grace or charity.” Human rights protection are the rights which are set out in international and regional human

rights agreements which states have (voluntarily) signed and ratified. According to Ofodum (2018) stated that, the social consciousness of man has been his continued efforts to seek justice and avoid injustice activities of his fellow man right from birth to his death. Sharma (2011) states that, Internationally and nationally, the need for the promotion and protection of human rights is now not only recognised as the foundation of freedom and justice but as an integral and essential element for the preservation of peace not only within the confines of particular states, but universally.

A healthy environment is a panacea to the economic and political development of a state. Nwosu, (2012) states that “Nigeria attended the 1972 Stockholm Conference on Human Environment, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and also ratified many other International Environmental Conventions, but unfortunately, not much has been done in the implementation of these laws, that has always been the problem with Nigeria. However, Nigeria has made other frantic efforts to protect and preserve her environment such as the “Land Use Decree of 1978”, “Environmental Impact Assessment Act (Decree No.86 of 1992)”, and “National Policy on Environment first published in 1989 with the revised edition produced in 1999)”. There are more than twenty-five federal environmental regulations, policies, and laws (Allen, 2012). The Nigeria national environmental programme maintains that “Nigeria is committed to a national policy that ensures sustainable development based on proper management of the environment in order to meet the needs of the present and future generations” (National Policy on Environment, 2016). So many other laws and policies were made as contained in the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Section 16, subsection 2 has it that “The State shall direct its policy towards ensuring the promotion of a planned and balanced economic development”. While section 17 (2) (d): “In furtherance of the social order, exploitation of human or natural resources in any form whatsoever for reasons, other than the goal of the community shall be prevented”. The political will to implement these laws has become a major trauma in various political dispensations in Nigeria.

Healthy Environment and Economic Protection

Evidences of rapid increase of human population according to Isife (2012) have indicated rapid environmental decline and human living conditions. Mabogunje (1985, p.13) stated that “it will be easy for people to become so exigent, worrying only about what to get out of the environment for their own immediate needs and uses, without caring very much for the consequence, especially, for succeeding generations”. Very interestingly, the Federal Government of Nigeria observes that land fragmentation, over-farming and over-grazing have led to soil erosion and desertification and that overcrowding has led to the spread of shanty towns and urban slums, all of which would worsen if the present population growth continues (FGN, 1988; NEST,1992). Unhealthy environmental activities have caused economic difficulties. The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) estimates that Nigerians destroy about 600,000 hectares of her forest every year through careless exploitation and husbandry, which has negative consequences and implications for a number of worsening environmental problems in the country, which include but are not limited to soil erosion and infertility, desertification and flooding.

Human’s activities to constantly expand their economic acquisition on the earth surface has largely affected and degraded the quality of the human and agricultural environment. Technological and industrial advancement, development and urbanisation has contributed

greatly to the excess carbon monoxide produced by combustion and other human activities (Isife 2012). Ironically, several rural towns and villages in Nigeria that had in the past enjoyed fresh air are currently experiencing air pollution problems due to the industrialisation process and expansion in human activities (Obajimi, 1998). Ideally, technological and industrialisation created the emergence of urbanisation which is responsible for the rapid accumulation of solid waste and a threat to economic protection. Onwioduokit (1998) stated that, most environmental problems are due to the production or consumption of goods whose waste products translate easily into pollutant. However, industrialisation and technological advancement are the keys needed to develop the human environment. Though very poor, weak and improper waste management control has added a great dimension to land area pollution in Nigeria, which manifest through chemical, physical and biological substances that affect the natural condition of water.

The idea of sustainable environmental health for economic development is mindful of the counsels of environmental specialists on the harmful effects of development. Ogbonna & Uchenna (2016) stated that technological and scientific expansion is seriously causing and giving support to development with little or no regards to the environment. Environmental sustainability requires a vibrant equilibrium and contribution between all the requirements of human efforts to the vital need for the protection of our natural environment (UN 2016). Environmental health sustainability is concerned about the question of equity; fairness, social justice and greater access to a better quality of life that the environment can offer if unpolluted. Economic protection is concerned about the economic development of the state, with a focus to start behaving in a way that will mitigate climate change, further environmental pollution and reduce inequalities, as all these threatens to change every progress already made in human and economic development for the benefit of the poor people in the world (Akintoye & Opeyemi 2014). Economic and infrastructural development is the technical and scientific acquisition and utilisation of knowledge to increase the manufacturing, distribution, and consumption of goods and services by man. Economic developments are more concerned with the means of production, consumption and services.

Pollution and Infectious Diseases a Violation of Human Rights

The human environment has globally experienced significant change as a result of natural and human disasters. Jarraud & Chung (2008); Farooq, Meraj & Sensing (2019) stated that, it is alarming the way climate change and greenhouse effect have been on the rise leading to many natural disasters such as ice-melting, floods, tsunamis, air pollution, the emergence of infectious and non-communicable diseases leading to various health risks facing the human population. Hyellai et.al (2021) noted that there are several health issues in Nigeria as a country, such as control of some disease vectors, maternal mortality, infectious diseases, poor hygiene and sanitation, disease surveillance, and road traffic injuries. As is the case globally, Nigeria faces environmental health-related problems, including environmental hazards and the insufficiency of basic human necessities, though, the designed programmes for addressing health issues in the country have proven inadequate and resulted in a small health status improvement (Abdulraheem, 2012).

For instance, Eboh (2018) informed that the Federal Government has increased the penalty for gas flaring to \$2 per 1,000 standard cubic feet (SCF) of gas, from N10 per 1,000 SCF of the commodity flared. Our argument is that, such pollution should be financially and health-wise compensated to the individuals affected, other than being used as a revenue generating outfit for the federal government. The 1999 Nigeria Constitution, Chapter IV, section 33(1) states that, “every person has a right to life, and no one shall be deprived intentionally of his life....”. However, the federal government may be directly accused of intentionally depriving

citizens affected by gas flare of their right to life, having converted gas flare which ought to be stopped or compensation paid to affected citizens. The Nigerian government is making profit from it hence they have refused to put an end to it. Eboh further states that, Government also stipulated a fine of N50,000 or a six months jail term or both, for anyone who provides inaccurate flare data.

The main objective is to identify environmental health-related risks that violates human rights, by discussing the current environmental status. Hyellai, Duan, Olusola, & Narh, (2021) specifically assessed and relayed Nigeria's current environmental health situation, presented the causes of death and years lost to disability, showing levels of contributions from environmental risks. They also explained how environmental factors affect health, identifying specific diseases associated with environmental risks. A study found that most Nigerians spend most of their time at work, school, or home environments, and some of these environments expose them to indoor pollution, electric and fire hazards, lead-based paint hazards, and inadequate sanitation and heating (Ezebilo, & Animasaun 2012). Some of these environmental hazards that have affected the health and safety of the population are caused by man's exploitative tendencies, which is a violation of the health of other members of society. The need for maintaining excellent healthy homes and societies to achieve a sustainable environmental health system for the population should remain a constant priority for political leaders (Jackson et.al 2013).

The concern for a better health condition for Nigerians becomes interesting. Hyellai et.al (2021) advocates that concerned organisations and institutions should eliminate childhood exposures to lead to reduce the risk of exposure and promote public health in general. Thurtle (2014) observed that, lead dust is usually dispersed into the environment during the extraction of gold, thus exposing the public to health defects when the lead is inhaled through the air or ingested in unsafe water. Intensive studies have shown that most lead in Nigeria had been exposed to the environment through unsafe mining practices by the communities involved (Jackson, Dannenberg, Frumkin 2013). Lack of safety precautionary measures that most miners undergo, to the extent of not wearing protective equipment while mining, hence returning home with lead dust on their clothes thereby infecting other members of society (Lo 2012). Such show of negligence to maximise profit to the detriment of others are completely a violation of people's rights to life. He further stated that, investigations in Zamfara reveal widespread lead-poisoning, with thousands of children living with dangerous levels of blood lead causing hundreds of human and animal deaths due to this lead risk. Obinaju et.al (2014) stated that some environmental health reports for surveys and research conducted in Nigeria over the previous years show lead metal at unsafe levels has gotten into homes, especially in Northern Nigeria. The water from several wells in Zamfara shows high levels of this heavy metal, and children in this community have blood lead at dangerous levels.

Water-infected diseases have increase based on unhealthy economic activities, and the demand for high-quality water and sanitation facilities also increased. Hyellai et.al (2021) stated that, as the value and demand for portable water increases, economic activities constantly polluting the available water making it more detrimental to human health also increased, they described the sources of water pollution to include domestic water pollution, industrial water pollution, agriculturally based water pollution, and oil spill water pollution are the primary sources of water contamination in Nigeria. Orisakwe (2019) stated that, the unhygienic disposal of waste in waterways blocks the system resulting in flooding during the rainy season, increasing water contamination, breeding of mosquitoes' emergence, and fast spread of water-borne disease; accumulated waste is usually a breeding ground for various diseases and disease vectors. Oyeniya (2011) observed that, the poor state of sanitary

infrastructural management in Nigeria, and lack of a central sewage collection centre or central dumpsites is a serious health challenge to citizens. Endsjö (1973), Lawanson, & Fadare 2013 and Ana et.al, (2013) were convinced by studies that the failure to treat sewage system in Lagos and Abuja, and open a solid-waste dumpsites have contaminated water systems, leading to health risks caused by poor hygiene such as diarrhoea-related disorders, bilharzia among others. These has really affected and contaminated drinking water with high nitrate and other harmful chemicals (Ana etal, 2013).

Conclusion

The sustainability of environmental health is for the benefit of all citizens. Therefore, there ought to be the responsibility of all citizens, and relevant stakeholders under the enabling laws to protect and promote the environment as a very important factor in human rights protection. The ‘bastardisation’ of the environment by the activities of private, public, and multinational organisations is a violation of the rights of other citizens whose livelihood depends solely on the environment. Understanding this, will make it easier for the government and relevant stakeholders to commit much of their time and resources to tackling environmental problems as a problem capable to instigate threats to national security. The responsibility to protect the environment should apply to all businesses under the enabling laws, both local, state, national, and international organisations without prejudice. There should be respect for the constitutional provision to stop gas flaring; dumping of chemical waste in an unprotected site; stop emitting poisonous gases into the atmosphere; stop indiscriminate falling of trees; and stop oil spillage on water and land. All these activities and many more have caused most deaths and disability combined in Nigeria within their operational coverage. Hence, it amounts to a violation of the human rights of those directly affected, and should be treated as such.

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NATIONAL INTEREST AND SECURITY IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA

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Abstract

The paper examined national security and national interest in the Korean peninsula. With the end of the Cold War's bipolar conflict, scholars whose perspectives are mostly rooted in western tradition realized that it was difficult to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula due to the lack of visionary leadership in the US and China, the lack of regional institutionalization in Northeast Asia, and North Korea's self-destructive survival strategy. The state of security in the Korean Peninsula was the subject of the study. It makes sense of Korea's public character, interests and relationship with the landmass emergency. The study uses realist theory to explain that the state is the main player in the anarchic system. The basic objective in an anarchic framework is endurance, which all entertainers make progress toward; As a result, a portion of the study focused on Korea's struggle to survive within the international system. The study used a qualitative method of data collection and analysis, primarily content analysis, to explain that North Korea's nuclear weapons program is a major threat to global security in the Korean Peninsula, which is a significant geopolitical region. Consequently, numerous studies have been conducted on the region's security and national interest concerns. This study suggests that the Republic of Korea adopt a strategy that could be referred to as a "porcupine strategy" in order to safeguard its following national security interests: to ensure the Republic of Korea and its people's survival, territorial integrity, economic prosperity, and promotion of Korean culture in order to contribute to world peace.

Key words: *National Interest, Security, Korean Peninsula.*

Introduction

In international relations, the concept of national interest is fundamental. This is because all nations are always working toward achieving or protecting their national interests' objectives. Each nation's foreign policy is always working toward achieving its objectives and is based on its own national interests. It is generally acknowledged right of each state to get its public interest. A state generally attempts to legitimize its activities based on its public interest. A state's actions are always influenced and governed by its national interest. As a result, it is absolutely necessary for us to comprehend the meaning and substance of national interest (Eberstadt, 1999).

Morgenthau asserts that the preservation of physical, political, and cultural identity from invasion by other states is of the national interest. The primary international strategy objective of any country is to get its homegrown objective which is the security and the uprightness of the country. As a result, policymaking goes beyond a nation's survival to ensure that its national interest is protected. It must rely on the success of national efforts in crucial domestic spheres to be effective, including internal political stability and social cohesion, supported by successful internal economic performance, and a gradual improvement in the general quality of life for the population (Wong, Perlez, and Buckley, 2015).

Korea was a single political entity whose territory roughly matched that of the Korean Peninsula up until the end of World War II. Since the Korean War was ended by the Armistice Agreement. In 1953, the northern locale of the landmass has been represented by the Popularity based Individuals' Republic of Korea, while the southern piece has been administered by the Republic of Korea. With its islands included, the Korean Peninsula covers 220,847 km² (85,270 sq mi).

Chosonmal, Chinese, and Japanese names for the peninsula all come from the same place. The Korean Peninsula, also known as the Sino-Russian Peninsula or Silla/Sila Korea, is a prominent but relatively small peninsula that is sometimes mentioned in older English historical books. Follow the 1270 east meridian north from the equator to the middle latitudes on a globe or map to easily locate Korea. In close proximity to the center of the Korean peninsula is that very intersection. Additionally, it is quite close to "the demilitarized zone," or DMZ, a significant geopolitical feature. The DMZ is a brief political limit shaped by the Korean Peace negotiation of 1953, which finished the threats of the Korean Struggle (1950-53). The Korean Conflict began as a civil war, grew into an international conflict between communism and capitalism fought on Korean soil, and has not been resolved after nearly fifty years of an uncomfortable truce. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) are separated by the DMZ, which divides the peninsula. According to Kong (2009), the demilitarized zone (DMZ) has a width of 2.4 miles and is centered on a 151-mile demarcation line that separates the Yellow Sea from the East Sea, also known as the Sea of Japan. The DMZ is an odd representation of peace and tension at the same time. The zone is "demilitarized" and "off limits" to soldiers and civilians, resulting in peace within: that indicates that humans are shielded from the zone's inhabitants' plants and animals. However, the North and South's opposing combat-ready forces continue to confront and intimidate one another throughout the zone, creating an uncomfortable tension. At present South Koreans call the landmass Hanguk, while North Koreans call the promontory Choson. Politically, South Korea is divided into nine provinces and six special cities. Politically, North Korea is divided into nine provinces and three special cities. Although the Korean peninsula is approximately 600 miles long, its narrowest point, near the DMZ, is only 120 miles long. The peninsula of South Korea is referred to as "tiger-shaped" by many people, particularly younger ones. The tiger is both a traditional deterrent to evil and a symbol of the modern, aggressively successful urban economy of South Korea. Other Koreans, particularly the elderly, still consider the peninsula to be "rabbit-shaped." The wisdom of the peninsula's traditional agricultural economy, which is rapidly disappearing, is symbolized by the rabbit. Numerous Korean folktales, paintings, and even South Korean exports feature the tiger and rabbit. The Korean peninsula's entire landmass is 84,565 square miles, roughly the same size and latitude as Utah (Friedberg, 1993).

Statement of the Problem

Due to its geopolitical significance and the ongoing tensions between North and South Korea, the Korean Peninsula has been the focus of international attention for decades. Not only do the two Koreas care a great deal about the security and national interest of the region, but so do their neighbors, China, Japan, and the United States. The presence of North Korea's nuclear weapons program is a major concern for global security, and the Korean Peninsula is a significant geopolitical region. Consequently, numerous studies have been conducted on the region's security and national interest concerns.

The United States' role in fostering peace and security on the Korean Peninsula has been the subject of some research. Researchers have analyzed the US's tactical presence in the locale, its coalitions with South Korea and Japan, and its endeavors to haggle with North Korea on the atomic issue. Many contend that the US's job is basic for keeping up with local security and forestalling struggle. Even after decades of war between the north and south Korea, which attracted the superpowers, the effectiveness of the north and south Korean national interests on the peninsula is still up for debate and may be flawed. The peninsula is now a strategic intersection of the four superpowers: China, Russia, Japan, and the United States, in terms of geography, politics, economics, and culture. Each of these superpowers has a particular stake in the peninsula. In addition, tensions in the demilitarized zone between North Korea and South Korea pose a threat of new conflict and create uncertainty. The national interests of the North and South Koreans on the peninsula are greatly hampered by the divergent interests of the superpowers. The North Koreans rule the northern peninsula, while the South Koreans rule the southern peninsula. The demilitarized zone serves as the boundary separating North Korea and South Korea (Davis, 2020).

Even after decades of war between the north and south Korea, which attracted the superpowers, the effectiveness of the north and south Korean national interests on the peninsula is still up for debate and may be flawed. The promontory presently comprises an essential place where the four superpowers of China, Russia, Japan and the US geologically, strategically, monetarily and socially cross. Each of them has a particular interest in the peninsula. In addition, tensions in the demilitarized zone between North Korea and South Korea pose a threat of new conflict and create uncertainty. The impact of the disparate interest of the super powers represents an extraordinary test to the public interest of the north and South Koreans on the promontory. While the northern landmass is represented by the North Koreans the southern landmass is administered by the South Koreans, While the neutral ground comprises the limit separating North Korea and South Korea (Davis, 2020).

For North Korea, public safety is principal, and its quest for atomic weapons is a basic component of its public protection procedure. The nation has been working on developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that have the potential to reach the United States and has carried out a number of nuclear tests. A substantial standing army, artillery, and other conventional weapons are also included in its military capabilities.

The promotion of economic expansion and the maintenance of peace and stability on the peninsula are two of South Korea's primary national interests. It is a vital partner of the US and has a critical military presence in the locale, including the US Powers Korea (USFK). With its highly developed technology sector and export-oriented industries, South Korea is also a major economic power.

Preventing conflict that could destabilize China's northeastern border and maintaining regional stability are China's primary priorities in the Korean Peninsula. It also wants to safeguard its economic and strategic interests in the region and stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia and addressing North Korea's nuclear and missile threats are Japan's national interests in the region. Japan additionally tries to extend its monetary binds with South Korea and has been attempting to further develop relations between the two nations.

The objectives of this paper are to:

- i. examine the significance and state of security in the Korean Peninsula

- ii. explore Korea's national identity and interests and its relationship with the peninsula crisis
- iii. evaluate the strategic value of the Korean peninsula to the parties in the peninsula crisis

Theoretical Framework

Theory of Realism

A view of international politics that emphasizes its competitive and conflictual side is referred to as realism—also known as political realism. It is typically appeared differently in relation to vision or radicalism, which will in general underline participation. Realists believe that states are the main players on the international stage because they care about their own safety, fight for power, and pursue their own national interests. The realists' skepticism regarding the relevance of ethical norms to relations between states is frequently a negative aspect of their emphasis on power and self-interest. They sometimes assert that international politics is a sphere devoid of justice characterized by active or potential state conflict, whereas national politics is the domain of authority and law (Amos 2017).

However, not all realists deny that international relations are influenced by ethics. The differentiation ought to be drawn between old style authenticity addressed by such 20th century scholars as Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau and revolutionary or outrageous authenticity. Even though classical realism places an emphasis on the idea of the national interest, it does not adhere to the Machiavellian idea that "anything is justified by reason of state" (Kathryn, 2019). Nor does it include the glorification of war or struggle. The classical realists do not deny that moral judgment can play a role in international politics. Instead, they criticize moralism, which is abstract moral discourse that ignores political realities. Based on prudence, they place a high value on successful political action: the capacity to determine, based on the likely political consequences, whether a particular course of action is right in comparison to other options.

Realism asserts a long theoretical tradition and encompasses a variety of approaches. The most frequently mentioned names among its founding fathers include Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Thucydides. Neorealism, which is an attempt to construct a more scientific approach to the study of international relations, has largely replaced classical realism of the twentieth century. International Relations theorists like Kenneth Waltz, who represent liberal, critical, and post-modern perspectives, have criticized both classical realism and neorealism (Waltz, 1979).

Conceptual clarifications

Concept of National Interest

National interest is a crucial concept in international relations, according to Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–1988), who defined it as "the protection of physical, political, and cultural identity of a state against encroachment by other nation states." Every nation is constantly working toward achieving or securing the objectives of their national interest.

According to Charles, Lerche, and Abdul (1994), the general, long-term, and continuing purpose that a state, the nation, and the government all see themselves as serving is the

national interest. In addition, Vernon (1960) defined national interest as "things that states seek to protect or accomplish in relation to one another." It denotes the desires of sovereign states. The claims, objectives, goals, demands, and interests that a nation constantly strives to preserve, protect, defend, and secure in relation to other nations can be defined as national interest.

The consolidation of democracy, continued economic expansion, and promotion of cultural pluralism are all in Korea's national interest, starting on the peninsula. The nation of Korea's security and prosperity are among its primary national interests, as stated in its constitution. Grinter's advocacy of democracy, liberty, and human dignity

Realizing such national interests will be necessary for a future North-South Korean government to exist. Specifically, Korea's political democratization has progressed beyond that of any other East Asian democracy. As a result, East Asia should learn from Korea's experience. The more important it is to focus on universal principles of international society like democracy, free market economy, and multiculturalism, the greater the relative power of the states surrounding the Korean Peninsula. because the security of Northeast Asia could be compromised by Chinese hegemonic regional influence rather than American global comprehensive influence.

Different scientific points of view, conversely, make sense of that in the contemporary universe of globalization, advancement of data innovation, and predominance of standardization, the impact of worldwide and local authority may not be unmistakably characterized. As a result, China and Japan's attempts to establish hegemony on a global and a regional scale are severely restricted by the United States. Regarding the G2, the United States will maintain her global leadership even within the Northeast Asian region, and the United States will request a harmonious partnership with China on symbolic issues in order to maintain its more effective leadership. It is helpful to consider the historical shift in the Northeast Asian security structure in relation to Korea's security, the rise of China, and the relationship between the US and China. This is because the development of new security arrangements in Northeast Asia has been the primary focus of the shift in Sino-US power relations.

Concept of security

Since the end of the Cold War, every security authority has been seriously reforming the concept of security. We witnessed a widespread trend in the age of globalization to broaden the scope of the security agenda Buzan, Barry, and Gerald, (1994). Moving away from a narrow focus on the safety of the state—also known as national security—and toward a more encompassing or alternative focus on the safety of people—either as individuals or as a global community—was one strategy. A guarantee or certainty of something is referred to as security. Assuring particular arrangements into the future is regarded as security. Usually, this means that the political system is in good shape; Changes in social norms that could upend these arrangements are then quickly identified as a threat to security. According to Buzan (1994), security is essentially a "contested concept," whose meaning is fluid and the subject of numerous competing claims and definitions.

It is helpful to historicalize the idea in order to comprehend the debates regarding the so-called new threats to security. Security has always been a variable state: Although Thomas Hobbes claimed that the only truly human condition is the fear of death, the causes of this fear vary greatly across time and space. People's safety can be compromised in a variety of ways; Indeed, human rights, environmental issues, cultural identity, and economic well-being may be more important than military issues. However, if one does not have a clear understanding of the nature and scope of post-Cold War security, the simplistic inclusion of other concepts and agendas may only result in an unnecessary complication of the term. As a result, expanding the concept of security may be dangerous. Moreover, the 'globalized worldwide local area', in which each person's life has become firmly associated and related with one another, understands that state security has never reduced regarding its impact on every individual's day to day routine (Dalton, 2018).

Methodology

The descriptive and ex post facto research designs were utilized in this study. This is due to the research's qualitative nature. The description and evaluation of the secondary data collected on the divergent interests at play in the peninsula, as well as the comparison of variables like national interest and the state of security on the peninsula, were used to draw conclusions about the topic of national interest and security in the Korean Peninsula.

Subsequently, the technique for information assortment in this study was the subjective strategy in light of optional sources. This study made use of secondary data sources, which included existing records and materials, research findings, and results from previous work by other researchers. It primarily focused in the peninsula's conflict, struggle for national interest, and security.

Results and Discussion

The significance and state of security in the Korean Peninsula

The intention to control the Korean Peninsula marked the beginning of a larger campaign to dominate Asia. This was a historic battleground. Over the centuries, several direct conflicts for geopolitical interests have occurred within the Korean Peninsula's sphere of influence. The China-Japan War, the Russia-Japan War, and the U.S.-China War all took place in the Korean Peninsula and served a variety of strategic and historical objectives.

Due to geopolitical considerations, the Peninsula has attracted great powers. Weathersby, 5,000 years in length brought together history has partitioned unfamiliar international interest with same bloodline Korean individuals isolating with one another each with a political and geological limit. Rivalry in Korea resulted in unexpected wars and destruction in the past due to the power interest and ambition of a great historical empire.

To better comprehend the significance of the Korean Peninsula in the present, it is necessary to comprehend its history. In 1592, Japan invaded Korea, and in 1596, a truce brought an end to the military conflict. China took part in the invasion of the newly united Japan over the Korean Peninsula. The Japanese were compelled to leave. After a brief period of peace, the first military impasse was resolved. Then, in 1597, Japan invaded Korea and withdrew in 1598 (Jordan, 2003).

Toyotomi Hideyoshi's death in September 1598 led to Japan's withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula. But the new Japanese government ordered them to withdraw. In addition to posing a threat to the Korean ruling dynasty, Japan's occupation also posed a threat to China's future leadership. The final peace negotiations, which took several years to complete, were in China's and Korea's favor. Both regimes wanted to keep their power in their own countries. Both the Joseon Dynasty in Korea and the Ming Dynasty in China worked together to stop Japanese supply lines and empire ambitions.

Empire Russia's expansionist policy and Japan's first war ended in a negotiation in 1903. Be that as it may, the exchange was not executed. For their geopolitical purposes, both nations desired total control over the Korean peninsula. Russia didn't want their strategic navy and maritime trade to leave through the Korean port, and Japan didn't want anyone else to control its important waterway. The primary cause of the immediate conflict that resulted in the Great Asian War of the 20th century was the city of Port Arthur's control.

After the breakdown of Russia-Japan impartial support zone discussion, a naval force war broke out in 1904. After losing the Korean Peninsula war to Japan, the Empire of Russia's legacy was severely damaged. Russia had a significant impact on the Korean government. As a result, it was opposed to any third nation entering its umbrella nation. In an expensive and bloody struggle for control of the crucial Korean Peninsula, Russia and Japan fought. The loss Korea sustained led to a significant reassessment of the Russian empire's legacy. On the other hand, Japan's victory demonstrated its international reputation. The war changed the balance of power in East Asia, and the Korean War started a new empire. The defeat of a European power by an Asian nation was unprecedented in history. Korea marked the beginning of Japan's Asian empire. Japan received support from the United States and Britain during the war, while Russia received support from France and Germany. Russia had lost two of its three armadas. There was only its Black Sea Fleet left. The Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on September 5, 1905, brought an end to the war as a result of American President Theodore Roosevelt's mediation effort. Russia's defeat in the Korean peninsula war resulted in the loss of all its previous successes, credibility, and even domestic turmoil. Japan's operations capacity far from the border was impossible without control of the peninsula.

In 1910, Japan forced the annexation of the entire Peninsula and established total control over the territory and trade. Germany defeated Japan in the First World War and took control of China and other Pacific territories from Japan's sphere of influence. On September 2, 1945, Japan unconditionally surrendered, ending its 35-year colonial rule over Korea.

At the Cairo conference in November 1943, allied leaders pledged that Korea would become free and independent. The war, however, did not end here. Foreign forces continued to occupy the Korean peninsula for their own geopolitical purposes. New power arose in Korea with US and Russia attempting to demonstrate their impact. In response to the American atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, the Soviet Red Army invaded Manchuria immediately to assist the communist guerrilla. The northern half was occupied by the Soviet Union, and the southern half was later occupied by the United States. Both sides agreed to draw the 38th parallel, which officially separated the North and South.

Due to disagreements between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding their respective geopolitical interests, an effort to hold general and free elections was unsuccessful. Russia and the United States of America did not want to form a single government, resulting in two governments in the North and South and their hold on power. Soviet Union troops

withdrew in 1948, and American troops withdrew in 1949, following the establishment of pro-Communist governments in North Korea and pro-West governments in Korea.

On June 25, 1950, South Korea was surprised when North Korea crossed the 38th Parallel. The capital of the South was quickly taken over by Communist troops, who then quickly expanded to control the entire Peninsula. The North's army was defeated by the South's army, which advanced on all fronts, including successfully advancing the final Pusan port. All of the major areas were quickly taken over by North's high morale forces.

Korea's national interest and identity and its relationship with the peninsula crisis

According to Ikle (1998), the connection between Korea's global and regional security environments and specific security issues pertaining to the country's survival in those environments is the source of Korea's national identity and interests. According to Kenneth (2019), every nation has its own national identity. To make sense of Korea's public interest as per the possibilities of Sino-US relations, there should be a clarification about Korea's public character. Two characteristics stand out most of the time. The one that stands out the most is Korea's status as a "Northeast Asian state." Although we frequently refer to the "Northeast Asian region," it is difficult to identify a specific nation as a Northeast Asian state. China, Japan, Russia, and the United States, for example, all have an interest in the Northeast; However, it is impossible to attribute these nations' national identities solely to Northeast Asian nations. Korea is the nation with the strongest Northeast Asian identity from this perspective. According to Holt (2012), this means that Korea's national interest is most dependent on Northeast Asian stability.

However, the likelihood of a unified Korea in the near future is extremely remote. We cannot, however, completely rule out the possibility of a sudden crisis that could result in a hasty reunification, so it would be prudent to hedge our risks. Russian policy must avoid the "explosive" scenario and explain that the most advantageous scenario is gradual convergence, which at the appropriate time would put voluntary rapprochement of state mechanisms on the agenda. The uncontrollable escalation of the Korean conflict remains a possibility.

For decades, the crisis has been going on along Russia's far eastern borders. The ascent and fall of strains have on various events driven the Korean landmass to the edge of war. The sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in March 2010, close to the so-called Northern Limit Line, was the most recent crisis event. The ship was destroyed by a North Korean torpedo, according to the report of an international commission established by South Korea and comprised of experts from allies.

China did not back up this conclusion, and Russian experts did not find the investigation's findings to be conclusive. Consequently, attempts to increase sanctions and pressure on North Korea following the incident received mixed responses from the international community and UN Security Council. However, the ship's sinking led to a significant deterioration of the situation on the Korean peninsula, not only between the two Koreas but also between major powers, particularly China and the United States. In the meantime, significant, if unnoticed, processes began in North Korea to develop novel approaches to the country's governance. The West was anticipating a crisis in North Korea and potentially significant shifts in the situation on the peninsula for a significant portion of 2010.

The issue, according to Ikle (1998), is that Northeast Asia has taken center stage in international politics since the beginning of the 21st century. This is due to the fact that this region is where the major powers most frequently clash over political, economic, and security

issues. However, Korea must have the diplomatic authority to continuously and effectively play at both the regional and global levels in order to avoid merely remaining in the region. China, Russia, Japan, and the United States clash and coexist in Northeast Asia, which is a point of contact between continental and maritime powers. In addition, Northeast Asia is a unique location where the four superpowers of the world geographically, politically, economically, and culturally intersect, making it one of the most important strategic points on the Eurasian continent. The stability and balance of Northeast Asia becomes a life or death precondition for Korea's national interest and security because the Korean Peninsula is at the center of such an area.

The security complex on the Korean Peninsula is the second most important aspect of Korea's national identity. As one can see from the ongoing North Korea issue, it is difficult to ensure Korea's security and public interest without equilibrium and amicability between the 'peninsular elements' and the 'global variables' on the grounds that the two classifications of variables are unpredictably interlaced. Consequently, North and South Korea must acknowledge that peace and security on the Korean Peninsula cannot be resolved solely from a peninsular or international perspective. The interests of neighboring great powers like China, Japan, and the United States on the peninsula are all distinct.

Every actor wants to avoid a future unified government on the Korean Peninsula that would be under the control of just one country. As a result, Korea's security strategy must incorporate both the "peninsular" and "international" factors in a harmonious manner. The two major players in Northeast Asia are the United States of America and China, both of which seek their own advantages on the peninsula. We know from history that the Korean Peninsula would be the scene of any conflict arising in Sino-US or Sino-US/Japan alliance relations. As a result, Korea will always need to be able to strategically analyze how the changing power structure between the United States and China affects the Korean Peninsula.

Strategic value of the Korean peninsula to the parties in the peninsula crisis

Due in large part to the geopolitical characteristics of the peninsula, Korea became a major source of contention for major foreign powers in the late nineteenth century. It was a good strategic foothold when the continental powers wanted to expand into the sea; at the point when oceanic powers looked for projection of force into the mainland, it filled in as a helpful scaffold (Sun, 2019). Russia and Japan made a lot of effort to build naval bases on the Korean peninsula. History shows that the countries that control Korea were once regional powers that became global powers. On the peninsula, where the national interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan intersect; Korea fills in its essential significance. As the most advanced post against Soviet expansion from the US perspective, the peninsula, along with China and Japan, is a crucial link in the chain against Soviet expansion (Holt 2012).

Keith (2013) pointed out that the strategic value of the Korean peninsula cannot be overstated: The defense of Japan would be seriously compromised if it became communist and entered the Soviet sphere. On the other hand, from a Soviet perspective, the peninsula would greatly facilitate a Soviet advance into the Western Pacific because it is situated at a cutting point of the US "maritime alliance" that connects China and Japan. When one considers that within a 1,000-mile radius of Seoul are concentrated (1) one billion people, (2) approximately eighty percent of East Asian industries, (3) approximately seventy-five percent of the world's armed forces, and (4) major high-seas SLOCs, its strategic value becomes even more apparent.

The power connections of the four significant countries whose interests converge on the Korean promontory are established in world occasions following Universal Conflict. There were three distinct eras in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union: the cold war that lasted until 1969, the detente that lasted from the beginning of the 1970s until 1979, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and the final phase, which included a "new cold war," that lasted until the INF treaty was signed in December 1987. A new era of peace began as a result of that event. The Soviet Union challenged the hegemony of the overwhelmingly powerful United States during the first period, which was characterized by US nuclear supremacy. It accelerated the development of its nuclear forces until it was roughly comparable to the United States. The second period of détente began at this point (Keith, 2013).

To lessen the likelihood of a nuclear war, the United States worked to normalize relations with the Soviet Union after its nuclear dominance ended. After a long arms control process, the two nations closed the SALT I and SALT II settlements. However, in the meantime, the Soviet Union was steadily developing its conventional weapons until it surpassed the United States in terms of overall military power. The Soviets acquired a nuclear war capability comparable to that of the United States during this period of détente. They contributed to revolutionary warfare in various Third World regions by employing a detoured, indirect revolutionary strategy. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan serves as the best illustration of this strategy. Following that event, the United States began to alter its approach to the Soviet Union. The United States of America strongly opposed Soviet military expansion during the Reagan administration. The US answered Soviet military extension in East Asia with a "three sided" partnership framework connecting Japan and China. The United States took the bold step of normalizing relations with China following the Sino-Soviet border dispute. At the same time, it invited Japan to increase its armed forces to take over a significant portion of the US defense role in the region. Hence, against this (generally maritime) Soviet extension, the US shaped a line of regulation. On this containment line between China and Japan, the ROK could be seen. The power relationships of the four major powers in Northeast Asia during this detente period can be characterized essentially by the confrontation between the Soviets' attempted reach into the Pacific on the one hand and the United States, China, and Japan on the other (Gerald, 2004). This contrasts with the bipolarity that existed during the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Although it would be a huge mistake to believe that the United States should soon withdraw its forces from the region, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union will most likely continue to be one of detente in the 1990s. While Japan, Western Europe, and Asian NICs continued to experience rapid economic growth in the middle of the 1980s, the combined shares of the United States and the Soviet Union in total world product have decreased by almost half compared to the 1950s. Since 1980, defense spending has increased at the expense of other sectors due to the average economic growth rate of 2%. The fierce arms competition that the two superpowers had experienced during the cold war could no longer be afforded. They've started to see other powers as more dangerous than their own arms rivals. One of the primary reasons that led to the signing of the INF treaty in December 1987 (Wheeler, 2018) was that they had to allocate more resources to their economic growth while maintaining a minimum degree of mutual deterrence. In addition, it is likely that the two superpowers will agree to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals by 1990 or later. From a Soviet outlook, even after the two superpowers nullify the INFs and decrease key arms considerably, Soviet military power wouldn't be essentially changed, as yet befitting superpower status.

Conclusion

In international relations, the idea of national interest is very important; every one of the countries are constantly taken part during the time spent satisfying or getting the objectives of their public advantages. Each nation's foreign policy is always working toward achieving its objectives and is based on its own national interests. It is generally acknowledged right of each state to get its public interest. A state generally attempts to legitimize its activities based on its public interest. A state's actions are always influenced and governed by its national interest. Thus it is fundamental as far as we're concerned to know the significance and content of public interest.

Morgenthau asserts that the preservation of physical, political, and cultural identity from invasion by other states is of the national interest. Any nation's first foreign policy objective is to safeguard its domestic objective, which is the country's safety and integrity. As a result, policymaking goes beyond a nation's survival to ensure that its national interest is protected. It must rely on the success of national efforts in crucial domestic spheres for its effectiveness, including internal political stability and social cohesion, supported by successful internal economic performance and gradual improvement in the general quality of life for the population.

Recommendations

The Republic of Korea ought to implement a strategy that could be referred to as a "porcupine strategy" in order to safeguard the following national security interests: to ensure the Republic of Korea and its people's survival, territorial integrity, economic prosperity, and promotion of Korean culture in order to contribute to world peace.

The environment of national security should be influenced by internal factors more. Only when there is broad consensus across the nation can the effectiveness of national security be maximized. Social conflict is more likely to be exacerbated by the complaints and grievances of the relatively less fortunate as industrialization progresses.

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Threats, Multilateral Security Mechanisms and Alliances in the Korean Peninsula

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Abstract

In this study, threats, multilateral security mechanisms **and alliances** in the Korean Peninsula was investigated. As a corollary of the threats experienced in the Korean Peninsula, the increasing influence exacted by super power nations of China, Russia, Japan and the United States on the Korean peninsula even after decades of the war which separated the North Korea from the South, consistently poses great challenge to the national interest of the North and South Koreans on the peninsula. In adopting the “realist approach” as theoretical foundation, this paper notes that the main actor in the anarchic system is the State. The critical goal in an anarchic system is survival, which all actors strive for; hence the study interlaced part of Korea's striving for survival in the international system. The study adopted the qualitative design and used commiserate data collection and analysis methods primarily content analysis to explain that the Korean peninsula has been critical to the development and national interest of not just Korea but other world powers and interests, which explains why there are so many primary and secondary interests contending for supremacy over the peninsula. This has created growing uncertainty within the Korean Peninsula. It is based on the above that this study recommends the creation of a policy framework for the protection of the Korean people from external interests.

Key words: *Threats, Multilateral Security Mechanisms, Alliances.*

Introduction

The rising influence demanded by super power countries of China, Russia, Japan and the US on the Korean promontory even following quite a while of the conflict what isolated the north Korea from the south, reliably presents incredible test to the public interest of the North and South Koreans on the landmass. Therefore, the connection between Korea's global and regional security environments as well as specific security issues pertaining to Korea's survival in those environments are the sources of Korea's national identity and interests. Every nation has its own unique identity. There must be an explanation about the national identities of North and South Korea in order to align their national interests with the prospects of Sino-US relations. Two characteristics stand out most of the time. The most prominent is Korea's status as a "Northeast Asian state on the peninsula." Although we frequently refer to the "Northeast Asian region," it is difficult to identify a specific nation as a Northeast Asian state. China, Japan, Russia, and the United States, for example, all have an interest in the Northeast; However, it is impossible to attribute these nations' national identities solely to Northeast Asian nations. From this perspective, South Korea is the nation

with the strongest Northeast Asian identity, and the north. According to Solingen (2005), this means that Korea's national interest rests primarily on the stability of Northeast Asia's region.

The issue, on the other hand, is that since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the peninsula has been at the center of international politics. This is because political, economic, and security issues between the major powers are most intense in this area. However, this situation necessitates that North Korea and South Korea possess the diplomatic authority to continuously and effectively play at both the regional and global levels, as opposed to merely remaining in the region. The peninsula's location in Northeast Asia serves as a point of contact between continental and maritime powers, where China, Russia, Japan, and the United States engage in conflict and coexistence. Besides, Upper east Asia is one of the Eurasian landmass' vitally essential places and an uncommon spot where the world's four superpowers topographically, strategically, financially, and socially meet. The stability and equilibrium of Northeast Asia becomes a life or death precondition for the national interests and security of both south and north Korea because the Korean Peninsula is situated at the center of such an area. The security complex on the Korean Peninsula is the second most important aspect of both north and south Korea's national identities. Because the "peninsular factors" and "international factors" are so intricately intertwined, it is impossible to guarantee South and North Korea's security and national interest without striking a balance. This can be seen from the current North Korea issue. Consequently, North and South Korea must acknowledge that peace and security on the Korean Peninsula cannot be resolved solely from a peninsular or international perspective. The interests of neighboring great powers like China, Japan, and the United States on the peninsula are all distinct. Every actor wants to avoid a future unified government on the Korean Peninsula that would be under the control of just one country. As a result, the "peninsular" and "international" factors must be harmoniously incorporated into the North and South Korea's security strategy. Because it is at the meeting point of continental and maritime powers, North and South Korea are in a better position to build the Northeast Asian region's collective identity. Regarding Korea's security concerns, it is highly likely that the United States, China, and Japan will follow policies that keep the North-South Korean division as it is. This likelihood will rise if the North Korean nuclear issue is not resolved satisfactorily.

Post-cold war, the Korean peninsula is important to countries in Northeast Asia and the world as a whole. The region is at the center of discussions about regional and global security. With the end of the Cold War's bipolar conflict, western-based academics concluded that it was difficult to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula due to a lack of regional institutionalization in Northeast Asia, visionary leadership in the US and China, and North Korea's self-destructive survival strategy (Specia and Sanger, 2018).

The new security circumstances tend to have rendered Korea's security condition less than stable, despite the strong US commitment to the region's security. Theoretical explanations of the interconnected relationships between globalization's characteristics and its effects on Korea's security have not been sufficient. Every nation has its own unique identity. To comprehend Korea's public interest as per the new security conditions in the time of globalization, Korea's public character should be made sense of.

Problem statement

Since the end of World War II, the Korean Peninsula has been divided into two distinct states: the North is ruled by the Kim dynasty, and the South is a democratic state. The division has led to a slew of security issues, such as military clashes, nuclear proliferation,

and violations of human rights. The Korean peninsula was divided into two zones of occupation when Japan gave in to the Allies in 1945: the North Korea under Soviet rule and the South Korea under American control. In 1948, two distinct governments were established in Pyongyang and Seoul in the midst of the rising Cold War tensions between Washington and Moscow. The division of Korea into North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and South Korea (the Republic of Korea) is the basis for the ongoing conflict known as the Korean conflict.

Cooperative security development on the Korean Peninsula is not a novel concept. Scholars began to investigate how cooperative security could alleviate military and nuclear tensions on the Korean Peninsula in tandem with shifts in the global order in the early 1990s. "The key to resolving the dispute on the Korean Peninsula involves... significant economic reform in North Korea and some preliminary liberalization of its political system," according to Western scholars at the time, although cooperative security could complement restrictions on North Korea's nuclear activity. However, this formulation implicitly calls for a soft regime change in North Korea, which the DPRK's (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) leaders would likely find difficult to accept.

From the late 1990s onward, research on cooperative security in South Korea increased, particularly during the "Sunshine Policy" of President Kim Dae Jung toward the North. Scholars in Korea, like those in the West, looked into how new inter-Korean relations could be supported by cooperative security, but they focused more on strengthening economic ties than changing the DPRK's political system. The freeze in US-DPRK and between Korean relations brought about a decrease in academic work on helpful security, even as new authority in North Korea and its solidification of an atomic weapons capacity changed the boundaries of harmony and security on the Promontory. In 2018, when South Korea's "tranquility Olympics" winter games started another pattern of between Korean tact, helpful security again turned into a focal point of grant. Scholars in Korea now tend to view cooperative security as a broader framework for arms control and building military confidence rather than as an alternative strategy for North Korea's internal political and economic transformation.

The majority of research on the future of the Korean Peninsula, particularly that conducted by experts from the West, has a tendency to narrowly focus on measures to redress the DPRK's (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) nuclear program. Scholars and analysts have recently begun to focus more on the process and components of a peace regime, including plausible options and routes that would take them from the current armistice to a new, institutionalized peace treaty based on normalized relations between the US and the DPRK. Some experts even suggest that Washington and Pyongyang will form a "security partnership" in the long run. As a prerequisite for denuclearization, these concepts necessitate the development of structures that either eliminate or at least reduce the perceived threat posed by the United States to the leaders of North Korea.

Maintaining the status quo, or more specifically, preventing war, has dominated South Korea's strategic posture for more than half a century. However, the strategic calculus has shifted significantly within and outside of South Korea since the end of the Cold War, particularly in the wake of the historic inter-Korean summit in June 2000. Despite the supremacy of discouragement, the ascent to the front of new homegrown political powers, bifurcated security discernment, changing elements in the Korean-American partnership, and continuous strains as represented by North Korea's atomic weapons desires have joined to make developing vulnerability versus South Korea's center vital decisions and ideal models.

The ongoing development of South Korea's strategic thinking has not been influenced by a single factor. Instead, Seoul's own version of "New Thinking" in terms of key security paradigms has been influenced by a convergence of forces dating back several decades but especially since democratization in the late 1980s.

Indeed, two seemingly opposing impulses have framed South Korea's security discourses since the end of the Korean War in 1953, making it possible to argue that strategic ambiguity was present from the beginning. working toward a peaceful reunification with its main adversary while simultaneously preventing another fratricidal conflict. The quest for such obviously mixed up objectives isn't extraordinary to the Korean Promontory as manifested by the historical backdrop of internal German relations, or all the more extensively, the US-Soviet relationship all through a significant part of the Virus War. However, because the interests of four major powers—China, Japan, Russia, and the United States—have always converged on the Peninsula, the consequences in the Korean context were and remain possibly more fragile, complicated, and contradictory.

Aim: The aim of the study was to ascertain the threats, Multilateral Security Mechanisms and Alliances in the Korean Peninsula. The objectives of this study are to:-

- i. identify and examine primary and secondary threats of the Korean peninsula
- ii. **examine the ROK-US Alliance including other alliances and** multilateral security mechanisms in Northeast Asia
- iii. analyze South Korea's security strategy in Northeast Asia and its impact on the development of the region

Research Questions

1. How has primary and secondary threats impacted on conflict in the Korean peninsula?
2. **What is the impact of the ROK-US Alliance including other alliances and** multilateral security mechanisms in Northeast Asia?
3. What has been South Korea's security strategy in Northeast Asia and its impact on the development of the region?

Research Hypotheses

1. Several primary and secondary threats has impacted negatively on the resolution of the Korean peninsula conflict.
2. **ROK-US Alliance including other alliances and** multilateral security mechanisms has failed to improve security within the Korean peninsula
3. South Korea's security strategy in Northeast Asia has mostly in reactive and not proactive and has therefore had no significant impact on the development of Northeast Asia

Significance of Study

Firstly, one of the significance of this study is that it will serve as a structural analysis of the nature and significance of the Korean peninsula will be provided by the research. It will determine how North and South Koreans' respective national interests diverge on the Korean peninsula and how it affects those interests.

Secondly, the research proffer lasting solutions to the conflict within the Korean Peninsula as it will help to ascertain the nature of the national interests of the North and South Koreans on the peninsula, as well as the steps and diplomatic ties that can be taken to advance those interests on a regional and global scale.

Lastly, it will add to the body of knowledge in this subject-matter especially with regards to issues surrounding public interest on the Korean peninsula.

Conceptual review

Conceptualisation of National Interest

As indicated by Dalby (1998), Korea's Public Advantages, In spite of the fact that it can't be said that Upper east Asian relations went through a total change because of the sharp Virus War request on the Korean Landmass, the improvement of US-China relations and standardization of Japan-China relations showed a clear difference to the principal stage which was portrayed by China's segregation.

The second phase of Upper east Asian global relations finished with the finish of the Virus War, introducing the third stage at around 1990. China has begun to become more active in international society since the end of the Cold War, with improved relations with Korea in particular. In this third stage, relations between the US, China, and Japan entered a new phase.

Be that as it may, in these entertainers conventional security relations there has been no advancement of common trust. The beginning of the G2 accelerates the new phase of international relations in Northeast Asia in preparation for China's complete rise. Most importantly, the Northeast Asian security structure still consists of strategic conflict and real cooperation (as we saw during the military tension between the ROK-US alliance and cooperation between China and the DPRK following the Cheonan incident in 2010). As a generally more vulnerable country, it is hard for South Korea to change the system of Upper east Asia's security structure. However, now would be a good time to maximize South Korea's national interest, including North Korean issues, given that the conflict between the United States and China has not yet significantly intensified.

Empirical Review

Sigal, (1999) in his work noted that North Korea is still the most important and persistent security issue in Northeast Asia. Globalization over the past two decades demonstrates that the North Korean regime continues to work on developing nuclear weapons. The regime's fear for its survival cannot be reduced by the United States' disarmament offers to North Korea. In dealing with North Korea, the United States and the international community have alternated between engagement and coercion, which has resulted in sometimes contradictory policies and a lack of consistency on the part of North Korea and the United States.

Schaller, (1998) in his empirical work noted that the North Korea issue is generally emblematic and critical among some other Upper east Asian territorial security, since the North Korea's protection from helpfully take part in the Upper east Asian provincial request has achieved a significant number of the local security troubles, for example, the US-China struggle over the Korean Landmass, the underdevelopment of multilateralism in the district, weapons contest among Upper east Asian nations, etc (Schaller, 1998).

Interest for the most part is a state of needing to be aware or find out about. Because of the hazy nature of the concept of national interest, it is challenging to provide a precise definition of the term (Waltz, 1979). Despite this, the term "national interest" refers to the overall, ongoing, and long-term goal that the states, nation, and government see themselves as

serving. A state's national interest is rooted in a people's social consciousness and cultural identity. To put it another way, a state's social values determine its national interest (Thomas, 2017). In practice, political leaders or policymakers synthesize and evaluate a nation's national interest. National interest is defined as "what policymakers say it is." When studying state interests, international relations scholars typically begin with power. We must adhere to the conventional realist schools of thought in order to determine the connections that exist between power and interests. In their research, there are two schools of thought that are based on the realist theory that peace is caused by a balance or preponderance of power. In point of fact, the distribution of state interests within the international system may be more significant than how power is distributed. Even if states reach power parity with the dominant power, there will still be no military conflict if they are content with the status quo.

Thomas (2017) opined that military conflict only occurs when opposing states intend to overthrow the existing system out of a desire motivated by state interests. Power preponderance only offers partial explanations for military conflict in the absence of more in-depth examinations of interest similarity. Various indicators of national interests, such as membership in IGOs, security alliances, and trade portfolios, could be explained in a theoretical discussion. Due to the complexity of interests, state interests were developed and divided into three main categories. According to Nye (1999), the definition of interest is a "slippery concept" that may necessitate a more multidimensional analysis rather than a one-dimensional explanation. He argued that state economic concerns, in addition to the formation of power or security, reveal state interests.

We can see from the above discussions that nations not only have security or political interests, but they also pay attention to economic processes and relationships, which may have strong effects on states' interdependence. According to Ashley (1984), both neoliberals and neorealists agree that states place a high value on economic well-being and national security. Gilpin, 2001), and states' primary objectives vary in how much emphasis they place on economic and security domains. The third type of interest concern is known as "community interests," and its origins can be traced back to the work of Karl Deutsch (1957). According to Rowman & Littlefield, Cha, Victor, Deutsch and his colleagues believed that institutions and people's sense of community can support and strengthen one another. This mutual identification can also help their interests become "not just instrumentally relevant but integral to one's own purpose."

Concept of Security

The meaning of security following the end of the Cold War varies from region to region, and the security conditions that have changed as a result of globalization have varied depending on social and political restrictions in the region. The formation of the Northeast Asian international order has been very different from that of Europe or North America. In contrast to the European case in which nations of comparative status in financial turn of events, social soundness, and at comparative logical and mechanical improvement stages, and so on., formed Europe's regional security order through reciprocity, and the current state of international relations between Northeast Asian nations can be seen as a result of the proliferation of Western diplomatic relations, according to Duffield, The singularity of the regional security order has also been significantly influenced by this kind of historical characteristic. The Cold War practice of bilaterally resolving major security issues persists in Northeast Asia. These customs are institutionalized as a "fragmented array of bilateral relationships," with the United States serving as the focal point.

Northeast Asia's astonishing economic dynamism is ushering in a growing regional interdependence alongside the Cold War security tradition. In view of the results of

globalization in the field of correspondence, transportation, systems administration, and regular citizen movement, distances are contracting and the economies of the locale's nations are turning out to be more reliant upon the prosperity of one another. This new sense of regionalism also has a security component, according to Fearon (1997):

We will also have increasingly common security concerns if we increasingly share a destiny. Interdependence may lessen the likelihood of major issues. However, the development of economic interdependence does not easily have a significant spillover effect into the security sector, which is unfortunate (p. 12).

The significant restriction of Upper east Asian, or East Asian, local security appears to be genuinely direct. The development of a more mature and stable regional order has been constrained by differences in power between nation-states, unresolved historical issues, the existence of largely autonomous cultures unaccustomed to long-term habits of association and interaction with their neighbors, and extraordinarily rapid economic and social change in recent years (Gilpin, 1983).

Korea is a symbol of the Northeast Asian region's security struggle in the age of globalization. Given this background, it is crucial to determine how to deal with the conflict between global interactions and the Cold War security complex legacy. No matter what the solution is, it ought to focus not only on Korea's safety but also on the new security arrangement for Northeast Asia.

Theoretical Framework

According to Morgenthau (1975) who is the proponent of the realist theory, realism is a theory of international relations that emphasizes the role of power politics, views competition and conflict as enduring features, and sees limited potential for cooperation. Because survival is the most important goal in an anarchic system, and all actors strive for it, this study intertwined Korea's struggle for survival in the international system. Since the competitive system encourages self-help rather than cooperation, states in an anarchic system must rely on their own resources to survive. In an anarchic system, states strive to maximize their power and influence, resulting in a state of security dilemma and uncertainty.

According to Nye & Welch (2010), it emphasizes the security dilemma in which one state's actions to increase its own security will decrease the security of another state, causing both states to further increase their security. Every state must rely on its own self-help because there is no authority above the anarchic international system to enforce rule, law, and norms. This spurs states conduct and strategy that makes a consistent "condition of war" (Mearsheimer 2001; (Nye and Welch, 2010) In order to survive, self-help and the world's anarchic structure force states to provide means of protection for themselves (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz 1979). In the absence of a supranational authority to enforce rules and maintain order, create conditions conducive to violence or the threat of violence (Waltz, 1979). All states' actions and responses to the anarchic system are influenced by their position in the international system; their methods of achieving security are similar, but their capabilities vary.

According to Waltz (1979), states seek balance of power rather than power maximization in order to maintain or shape their position. In order to maintain its position, a state will attempt to join the strongest bandwagon. In an anarchic system, a state's primary goal is security; after that, other goals like development, profit, and power can be pursued. According to American academic and neo-realist Joseph M. Grieco, the idea of relative gains and absolute

gains is a way for states to increase their power and influence through cooperation. States may gain absolute capabilities through cooperation; however, the perception of relative gains by states and the role of international institutions as a mediator distinguish neo-realists and neo-realists regarding cooperation (Carlsnaes, Risseet al. 2002; (1990, Grieco) Neo-pragmatists contend that states interest in security and power compel their conceivable outcomes to collaborate regardless of whether they have common interest (Grieco 1990; 1998, Keohane).

Methodology

Due to the nature of this study, the qualitative method of data collection was adopted. This implies that the study depended solely on secondary data. Secondary data can be referred to as “the study of recorded human communication such as books, websites, paintings and laws”. Information from magazines, newspapers, journals and textbooks either in hard copies or soft copies from the Internet that relate to the research variables were used.

This research also relied on the research findings of others and studies that have been published; and in some cases not published. Secondary data sources include journals articles, textbooks, essays, magazines, Internet, etc. Furthermore, the qualitative content analysis method was adopted. Qualitative analysis is the analysis of information that is not in numerical form. The data comes in the form of texts obtained from various sources. The opposite of this is the quantitative analysis method. The content analysis here was useful in that it provided opportunity for the research questions to be effectively treated based on empirical data generated through available secondary data.

Primary and secondary threats of the Korean peninsula

Primary threat

While the Republic of Korea plays a significant role in the United States' containment of the Soviet Union, North Korea is the real primary or direct threat, according to an in-depth examination of the security issues on the Korean Peninsula. The reunification of the Korean Peninsula under communism is North Korea's primary political objective. The bottom line—their fundamental political objective—remains the same, regardless of the North Koreans' strategy's superficial modifications or diversification (Dalby, 1998). The "Three Revolutionary Strategies" of North Korea will include this Korean Peninsula communization:

- a) To make North Korea a stronghold for the socialist revolution;
- b) To construct a group's progressive base in South Korea in view of
- c) To reinforce world progressive power by helping out other autogenous progressive power; as well as socialist nations.

This depends on the alleged "four military lines":

- a) North Korea's armed forces' modernization;
- b) the outfitting, everything being equal;
- c) making all regular military personnel officers; and d) the entire North Korean peninsula's defenses (Thomas, 2017).

Since the "7-Year Economic Plan" in 1961, North Korea has pursued a policy of promoting the development of heavy industries and has spent a significant amount of their GNP on military expenditures, as pointed out based on this military policy. From 1954 to 1966, their military budget was less than 1% of total annual expenditures; from 1967 to 1971, it was over 30%, and from 1972 on, it has been about 15% on average. As a result, North Korea's military spending has increased in tandem with its increased capabilities. demonstrates a comparison of North Korea's and South Korea's combined military expenditures since 1950., Despite the ROK's continued force improvement since the 1970s, North Korea remains superior to the ROK in terms of military power. The ROK's military power has long been inferior to that of North Korea. Notwithstanding, with a predominantly greater GNP and higher monetary development rate, the ROK was in every case liable to arrive at a tactical equality with North Korea by the last part of the 1990s (Dalby, 1998).

Secondary Threats

In contrast, the USSR, China, and Japan's military might constitute the ROK's secondary, or latent, threats. Three significant recent transitions merit close observation:

(1) the naval and military expansion of the Soviet military in the Far East; (2) Japan's rearmament; (3) China's growing military might, especially in nuclear sub-power; marines.

All three of these are interconnected variables that have a significant impact on ROK security. Japan has begun to reorganize itself in response to the enormous military buildup in the Soviet Far East. China, on the other hand, aims to be a major economic power by the year 2000, so it has been steadily modernizing its naval forces to safeguard its maritime resources. The number of submarines in China's fleet is now twice that of the Soviet Far East fleet. Six of these are nuclear-powered Chinese submarines, two of which already carry SLBMs. The United States gave China some modern military technology in part as a way to keep the Soviets under control (Kang, 2009).

China and Korea share a continental shelf, so if either nation declares its own Exclusive Economic Zone, there could be conflict. Likewise, China's expanding maritime and air power is a danger to Korea. The Far East has seen the most notable military expansion by the Soviets. According to Sigal (1999), the Soviets have deployed 57 army divisions, or one-fourth of their total, aircraft, and 25% of their nuclear weapons in this region. This vast Soviet military power in the region represents an overall average increase of over 300 percent compared to the level in the 1960s. The region has significantly increased in importance from the perspective of Soviet global strategy as a key component of the Soviet total strategy and as a means of defeating the US in the zero-sum game in Northeast Asia. The most attention should be paid to the rapid rise in Soviet naval power in the region. Albeit not exceptionally impressive toward the finish of the 1960s, the USSR started to extend its maritime power during the 1970s, moving on from a seaside to a blue-water naval force. The entire region up to the Indian Ocean is now under the control of the Soviet Pacific Fleet headquarters in Vladivostok. The North Pacific, the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, the South Japan Sea, and the South China Sea are the individual strategic areas that make up this larger region.

ROK-US Alliance including other alliances and multilateral security mechanisms in Northeast Asia

A complement to Korea's bilateral alliance with the United States The establishment of a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia may offer a solution to South Korea's strategic dilemma of managing relations with both the United States and China. Lee's

"strategic alliance" encapsulates his intention to restore the ROK-US alliance as the primary security pillar of South Korea's conventional East Asia strategy. The "strategic cooperative partnership" with China also reflects the fact that Seoul is becoming increasingly dependent on Beijing for security issues like the North Korean nuclear issue. However, the issue is that Seoul may be perceived as pitting Beijing against Washington (Gilpin, 1983).

The third pillar of South Korea's East Asia strategy is the answer to this suspicion: new emphasis in Northeast Asia on multilateralism. A multilateral security mechanism is seen as a useful complement to Korea's traditional bilateral military alliance with the United States because its security interests are diversifying to deal with the major power rivalry in Northeast Asia, tightening energy competition, worsening environmental issues, and the North Korean threat. Before Lee came to power, there were already plans in the region to create a new security mechanism.

The ROK's interests in national security are its survival, territorial integrity, economic prosperity, and the advancement of culture and world peace. The survival of the Korean people is of the utmost significance. Provocation from North Korea and other potential threats from the major powers on the Korean peninsula threaten our survival. In particular, the Soviet Union has continuously strengthened its military presence in Northeast Asia, where the interests of the four major powers intersect. Established maritime powers such as the United States, Japan, and some European nations have implemented protectionist measures to limit the trade expansion of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICS) under the guise of their own trade deficits ever since 1980, when the volume of trans-Pacific trade exceeded that of trans-Atlantic trade. It is imperative that we acknowledge the fact that these protectionist measures also constitute a distinct threat to the Korean national interest. Second, regional attack by the genuine or by potential adversaries ought to be dissuaded using any and all means.

However, the continental shelf, which has recently become a contentious issue in international law, should be included in territorial integrity. An Exclusive Economic Zone should be established and territorial waters should be extended to twelve miles. The economy is the third.

South Korea's security strategy in Northeast Asia and its impact on the development of the region

The Korean Peninsula has been haunted for nearly seven decades by the threat of nuclear war. President Harry Truman of the United States made the public suggestion in November 1950 that nuclear weapons could be used in the Korean War. The United States of America used a variety of tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) for about 40 years after the war. Both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, also known as North Korea) and the Republic of Korea launched their own programs to develop nuclear weapons. Pyongyang persisted, announcing its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and subsequently making rapid progress in building up nuclear and missile capabilities while enshrining a nuclear-armed status in the country's constitution. Seoul abandoned its dedicated weapons effort shortly after ROK president Park Chung-hee was assassinated in October 1979. A thermonuclear yield was achieved by North Korea's sixth nuclear test in September 2017. After two months, the DPRK sent off a Hwasong-15 long range rocket, which Pyongyang says is an intercontinental weapon

framework that can arrive at the whole US central area. At that point, North Korea made the announcement that it had completed its mission to construct its nuclear arsenal.

In the years following the Korean War, military escalation on the Korean Peninsula reached a level never before seen. The situation had become more volatile than it had been since the USS Pueblo crisis in 1968 or even since the Korean War ended in 1953, according to many analysts. The Cuban Missile Crisis was compared by some experts. Moscow and Washington have a special role to play in promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula because of the historical relationship between Russia and North Korea and the US alliance with South Korea.

Russia and the United States also bear a special responsibility for maintaining peace and international security because they are permanent members of the UN Security Council and depository states of the NPT. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was adopted in July 2015 as a result of their collaboration with other major powers, which helped resolve the Iranian nuclear program crisis. In spite of US president Donald Trump's choice in May 2018 to remove the US from the JCPOA, the arrangement stays a model of what can be accomplished through multilateral tact, particularly when US-Russian collaboration is saddled to advance atomic restraint (Snyder, 1997).

In a similar vein, Russian–US cooperation within a multilateral framework could play a significant role in the development and implementation of proposals if the key players demonstrate the political will to seek a long-term solution to the security issues on the Korean Peninsula. The possibilities are abundant. For instance, even though the shooting stopped 67 years ago, the Korean War has not been officially resolved. The Cease-fire Understanding of 1953 still can't seem to be supplanted by a legitimate truce or a more complete accord.

In these conditions, the Moscow-based Community for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the Global Foundation for Key Examinations (IISS) concurred in 2017 to direct a joint evaluation of North Korea's advancement in creating atomic and rocket capacities. They additionally embraced to foster proposition on conceivable worldwide moves toward work with the denuclearisation of the Korean Promontory and make enduring harmony and security components (Solingen, 2005).

Conclusion

Korea was a single political entity whose territory roughly matched that of the Korean Peninsula up until the end of World War II. Since the Korean War was ended by the Armistice Agreement. In 1953, the northern locale of the landmass has been represented by the Popularity based Individuals' Republic of Korea, while the southern piece has been administered by the Republic of Korea. The Korean Even after decades of war between the north and south Korea, which attracted the superpowers, the effectiveness of the North and South Korean national interests on the peninsula is still up for debate and may be flawed. The peninsula is now a strategic intersection of the four superpowers—China, Russia, Japan, and the United States—in terms of geography, politics, economics, and culture. Each of these superpowers has a particular stake in the peninsula. In addition, tensions in the demilitarized zone between North Korea and South Korea pose a threat of new conflict and create uncertainty. The national interests of the North Koreans and South Koreans on the peninsula are greatly hampered by the divergent interests of the superpowers. The North Koreans rule the northern peninsula, while the South Koreans rule the southern peninsula. The demilitarized zone serves as the border separating North Korea and South Korea.

The Korean peninsula has undergone significant transformations since the turn of the century. In the 1990s, as the Korean peninsula transitioned from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, tensions eased significantly. Conflict manifested itself, even resulting in crises that threatened war.

Recommendations

1. The ROK must continue to devote 15% of its gross domestic product to defense development and more appropriate weapon systems. Particularly, the ROK ought to develop the Precision-Guided Munitions, or PGMs, which are essential to modern warfare. The ROK defense industry should be supported in this regard.
2. The ideal objective for the Korean people would be a welfare state governed by a free democratic system.
3. Korea's freedom, peace, and happiness could be guaranteed by such a free, democratic welfare state.
4. However, economic growth is necessary for a welfare state, and economic power is unique in its capacity to improve national security and diplomacy.
5. Fourthly, Korea ought to promote world peace and culture. The civilized culture that has existed for 5,000 years is a source of pride for the Korean people. As a branch of oriental civilization, Korean culture has contributed to human civilization and peace. With regards to public safety interests, this subject may be recommended:

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THE DILEMMA OF PROTECTION IN THE BOKO HARAM CRISIS: CHALLENGES CONFRONTING AID AGENCIES

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Abstract

In situations of serious human casualties resulting from violent conflicts or disasters, and where the national government is incapacitated in the management of the crises, the international community has a responsibility to protect civilian lives first. This study examined the challenges confronting international aid agencies in offering protection to displaced persons in Bornu State, Nigeria. Three objectives informed the present study while the Liberal theory was adopted. The study adopted the qualitative survey design to assess the opinions of staff of United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Christian Aid (CA), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), International Office for Migration (IOM), Action Aid (AA) and the World Food Programme (WFP) in Bornu state. The population of the study was 1,500 local and international aid workers in Bornu state. Interviews were conducted on the staff of selected agencies. The descriptive approach of data analysis to assess the relationship in literature or secondary data was used for the study. Some of the findings on the security challenges of aid agencies were summarized as: attacks on food vans, kidnap of aid workers, attack on camps, stealing in the camp and inability to access the interior parts of the state. The study recommended that national institutions such as the police, army and civil defense should be strengthened to provide security for aid workers in the region. The study also recommended that the Nigerian government should be encouraged to take responsibility of the victims of internal displacement.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Aid Agencies, humanitarian crisis

Introduction

Humanitarian organizations or agencies are established to provide care for and support people suffering from the scourges of violent conflicts and natural disasters. Their primary aim is to reduce the impact of the circumstances which compel people to leave their places of habitual residences to seek safety elsewhere. Their roles are numerous; ranging from medical care, security, safety, trauma healing, to food aid, registration matters, helping to find missing relations, provision of temporary shelter and clothing. These agencies work in many parts of the world where there is humanitarian emergency that threatens peoples' lives and livelihood. These agencies can either be governmental or non-governmental. They can also be international or national organizations. They are usually funded by international donors who are committed to the reduction of human suffering and death, especially the ones resulting from violence, wars and natural disasters. Humanitarian agencies are traditionally guided by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence (Waters, 2001) that drive humanitarian assistance.

Humanitarian organizations – including United Nations agencies such as the World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) etc; international non-governmental organizations such as ActionAid, Danish Refugee Council, International Office for Migration, Christian Aid, and national non-governmental organizations such as Danjuma Foundation, Tony Elumelu Foundation – are working in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states to help the women, children and men who have been forced to flee their homes as a result of the conflict as well as the communities that host and support them. These agencies provide humanitarian assistance in different kinds to people in need. Their roles include, and are not limited to protection services, food, shelter, water, medical care, education, latrines and many other forms of practical support that people need in an emergency to survive.

While it is increasingly recognized that humanitarian assistance should be used, to the extent possible, to support livelihoods as a part of life-saving strategies, livelihood support is not without its challenges, particularly in the context of complex emergencies where it may place beneficiaries at further risk than basic relief assistance. Any form of humanitarian assistance, when introduced into a complex emergency typically characterized by a resource-strained environment, can play into the dynamics of the conflict. Food aid, as a very visible form of support may be particularly subject to manipulation. Assistance can affect the balance of power and may ultimately exacerbate or prolong a crisis even when it is effective in saving lives and alleviating suffering.

Physical security of both aid workers and the displaced persons is usually a major challenge. Reported cases of attacks, resulting in kidnapping, rape, murder and destruction have put humanitarian workers on alert, and with the fear of venturing into ‘unsafe’ zones (Sharp, Burkle, Vaughn, Chotani & Brennan, 2002). Apart from physical security, food is a major area of concern for humanitarian agencies because once people are forcefully displaced, their means of livelihoods are affected, and they are subjected to food insecurity (Janku, 2001). There can even be fights over food among the displaced for survival.

Since the commencement of the war on terrorism in the north east of Nigeria which has led to severe humanitarian catastrophes, several agencies have been involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance for over 2 million persons daily in the north-east (USAID, 2018). This also includes the provision of safe drinking water to 2.4 million people and education to over 1 million children in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa (UNOCHA, 2018). However, these services have had hitches and sometimes the agencies threaten to leave. Because basic need is significant to the survival of persons who can not avail themselves of any help, the need to conduct an independent study on the challenges of aid agencies in these areas has become expedient.

Statement of the Problem

Humanitarian assistance in Nigeria’s north east region to help victims of violent conflicts has witnessed several obstacles. Despite the numerous number of aid agencies in the region, humanitarian situations continue to deteriorate. Reports from the media noted that some humanitarian agencies had threatened to withdraw due to many challenges beyond their control. This had exacerbated protection crisis in many camps. There have been several cases of malnourished children, pregnant women, and deaths resulting from nutrition-related complications. The intractability of the Boko Haram conflict has inflicted harsh and

devastating casualties on a large part of the civilian population. Humanitarian situations continue to rise, and draw international attention, as large numbers of agencies have trooped in to reduce the impact of the conflict on especially vulnerable populations. Constant pictures of gory-looking victims of the violent conflict in the region confirm food crisis in the camps irrespective of the mammoth food agencies in the region.

Aim and Objectives of the Study: The aim of this study was to examine the challenges confronting aid agencies in crisis environments in Bornu State, Nigeria. To achieve this, the study developed three specific objectives which were to:

1. examine security challenges of aid agencies in crisis environments in Bornu state;
2. examine capacity challenges of aid agencies in crisis environments in Bornu state;
3. examine food distribution challenges of aid agencies in crisis environments in Bornu state.

Liberalism has its roots in stoicisms emphasis on the equality of people and the factors that unite them as opposed to what divides them, be it geographic, cultural, ethnic or political. That is the idea that we are all part of a community of humankind, regardless of our different political communities and culture. Liberalism's central theme of analysis is the individual; as they and their states are claimants to rights. Immanuel Kant states that the imperative for perpetual peace required the transformation of the consciousness of the individual, republican constitutionalism, and a federal contract between states to abolish war; "this Federation can be likened to a permanent peace treaty, rather than a super-state actor or world government" (Akpan, 2012:56). There is a big link between Liberalism and Integration Theories – interdependence. David Mitrany, a pioneer theorist of integration, maintained that transnational cooperation was required in order to address common challenges (Mitrany, 1943). The integration theory is significant in the fields of diplomacy, international organizations, peace and development studies (Akpan, 2012).

Peaceful change would come not through a shift of national boundaries but by means of actions taken across them. States would not surrender formal Sovereignty which they certainly remained reluctant to do in any case, but would transfer executive authority for specific ends. World Peace could best be promoted if international activities were to be organized around basic functional needs such as transportation, health, and welfare necessities, scientific and cultural activities, trade, and even production... The successful performance of functional activities by bodies that had taken over specific tasks and authorities from governments would bring nations closer together and build a common interest in peace... as governments ceded more and more of their tasks to these worldwide organizations, economic unification would not only promote a working peace, but would build the foundation for broader political agreement.

The relevance of these theories to the current study cannot be overstated. Liberalism and integration emphasize the importance of global integration in solving many of humanity's problems, which include such factors that compel human exodus and humanitarian catastrophes. For instance, addressing many of human problems such as welfare, and other social-economic challenges, through interdependence, could help stem the scourges of warfare and other forms of violent conflicts in Africa, and also prevent humanitarian crises in the event of human displacements. Chris Brown also noted that "the growth of voluntary aid organizations such as Oxfam, and human rights groups like Amnesty International suggests that some concern for the interests and rights of citizens of other states is quite widely accepted; this connotes that a widening sense of identity has accompanied the growth of ever larger networks of interdependence (1995:94-95). The liberal theory contends that people, as well as states can achieve mutual interests and achieve these aims through cooperation, and observance of international laws (Rourke, 2008). This is vital for managing humanitarian problems. On the whole, liberals recognize expending and successful roles of international

governmental agencies like the United Nations, European Union, AU, Organization of American States, etc. in the contemporary world; thereby preventing wars and working for a common good, and avoiding situations that result in population flights.

Burden-sharing: The Burden-sharing principle is in consonance with the principle of common humanity; it proposes a collective action in situations of a problem to protect the interests' of an individual within a group; when the group lacks the capacity to avail itself of certain needs. Bolks and Stoll (2000) argue that “cooperation produces positive-sum benefits”, and this results in the will to share burdens among certain actors. Thielemann (2003:256), notes that “at the international level, cooperation is thought to produce a level in the provision of valued public goods which an individual state cannot attain on its own; burden-sharing can thus be seen as a retinal response to the problem of under-provision”

Expanding the principle of burden-sharing, Smith (2001) notes that the refugee situation in Africa required the cooperation of “all” – local and international efforts to address. Human displacements such as refugee flows are associated with burdens which usually overwhelm receiving states, and sending states alike. In explaining the causes of refugees crises, Ashara (2015), observes that the lack of, or inability of the African states to manage refugee problems result in a crisis situation. Hence, the relevance of the burden-sharing principle lies on the international community, especially African states to see the refugee phenomenon as their ‘own’ problem.

Internal Displacement: Forced human displacements subject the victims to serious dangers. Barnett & Weiss, (2008), observed that irrespective of the mostly coordinated efforts of humanitarian organizations, displacement often leads to hunger and illness, both physical and mental. There is loss of dignity, as individuals and families become dependent on others for survival. Children are unable to go to school and many are not able to get the health care that they need. The effects of displacement can last a lifetime and beyond, damaging the prospects of future generations. For many displaced people in the world, the experience can result in a permanent loss of livelihood or employment opportunities, and can turn into chronic destitution. The effect of this is that people lose contact with their countries, their cultures, and their communities, and this may be devastating to them. Cohen (1999), noted that there is growing awareness within the international community of the magnitude of the crisis of internal displacement that affects between 20 and 25 million people worldwide.

While the responsibility for the protection of IDPs falls first and foremost on national governments and local authorities, it is vital that the international community provide protection and assistance for IDPs in cooperation with the governments concerned. International protection and assistance especially become needed where governments lack the will or the capacity to provide for their own displaced populations, which is tragically often the case in conflicts caused by, or resulting in, acute crises of national identity.

James (2008), sees internal displacement as particularly tragic because of the physical, social and psychological dangers and indignities to which it exposes innocent people. He says the usual causes of the most problematic type of displacement are themselves traumatic: violent conflicts, man-made and natural disasters in which discrimination on a variety of grounds feature prominently. Whether the victims are forced into camps or choose to hide away in unchartered territory or merge into communities that are often equally ravaged, initial displacement nearly always have devastating effect on families, cultures, jobs, education, and the security of a stable society. Above all, he said, it denies innocent people access to food, shelter, and medicine and exposes them to all manners of violence. If left unaddressed, internally displacement may not only cause internal instability but may spill across borders

and upset external and regional stability. There is therefore a compelling need for the international community to strengthen its support for national efforts to assist and protect displaced populations (Janku, 2001).

During emergencies or humanitarian crisis, nutrition is of the most hit. Family standards of living which are usually characterized and associated with access to food security becomes a problem both for the affected and those working to help them. A healthy body and healthy living conditions means that the human body can use the nutrients from food and water properly. This means people must take good care of their bodies and surroundings, and must also have good hygiene practices. Adequate water is needed for sanitation and hygiene as well as drinking and cooking (Hansen, 2011). However, the plight of forced displacement has created denial of access to these needs. To have food security people need to have a wide range of foods from all 6 food groups every day (Ekpeyong, 1984). Clean water needs to be available every day, too. These resources must be used wisely and people must plan for the future in addition to their immediate needs.

Children and other vulnerable groups are usually the most affected in situations of humanitarian crises (Cohen, 1999). Inadequate food intake in children is associated with a number of serious health, behavior, and cognitive deficits (Muggah, 2003). Children who are food-insecure are in poorer health and are more likely to be developmentally at-risk than non-food-insecure children, according to parental reports (Smith, 2001). Infants who experience food insecurity are more likely to have insecure attachment relationships, and to perform more poorly on tests of cognitive development (Cohen, 1999). Children in food-insecure households have more stomach aches, frequent headaches, and colds than children who are in food-secure households. Higher rates of hospitalization, iron deficiency anemia, and chronic health conditions are reported among food-insecure children (Wet, 2002). Studies also report that food insecurity is associated with higher rates of behavioral problems in 3-year-olds; in school-aged children, psychosocial deficits, as well as higher anxiety and depression; and, in adolescents, higher rates of depressive disorder and suicidal symptoms (Hansen, 2011). Food insecurity, particularly when experienced in the earliest primary grades, also has a significant detrimental effect on non-cognitive classroom measures, such as interpersonal skills, self-control, and the group of competencies (including attentiveness, persistence, and flexibility) termed “approaches to learning” (Smith, 2001).”

Food Aid: As an important sector in humanitarian assistance, food aid has taken the interest of researchers and policy makers in recent time. Food aid normally forms an important component of the basic relief package, which ideally also includes clean water, emergency health care and shelter (Janku, 2001). However, while the first priority of organizations like the World Food Programme is to use food aid to address the needs of those who are unable to meet their current needs and are at risk of death in the short term, there is growing recognition that food aid and other assistance can save more lives in the long term if it is also provided to those whose livelihoods are at risk of failure (James, 2008). This requires broadening the traditional focus of humanitarian assistance - those who have already depleted their assets and are destitute - to include those who risk losing their assets (Larry, 2009).

By targeting the latter group with food aid and other relief assistance, humanitarian organizations can help prevent them from depleting their assets, thus supporting an entire community’s capacity to cope with crisis today and avoiding negative impacts to their health and future wellbeing (James, 2008). According to the latest FAO estimates, the number of undernourished people in the world increased from around 870 million in 2004–6 to over one billion in 2009, mainly as a consequence of high food prices and the global economic recession (FAO, 2009). The humanitarian system faces a number of new and ongoing

challenges including climate change, volatile food prices, the financial crisis and the HIV/AIDS and flu pandemics. Longer-term issues, notably rapid urbanisation and ageing populations, will also require adaptation. The contexts in which emergency and transitional aid are needed are constantly shifting (Berman, Felner, Shapiro & Troland, 2013). The 2000s started with drought in the Horn of Africa, which highlighted the protracted crises that these countries face, in terms of repeatedly high levels of food insecurity and acute malnutrition. In fact, governmental humanitarian assistance grew in 2008 despite a reduced growth rate of gross national income (GNI) in many countries (Larry, 2009). Given the unprecedented challenges outlined above, and the interplay between them, it is anticipated that humanitarian and food assistance needs will continue to increase.

Challenges to Aid

Providing food and other relief assistance in ways that supports livelihoods is not without its challenges, however, and may not always be appropriate (Pain & Sue, 2002). The many challenges that thwart relief efforts in complex emergencies, such as access constraints, insecurity, targeting dilemmas and weak local/national capacity, may be even more acute when attempting to programme assistance in ways that support livelihoods. Supporting livelihoods requires careful analysis of all these constraints, along with early intervention, good multi-sectoral programming, strong partnerships and adequate resources (USAID, 2018). Humanitarian workers face a number of critical challenges carrying out their work in conflict situations. Humanitarian access is commonly understood as access for assistance and protection to civilians during armed conflict, as well as military *hors de combat*. It encapsulates issues of freedom of movement of international aid agencies, freedom of access to populations in need and safety and protection of humanitarian personnel, aid and property. When conflict prevents civilians from accessing food and other essential requirements through normal channels, free passage of relief supplies to civilians in need should be granted, as laid down in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their two Protocols of 1977 (UN, 2002).

Determining the number of people in need of assistance and the level of assistance required and keeping up-to-date with changes is particularly difficult in complex emergencies (WFP, 2002). Clearly, such work is hindered when there is not full, consistent access to affected people and areas. In addition, lack of strong public institutions or reliable government counterparts results in serious information gaps, doubts about the reliability of many data and difficulty in verifying information, particularly in the initial stages of an operation (Sharp et al., 2002). These problems are compounded in situations where warring parties seek to provide or withhold food in order to meet their own political/military objectives.

Misappropriation of aid, including food commodities, takes many different forms including direct theft from warehouses or during transportation, post-distribution “taxation” where recipients are forced to turn over a certain portion of received commodities, over- or under-distribution on the basis of inflated registration or exclusion of marginalized groups, or leakage due to weak staff or implementing partner capacity to carry out needs assessments and implement targeted distributions (Pain & Sue, 2002). In any of its forms, misappropriation is a serious issue as it implies that part of the assistance does not reach the intended beneficiaries. Moreover, misappropriated commodities could end up playing some role in sustaining belligerents, which is certainly not the intention of humanitarian assistance. (WFP, 2002)

Over 230 UN staff members have died from malicious acts since January 1992, illustrating the extreme danger of the UN’s work in complex emergencies (UN, 2002). In some situations, WFP has been forced to run operations remotely from neighbouring

countries/regions which presents a major disadvantage to operations, including adding costs and preventing close relationships with local authorities, the affected populations and partners on the ground.

The lack of appropriate resources is often a serious constraint to meeting the humanitarian needs in complex emergencies as it undermines the programming strategy with negative impacts on quality and results of operations. Limited resources often prevent humanitarian agencies from programming the right mix of food and non-food relief assistance to address the total needs resulting from the crisis (Pain & Sue, 2002). Unfortunately, while the high media profile of many complex emergencies at their onset typically results in substantial initial funding commitments, as conflicts turn into a protracted crisis, “donor fatigue” can set in and resources dwindle, especially as new crises occur elsewhere (Barnett & Weiss, 2008).

Crisis environments are environments hit by natural or man-made disasters. They are characterized by the demand for humanitarian assistance. Pictures of hungry and malnourished children, pregnant women, wounded and sick people are everywhere. When these problems become difficult to manage then a humanitarian crisis may have arisen (Nunn & Qian, 2014). People need food to survive. During a complex emergency, a family’s normal means of accessing food may become disrupted, due to loss of crop or livestock, inability to engage in normal means of living or reduced remuneration and/or separation from family and community due to death or displacement (Larry, 2009). Food aid normally forms an important component of the basic relief package, which ideally also includes clean water, emergency health care and shelter.

Methodology

The study adopted the qualitative survey design to evaluate the opinions of staff of selected food aid agencies in Bornu state. The study was conducted in Maiduguri, the capital city of Bornu state, Nigeria. It is one of the three north eastern states (the others are Adamawa and Yobe) that have been under the siege of the Boko Haram insurgency that has displaced millions of persons from their home, causing many deaths. The population of the study was 1,500 local and international aid workers working with 16 agencies to help victims of the violent conflicts in Bornu state (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018). The simple random sampling technique was used to select 25 aid workers working with seven agencies specialized in providing food aid for the study (making up 10 males and 15 females). The following agencies were selected for the study: United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Christian Aid (CA), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), International Office for Migration (IOM), Action Aid (AA) and the World Food Programme (WFP). Primary sources emanating from in-depth interviews and secondary sources included journals, periodicals and publications of agencies. The descriptive approach of data analysis to assess the relationship in literature or secondary data with primary sources was used to analyze data.

Results and Discussions

The findings on the security challenges of aid agencies were summarized as: attacks on food vans, kidnap of aid workers, attack on camps, stealing in the camp and inability to access the interior parts of the state. These findings are in agreement with Barnett and Weiss (2008), who noted that security is a major issue in humanitarian assistance. Workers may face attacks and hijack of the foods for distributions. Lack of security limits freedom of movement of international aid workers, freedom of access to populations in need and safety and protection of humanitarian personnel, aid and property and this will imply that people in need suffer more when they do not get access to foods (J. Johnson, personal communication, July 13

2021). When conflict prevents civilians from accessing food and other essential requirements through normal channels, free passage of relief supplies to civilians in need should be granted, as laid down in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their two Protocols of 1977 (UN, 2002). Pain and Sue (2002), noted that many challenges that thwart relief efforts in complex emergencies, such as access constraints, insecurity, targeting dilemmas and weak local/national capacity, may be even more acute when attempting to programme assistance in ways that support livelihoods.

Victims of violence/displacements are those who require access to adequate nutrient-rich food and safe water as essential for protecting the safety, health and well-being of millions. There is a clear link between nutrition and public health. Communicable diseases brought on in part by malnutrition are responsible for millions of preventable deaths each year. Mass population movements can result in high rates of malnutrition, sickness and death, but when insecurity prevents access to food aid, the situations can be devastating (CIVIC Official 1, personal communication, July 12, 2021).

The findings on capacity challenges of aid agencies in crisis environments in Bornu state included poor food storage facilities, inexperienced aid workers, donor fatigue, non-professionals in nutrition, inadequate food aid personnel, and ineffective food designs. Pain and Sue (2002) support this finding by noting that limited resources often prevent humanitarian agencies from programming the right mix of food and non-food relief assistance to address the total needs resulting from the crisis. Donor groups or individuals may be exhausted or committed (CIVIC Official 2, personal communication, July 12, 2021). At any stage of this scenario, the displaced person are in danger of food shortage and hunger.

Shortage of food also makes people more vulnerable to sexual abuse and exploitation (Sharp et al., 2002). Poor quality diets and vitamin and mineral deficiencies contribute to delayed childhood development, causing irreparable damage. Additionally, for those who live with chronic illnesses, such as HIV/AIDS, adequate nutrition is vital in maintaining the immune system. Some women may become malnourished, while others can lose the confidence or strength to breastfeed their infants (UNICEF Staff 1, personal communication, July 18, 2021). With support networks shattered, there may be even more demands on a mothers time to get food for her family, find shelter and plan for an increasingly insecure future.

Finally, findings on the food distribution challenges of food aid agencies in crisis environments revealed bias in distribution, poor food distribution process, food not adequate in nutrients, food not usually enough, distribution process does not prioritize vulnerable groups. Sharp, Burkle, Vaughn, Chotani & Brennan (2002), had noted that in any of its forms, misappropriation is a serious issue as it implies that part of the assistance does not reach the intended beneficiaries. Moreover, misappropriated commodities could end up playing some role in sustaining belligerents, which is certainly not the intention of humanitarian assistance. (WFP, 2002).

Micronutrient deficiencies represent a largely invisible but often crippling form of malnutrition, affecting birth and maternal outcomes and child development and learning potential. Iron deficiency anaemia and vitamin A deficiency are amongst the most visible forms of micronutrient deficiencies in refugee populations, but these are just the tip of the iceberg and in reality the refugee populations often suffer from multiple micronutrient deficiencies (Shah, 2007). The High Commissioner for Refugees has put a high priority on

improving the nutritional status of refugee populations and decreasing the burden of anaemia and other micronutrient deficiencies.

Conclusion

This study had examined the challenges that confronted aid agencies in crisis areas of Bornu state. The study revealed that insecurity, donor fatigue, inexperienced staff, protracted nature of the conflict resulting in simultaneous flows of displacements, inadequate personnel are some of the challenges that confronted food aid in the area. The study concludes that this situation is responsible for the precarious nature of humanitarian situation in Bornu state.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made:

1. The study recommended that the national institutions such as the police, army and civil defense institutions should be strengthened to provide security for aid workers in the region.
2. The study further recommended that national governments should be encouraged to take responsibility of the victims of internal displacement.
3. The aid agencies should embark on occasional training and retraining of their staff on humanitarian intelligence.

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FOREIGN AID AND DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: THE IMPORTANCE OF HOMEGROWN DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

Foreign aid to Nigeria does not seem to be meeting its objectives in promoting socioeconomic development. There seems to be a missing link to aid effectiveness that has been greatly debated in existing literature and development forums. This paper aimed to describe the impact of foreign aid on development in Africa and the importance of homegrown development as a factor of aid effectiveness. The paper used a historical-descriptive method and secondary data. The paper suggests that foreign aid can be effective only if it is channeled towards Nigeria's own development initiative, considering the social, cultural, and economic dynamics of Nigeria. The paper recommended that Nigeria needs to create a development blueprint that reflects the peculiar needs and aspirations of its constituents. The idea would be for Nigeria to create a development plan and the donors give aid in line with their strengths and capacity.

Keywords: Foreign aid, aid effectiveness, indigenous development.

Introduction

There is widespread poverty in most African countries, as well as a high death rate, a low GDP growth rate, a high population growth rate, a rise in income disparity, a rise in absolute poverty, a drop in educational standards, and a decrease in the human development index (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2022). About 1.2 billion people in Africa survive on less than \$1 per day, and another 2.8 billion on less than \$2 per day (UNDP, 2022). The same thing has happened with death rates, which have risen dramatically over the years. More than ten million children die every year from treatable diseases including malaria and polio (Ogundipe et al., 2013). In addition, preventable causes of death in children, such

as dehydration, continue to account for more than 10 percent of all child deaths in developing nations (Todaro & Smith, 2011).

International affairs and diplomacy have long been preoccupied by the widening divide between wealthy and developing nations. Because of this disparity, wealthy nations regularly send money to developing nations, notably those in Africa, to assist them develop and close the gap. Even though decades of foreign aid were supposed to change the fate of many African states, most of which are currently facing low growth rates, the evidence suggests that this hasn't happened. Due to this, it's clear that merely donating money to Africa isn't going to solve the continent's problems on its own. Western countries have reportedly spent almost \$600 billion on aid to Africa (Akonor, 2008). However, severe underdevelopment persists, and certain states such as Somalia are widely regarded as having disintegrated.

Statement of Problem

The first question that arises is whether there is a correlation between foreign aid and Nigeria's level of development. The second question is whether aid has hampered development in Nigeria. No one can agree on the right solutions for these issues. This study claims that a development program that does not originate within Nigeria cannot have lasting effects. Aid is more likely to contribute to sustainable socioeconomic development if donors have a deeper understanding of the internal dynamics of the countries receiving it.

This article aims to examine the efficiency of aid in Nigeria. The difficulty of attributing changes in a country's growth rate or GDP per capita to aid inflow will be addressed. Or we can confidently assert that aid is inefficient if there is a connection between aid, poverty, and poor policies. This conundrum has been dubbed the "chicken and egg" issue (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). The usefulness of help is still being debated, and there is currently no conclusive evidence linking aid with economic growth. The study aims to elaborate such discussions, demonstrating that domestic factors are more important than external ones when it comes to national progress.

Aim and Objectives of the study

This study aimed to describe the impact of foreign aid on development in Africa and the importance of homegrown development as a factor of aid effectiveness. In line with this, the paper has the following objectives:

- i. To describe the nature of foreign aid
- ii. To explain the benefits of foreign aid
- iii. To describe the challenges of foreign aid
- iv. To understand the determinants of aid effectiveness
- v. To explore an alternative way of administering foreign aid.

Literature Review

Post-Development Theory

The post-development theory served as the theoretical basis for this paper. The failure of previous development efforts prompted the emergence of post-development theory. Most efforts to reduce poverty in the developing world have fallen short of their goals. As Sachs so aptly puts it, the concept of development is a ruined idea in the mindscape. Development has always been accompanied by delusion, disappointment, failure, and crimes, and they all share the same narrative: it failed (Sachs cited in Mathews, 2004a, p.47).

Post-development theorists argue that progress is futile and that it should be stopped. It is not the process of development itself that is coming to an end, but rather the binary, mechanical, reductionist, inhuman, and ultimately self-destructive concepts of development that have been prevalent up until now (Ziai, 2007). Post-development theorists, as defined by Mathews (2004b), focus on the ideas and methods that have gained traction since the end of World War II. The false premise of post-World War II views and practices is that different parts of the world are at different stages of "development," and that the "undeveloped" should try to emulate the "developed" to overcome its problems.

Not only did development not end the crises in the Third World, it but exacerbated existing issues like cultural alienation, environmental degradation, low self-esteem, conflict, and unmet expectations. Disillusionment and disappointment in the potential of future development endeavors have resulted from the failure of progress. The concept of development itself is incorrect, which is why development has failed. As a result, post-development theorists argue for a fresh perspective on development issues, one that could reveal certain problems to be "non-problems" and reveal new ones.

Post-development theorists are critical of development literature for its depiction of underdeveloped lifestyles as inherently bad. The undeveloped lifestyles can't be discarded like trash. While this does not imply that any aspect of life in a developing country is superior, development literature often likens it to Hobbes's state of nature. Western academics and researchers often provide a bleak and gloomy picture of life in Africa, yet anecdotal evidence from the suburbs belies this. Underdevelopment has been blown out of proportion, according to post-development theorists (Mathews, 2004b).

If progress involves adapting Western culture, then we shouldn't be afraid of it working out. The contemporary Western way of life is not an adequate example to be followed by the rest of the world. Post-development theorists argue that, like the impoverished world, the developed world is given too much credit. If "developed" means eliminating issues like poverty, inequality, war, hunger, and misery, then their argument goes, no place on Earth can be considered developed. Although the Western way of life is promoted as the ideal, it is not perfect. Western-style development has several drawbacks, such as the devastation of natural resources, the erosion of social and cultural norms, and the exploitation of less developed nations. The post-development theoretical community, considering these issues, argues that "development" should be avoided (Mathews, 2004b).

Theorists who work in the "post-development" sphere stress the importance of a development strategy that prioritizes intangibles. The most effective method of progress is one that alters our worldview. Beliefs influence behavior. Modern concepts of development are a failure for the developing countries. To pursue progress, a country must first accept that it is undeveloped. A lot of Third World people don't have much faith in development because of all the failed projects in the past. The Third World no longer has any hope for development. Because of this, the 'end of development' is something that post-development theories consider. Diversity characterizes the nations of the third world. As far as they are concerned, labeling a vast swath of the world as "underdeveloped" is a way to dismiss the world's uniqueness and diversity. Diverse communities indicate that there is room for improvement in terms of societal cohesion and economic development (Mathews, 2007a).

Post-development theorists argue that various cultures must discover unique solutions to their challenges. Therefore, aid for development should start from the ground up rather than from the top down. The surroundings and culture of the recipient must be considered while

designing help projects. Post-development theorists tend to be wary of such initiatives. They promote social movements on a local level. According to post-development theory, local community groups are more effective aid channels than national and international organizations (Matthews, 2007a; Ziai, 2007).

Conceptual Framework

This section looks at the major concepts in this study. They include foreign aid, development, underdevelopment, and homegrown development.

Foreign aid

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) provides the standard definition of foreign aid, which is as follows: (1) financial flows, technical assistance, and commodities whose primary objective is to promote economic development and welfare (excluding aid for military or other non-development purposes); and (2) are provided as e. Concessional finance refers to grants and subsidized loans, while non-concessional financing refers to loans with market or near-market terms (and so are not foreign aid). The DAC considers a loan to be aid if its present value is at least 25% below the present value of a comparable loan at market interest rates (this percentage is called the "grant element"). Therefore, for a loan with a 10% interest rate, the grant component is 100%, for an outright grant it is 100%, and for other loans it is some percentage in between.

There are three main types of aid defined by the DAC. The main form of foreign aid is official development assistance (ODA), which comes from the governments of wealthy countries to those of lower and intermediate income. Governments provide official assistance (OA) to countries like the Bahamas, Cyprus, Israel, and Singapore that have per capita incomes over roughly \$9,000 and former Soviet Union satellite countries. Donations from private enterprises, foundations, charities, and religious organizations are all examples of private voluntary assistance.

Development

'Development' is mainly progress, be it economic, social, or cultural, that serves the basic needs of both today and tomorrow. These needs include five interconnected freedoms: namely, economic opportunities, political freedoms, social freedoms, transparency, and protective security (Sen, 1999). Development means much more than economic growth as measured by improvement in GDP per capita. In like manner, a decline in GDP growth rate does not necessarily mean there is underdevelopment.

Underdevelopment

'Underdevelopment' occurs when economic opportunities, political freedoms, social freedoms, transparency, and protective security are denied or not equally accessible to all members of the populace. Underdevelopment is not the absence of development (Rodney, 1973). It results from the uneven nature of human social, political, and economic development.

Homegrown Development

Homegrown development refers to an approach to administering foreign aid where the recipient country takes the lead in designing and implementing development strategies,

policies, and programs, based on its own priorities, needs, and context. It emphasizes local ownership, participation, and decision-making, with the aim of promoting and inclusive development (Tarp, 2014)

Empirical Review

There is a lot of discussion in the field of development economics over whether foreign aid is helpful. Aid may not boost human development indices or speed up economic progress, according to certain economists (Boone, 1996). On the other hand, some people think it does, especially if the country receiving the aid takes the right steps (Burnside & Dollar, 2000).

According to "the End of Poverty" author Jeffrey Sachs, if wealthier countries increased aid flows to underdeveloped countries, poverty could be eradicated worldwide. Human capital, commercial capital in the form of machinery, infrastructure like roads, weak institutions, and a lack of scientific understanding are all obstacles that the poor must overcome. A "poverty trap" is formed by these difficulties. Poor nations can't pull themselves out of poverty without outside assistance (Sachs, 2005). Therefore, wealthy nations like the United States, Japan, Canada, and the European Union should help the world's impoverished by donating 0.7% of their GDP to the bottom billion in Africa.

Aid had a negative influence on growth on average, according to Burnside and Dollar (2000), but a favorable effect in nations with good policies. They found that, unlike multilateral aid, bilateral aid does not promote effective policy. The government of the country that received the aid also spent more money as a result. If aid is to influence economic growth and development, they said, it must be consistently contingent on the quality of policies. As a result, there is more justification for tying aid to conditions (Burnside & Dollar, 2000).

Several unfavorable results, including redundancy and administrative load, have arisen because of poorly planned help, as stated by Lawson (2012). More than three thousand non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in northern Ghana say they work in development aid. Because donor efforts are concentrated on a restricted scope, such as water provision as an example, economic deprivation and stagnant development have worsened in the region due to the lack of adequate coordination of this avalanche of philanthropies. Poor coordination of help causes donors to waste money on projects that have little to no effect on the communities who receive it.

Moyo (2009) claims that hardly a single nation has been successful in using international aid to foster long-term economic growth and development. According to her, the free market and not foreign aid is what has helped the industrialized countries of Europe, America, Japan, and Asia advance their economies. Africa's dependence on help from the developed world is to blame for the continent's development problems. Despite an increase in aid to Africa from 1970 to 1998, Moyo (2009) notes, poverty rates on the continent soared from 11% in 1970 to 66% in 1978. This disproves the belief of aid supporters that their money will lead to greater prosperity in the nations that receive it.

From 1960 to 2010, Okon (2012) analyzed how foreign aid affected human development in Nigeria. Human progress was found to be negatively correlated with development aid. Human development in Nigeria appears to be deteriorating because of foreign aid. Because so much of it is wasted or stolen, aid serves little to advance human progress. Using the same two gap model methodology, Kolawole (2013) looked at how ODA and FDI affected real growth in Nigeria from 1980 to 2011. Several different econometric tools, including the granger causality test and the Error Correction Method (ECM), the authors found that imports

had a negative influence on real growth in Nigeria, whereas domestic investments and exports have a positive effect. The study's primary findings suggest that foreign direct investment (FDI) has a negative impact on GDP in Nigeria, whereas official development assistance (ODA) has little to no impact. They say that the fact that aid money is sometimes stolen or misused is to blame for the negligible growth in aid.

Most of the literature on foreign aid proposes that help is more or less ineffectual in tackling the development difficulties in Africa, despite the findings of Sachs (2005) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) on the effectiveness of aid. Nonetheless, the results of these analyses point to the effects of AIDS. They look to help as the key solution to development problems. They fail to see that aid is merely complementary to effective development strategies. This research seeks to address this knowledge gap by proposing an approach to aid administration that promotes sustainable socioeconomic development in the country receiving the funds.

Methodology

This research employed the historical-descriptive research design. The descriptive research design is a qualitative research design that systematically describes a phenomenon and provides information about it. The historical aspect implies a systematic description of relevant past events (Kothori, 1985).

This study used qualitative data from secondary sources. The secondary sources include books, journals, newspaper articles and online publications. Secondary data for this research were collected using desk research method. Desk research involves reading book, journals, newspaper articles and online publications, related to foreign aid and development. Content analysis was used to analyze the primary and secondary data. Content analysis is the objective and systematic analysis of texts by summarizing and explicating information from written documents relevant to the research.

Results and Discussions

This section looks at the nature of foreign aid, the benefits of foreign aid, the challenges of foreign aid, the determinants of aid effectiveness and an alternative way to administering foreign aid.

The Nature of Foreign Aid

Diverse definitions of foreign aid have created difficulties in defining the term, as not all non-commercial international financial transfers can be conceptually categorized as foreign aid. Foreign aid is typically understood as a transfer of resources from wealthy nations to impoverished, underdeveloped nations. At some point, 'all real resource transfer' from developed to underdeveloped or developing countries was included as foreign aid, posing conceptual difficulties because it includes certain resource transfers that do not constitute foreign aid. The following are the transferred resources:

- i. Preferential tariffs granted by developed nations to less developed nations constitute "disguised" resource transfer, but do not qualify as foreign aid.
- ii. Flow of foreign private investment based on non-commercial considerations should not be classified as foreign aid.

From the perspective of the donor, the flow of capital from donors to recipients should be non-commercial and should entail concessions in interest rate and repayment terms. This definition is insufficient because it includes military aid, ad hoc financial support in the event of natural disasters, food assistance in the event of drought, etc. According to Michael Todaro, the generally accepted and utilized definition of foreign aid encompasses all official grants and concessional loans, in currency or in kind, that are primarily intended to transfer resources from developed to less developed nations for the purposes of development and income redistribution (Todaro, 1983).

According to the United Nations, economic aid consists of grants and long-term financing provided by governments and international organizations for non-military purposes. According to Mikesall, foreign aid is the transfer of real resources from one country to another that would not ordinarily occur due to the operation of market forces or in the absence of specific official action taken by the donor country to promote such a transfer. Therefore, foreign aid consists of both direct government disbursements and those facilitated by special official action, such as government guarantees.

Foreign aid is defined by Riddell (2007) as including all types of resources, including physical goods, skills and technical know-how, financial grants including gifts, and loans provided to recipients at concessional interest rates. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines aid as Official Development Assistance (ODA) if it meets three criteria: i) it must be undertaken by official agencies; ii) it must have the primary objective of promoting economic development and welfare; and iii) it must contain at least a 25% grant component.

The Benefits of Foreign Aid

According to the early growth theories that existed in the 1950s and 1960s, capital formation was the primary problem of developing countries, and these theories believed that development assistance was crucial because capital formation played a crucial role in economic growth and development. It was argued that these developing nations lacked the private and public savings necessary to finance significant investments, such as the development of economic and social infrastructure. In addition, developing nations have limited foreign exchange resources to finance the importation of machinery and other capital products. As a result, foreign assistance was required to cover the savings-investment and trade gaps by increasing the level of investment and thereby fostering economic growth. Since 1980, the goals of foreign aid have shifted to include economic growth, investment, poverty reduction, and public spending on services in developing nations.

Foreign aid also comes in the form of technical assistance, which provides technical skills that have a positive impact on development. This is accomplished by enhancing the quality of human capital and closing the skills divide. A further advantage of foreign aid is that it assists the government in achieving its development goals by covering its expenditures and expenses. Therefore, foreign aid invested in education, health, and other infrastructure contributes to economic growth and overall economic development. The program aid, which is also viewed as an import subsidy, enhances the production efficiency of both public and private enterprises, resulting in an increase in output and the availability of goods and services.

Also, foreign aid is known to be crucial for emergency relief in war-ravaged and natural disaster-stricken regions, such as those affected by floods, hurricanes, etc. Generally, humanitarian aid has gone a long way toward saving lives, providing food to the

impoverished and hungry, offering free health care services to the sick and destitute, and distributing medicines to those at risk of contracting infectious diseases in times of emergency (Conchesta, 2008).

Lastly, foreign aid has aided in the resolution of debt overhangs in developing countries, and the remaining funds from debt cancellations can go a long way toward fulfilling other vital functions in these nations (Conchesta, 2008).

The Challenges of Foreign Aid

Aid is believed to have negative effects on the economies of developing nations. It is observed that project aid distorts spending patterns because aid recipient governments are expected to fund project's recurring costs. In addition, the increase in the number of initiatives strains the already limited capacity of developing nations.

In an economy with potent groups but weak institutions, as is the case in many African nations, the increased lobbying and rent-seeking activity that follows a resource windfall causes a greater than proportional increase in redistribution (Lane & Tornell, 1996). This aggressive effect will then result in a reduced rate of investment return and a net social loss.

According to Riddell (2007), Aid coupling, which is associated with project aid, leads to the exploitation of developing countries because they are typically indebted to the donor country for the purchase of goods.

Foreign aid is also likely to cause the real exchange rate of developing countries to appreciate, resulting in higher domestic inflation. The Dutch disease occurs when an influx of foreign exchange in the form of export earnings, private capital infusions, or foreign aid exerts upward pressure on the real exchange rate of the recipient developing country. Foreign aid may cause the exchange rate of the recipient country to appreciate, thereby reducing the export sector's competitiveness.

Debt extensions and overhang are also a significant issue in developing nations. In spite of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiatives and other reforms, countries continue to carry enormous debt loads. This has been attributed to the extremely high interest rates paid on loans, which consume a significant portion of their budget.

The fungibility of aid in developing countries has a limited effect on economic growth and poverty reduction (Pack & Pack, 1993). Fungibility of aid refers to the concept that donors provide funding for initiatives that address specific needs in a country for which the recipient government has already budgeted. The influx of foreign aid enables the recipient government to reduce its own allocation of resources in the sector receiving ODA and reallocate those funds elsewhere. Although the concept of fungibility in and of itself is not inherently harmful, particularly if surplus funds are redirected to productive uses within the economy, fungibility is problematic because it increases the likelihood of corruption and rent-seeking. The fungibility effect makes it easier for corrupt officials to reallocate and conceal a portion of the "surplus" funding for wasteful expenditures and fraudulent or inflated procurement costs, because the initial stated objectives of these government funds can still be met with foreign aid funds (Conchesta, 2008).

Aid also creates a problem of "moral hazard" in the recipient nation by acting as a persistent soft budget constraint. The constant flow of easy foreign aid funds creates the impression that the recipient government will be bailed out if things go awry. Foreign aid also allows resources to be used for other purposes, such as the recipient government using local taxes

and other sources of income for military armaments, prolonged oppressions, and luxury consumption (Degnbol and Pedersen, 2003).

Factors that influence aid effectiveness

In a 1995 IMF seminar publication, Jaycox contends that even though "the destiny of Africa lies in the hands of Africans," the continent will still require international assistance to overcome its macroeconomic challenges. The six guiding principles of the World Bank, namely, selectivity, results orientation, client orientation, cost-effectiveness, financial integrity, and partnership, are cited as a way in which international donors can assist African nations in building the capacity to take ownership of their development. Transparency, public expenditure reviews, public investment programs, donor support for government programs, and medium-term fiscal planning are anticipated to be in place in recipient countries to increase the effectiveness of aid (Christensen, 1995).

There is little evidence of effective aid performance in Africa more than ten years after these and numerous other recommendations were made. Is it because neither donors nor so-called "development partners" have given them adequate consideration, or because they exist only on paper? What "partnership" can a poor country have with a rich nation that is mutually beneficial? Faced with these concerns, it becomes a conundrum whether aid should be increased or decreased, despite the perception that, to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), an increase in aid to Africa will be required (Sanjeev et al., 2006). On the long term, this is anticipated to assist a country in identifying key policies and measures that can assist it in absorbing higher levels of aid and ensuring its efficient use. For such a long-term financial program to be effective in the face of growing uncertainty regarding the impact of aid on real growth rates, it is necessary to assess aid expenditure and the policy environment into which it will be disbursed, i.e., one in which corruption is reduced.

Effective governance, including competent bureaucracies, has been cited as the solution to Africa's development issues (Chakravarti, 2005). It is now a globally recognized mantra. However, this appears inconsistent with the neoliberal prescription of removing the state from the economy. Goldsmith (2003) concludes that "long-term public bureaucratic capability is primarily endogenous and unaffected by aid" despite claims by critics that aid undermines domestic administrative capability. Simply put, he lacks sufficient evidence to conclude that African states that have received less aid have an efficient administrative structure, and there is little evidence that those that have received more aid necessarily perform better.

Focusing on country ownership, donor harmonization, alignment to recipients' national development strategies, managing for results, and mutual accountability between donors and partner countries is the best way to "increase the impact aid has in reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity, and accelerating achievement of the MDGs" (Wood et al., 2008). These five essential principles are not new to the literature on aid effectiveness; what is novel is that the declaration represents a consensus between aid donors and recipients regarding how aid can be effective.

In 2008, at the 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, it was noted that, despite some progress toward the declaration, there are obstacles (mostly political) that impede further development. In response, the synthesis report concludes that while the Paris Declaration can be beneficial, "it is far from being viewed as a panacea for many countries' most pressing development concerns" (Wood et al., 2008). This conclusion is shocking

because it reduces the declaration to one of those well-intentioned international declarations that do not truly guarantee long-term positive change.

Browne (2006) argues that aid does not match development needs because its "size and direction is subjectively determined by donors" – institutions and agencies that must serve the interests of their paymasters in the involved ministries, primarily nondevelopmental interests such as commercial, geopolitical, strategic, and historical ones. Browne believes that development is a domestic issue and that developing countries should devote more resources to it, as donors invest more in global public goods with a greater impact.

Lancaster (1999) asserts that Africa's developmental problem stems primarily from "the failure of the region to grow," including low rates of savings and investment, whereas Ayittey (2002) contends that it stems from "bad leadership, and the enabling role played by the West." Lancaster argues that the population has increased beyond economic growth rates. What can we say about the evidence presented by Azarnert (2004) that indicates foreign aid appears to have some positive effects on fertility and population growth in Africa? This implies that even in cases with a small population, the deployment of aid would have a significant impact on growth rates, without necessarily increasing annual economic growth rates. Botswana, with a population of only 1.9 million and an annual population growth rate of 1.2%, has maintained one of the highest economic growth rates in the world, transitioning from a once-poor nation to one with a per capita GDP of nearly \$15,800 in 2008. Although Botswana is endowed with abundant mineral resources, we can argue that it is not just a matter of numbers, but of numbers that matter – a population that is capable, innovative, and self-reliant enough to make concerted efforts toward overall development. "Aid is a double-edged sword," Lancaster concludes, implying that when the economic and political conditions are favorable, it can support progress. In the absence of an enabling environment, assistance will be squandered.

Numerous variables are factored into the equation of African development, making it difficult to determine which one(s) best explain the African dilemma. This dilemma necessitates a new method of administration.

Alternative Ways of Administering Aid: Homegrown Development

In Nigeria's pursuit of economic growth and improvement in the standard of living of its citizens, foreign aid is not a substitute for effective governance. Foreign aid is merely a supplement to the government's development endeavors in Nigeria. The preceding section identified obstacles that impede the efficacy of foreign aid. However, when combined with Nigeria's indigenous development model, aid can be effective (Easterly, 2007).

The concept of indigenous development is one way aid can fulfill its development obligations. Former UN Deputy Secretary General Louise Frechette stated that "development cannot be imposed from the outside." "Progress is unlikely absent a national strategy owned and directed by the country and reflecting the broad needs of society" (Frechette, 2002, p. 20).

Easterly (2006) argued that indigenous development was the only self-sustaining strategy that could permanently lift countries out of destitution. Developing nations were required to appropriate concepts, institutions, and technologies from developed nations to formulate their own development strategy. Making available examples of things that do work...it does not mean that countries operate in a vacuum and cannot use knowledge gained from other countries; what I mean by homegrown is for the local people in charge to determine how to

imitate and borrow institutions and technologies from other countries in a way that is compatible with local culture and political traditions and situation.

In a similar vein, Rahman (2012) explained that homegrown development strategy is the embodiment of the people's own development analysis. It receives legitimacy and is bolstered by the direct participation of the parliament, the most important democratic institution that combines the needs of various constituencies to make policies context specific. It lacks any type of donor intrusion as loan conditions on any level (Rahman, 2012, p. 86).

The success of nations such as South Korea, Hong Kong, China, and India demonstrated that foreign aid can only be effective if it promotes domestic development. "The South Korean government guided its corporations, whereas Hong Kong was a paragon of laissez-faire capitalism." China was characterized by a unique combination of Communist Party dictatorship, state enterprises, and partial market liberalization. Singapore is not a democracy" (Easterly, 2007, p.287). Most of success in none of these cases resulted from externally prescribed development strategies.

Through the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS), the Obasanjo administration attempted to foster Nigerian-led economic growth. The objective of NEEDS was to transform the economy through the creation of prosperity, the generation of employment, the eradication of poverty, and a reorientation of values. However, NEEDS cannot be considered an indigenous strategy because it was based on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) of the World Bank and IMF (Agupusi, N.D.).

By empowering local communities, enhancing ownership, and aligning interventions with local needs and priorities, indigenous development can play a crucial role in enhancing aid effectiveness in Nigeria. Here, we will discuss the prospective aid effectiveness benefits of indigenous development in Nigeria, supported by pertinent citations and references. By involving communities in the design, implementation, and monitoring of development initiatives, homegrown development promotes local empowerment and ownership. It enables local actors to participate actively in decision-making processes, ensuring that interventions are tailored to their specific requirements and priorities (UNECA, 2018). This strategy enhances local capacity and promotes a sense of ownership, resulting in more sustainable and effective outcomes.

Considering the social, cultural, and economic dynamics of Nigeria, foreign aids can be contextually pertinent due to indigenous development. By involving local stakeholders in the development process, aid programs can be better aligned with local contexts, ensuring that solutions address the root causes of problems and effectively contribute to the achievement of development objectives (Akolade, 2019). This relevance improves the efficacy and long-term viability of aids.

Local development acknowledges the importance of local knowledge and expertise. By utilizing local talents, skills, and resources, aid programs can access indigenous knowledge systems and solutions that are better suited to local circumstances. This not only improves the efficacy of interventions, but also encourages the preservation and application of indigenous knowledge, thereby contributing to Nigeria's overall development (Odojin et al., 2017). Nigeria's institutions and systems can be bolstered by locally sourced development. Aid programs can improve local governance structures, policy frameworks, and service delivery mechanisms by emphasizing capacity development and institutional strengthening. This promotes systemic change and enables sustainable development beyond the duration of specific initiatives (Odojin et al., 2017).

Effective local development requires sufficient resources, technical expertise, and financial support. To empower local actors and ensure the success of indigenous initiatives, development partners and donors must provide the necessary assistance and capacity-building initiatives. Homegrown development requires effective collaboration and coordination between development partners, local authorities, civil society organizations, and community members. To attain sustainable development outcomes, stakeholders must collaborate to leverage their respective strengths, share knowledge, and coordinate their efforts (Akolade, 2019).

Homegrown development can increase the effectiveness of aid in Nigeria by promoting local empowerment, contextual relevance, and leveraging local knowledge. It affords the chance to strengthen institutions and systems, thereby fostering sustainable development driven by local requirements and priorities.

Conclusion

Nigeria like most African countries has received foreign aid from independence to date. However, the different levels of assistance have not resulted in the expected development outcomes. Foreign aid has proven useful in emergencies and debt relief but there are still challenges with corruption and weak institutions in Nigeria. The homegrown development approach implies that Nigeria needed to seek its answer from within. Nigeria using local institutions, resources and ideas can direct foreign aid from donors to achieve its development goals. Only Nigeria can identify its challenges in line with its history, structures and idiosyncratic features. Aid can be effective when Nigeria comes up with a development blueprint. Aid from donors would be directed to milestones on the blueprint as determined by the Nigerian government.

Recommendations

From the foregoing, this paper made the following recommendations:

- i. Nigeria needs to create a development blueprint that reflects the peculiar needs and aspirations of its constituents. The development plan would be a grand nom to influence donor aid policies.
- ii. There should be multi-donor coordination. Foreign aid should be coordinated in line with the needs of Nigeria's development plan. The idea would be for Nigeria to create a development plan and the donors give aid in line with their strengths and capacity. This is a bottom-up approach and will ensure Nigeria owns its development.

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AN EVALUATION OF NIGERIA EU –RELATIONS IN NIGERIA’S NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FROM 1999-2015

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&

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Abstract

The under-development of Nigeria has posed –concerns to national and international communities despite the contributions of international organizations like the European Union. The European Union has made developmental contributions to Nigeria from its relation with the country and especially the recent relationship framework of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between Nigeria and EU. Worryingly, is the impact of this relations on the development of Nigeria .With the return of democracy in 1999 the EU has exhibited developmental, political, trade etc relations with Nigeria. To what impact has this relation yielded is the basis of this research. This paper assessed Nigeria-EU Relations and national development from 1999-2015. The research explores the recent relations of Nigeria from 1999-2015 and the developmental level that has evolved in Nigeria. The analysis encompasses the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 as a legal framework between Nigeria and EU. With the use of secondary data, this work assessed relations between Nigeria –EU in fostering economic, social, political, etc of the country. The study revealed that EU developmental assistance is a little fraction to development in Nigeria. Hence, the study made valuable recommendations such as to collaborate more at length with the EU in its developmental plans and to work more closely to enforcing the terms of the Cotonou agreement in Nigeria which will bring about a measure of high development

Keywords: European Union, Relations, National Development

INTRODUCTION

Relations between Nigeria and the European Economic community dates back to the signing of the treaty of Rome in march 1957. With the various agreements between Nigeria and EEC and now

European Union (EU), European delegation in Nigeria has grown to become a powerful institution not only for observing and monitoring the political and socio-economic situation in Nigeria. It has established itself as a formidable agency for the initiation and implementation of European development aid projects in Nigeria. The new relationship between Nigeria and EU is pursued through constructive political dialogue which is based on article 177 of the Maastricht Treaty and article 1,23 and 9 of the African Caribbean partnership-European Union. Nigeria government and the European Union relations is geared towards the attainment of the national development. However scholars like, Eyinla (2005) analysed that the future of the European Union's aid programme in Nigeria's national development is a small fraction when compared with Nigeria's own resources. He was of the view that European Union Aid disbursement in Nigeria will continue to attempt to use its developmental aid instrumentality to demand certain levels of behaviour from Nigeria.

However, some authors like Hyden, (2006) were of different opinion that intervention of the E.U in the rural communities and particularly the oil producing states of Nigeria is an indication of the EU best interest for the eradication of poverty and development especially in the third world countries Nigeria inclusive). This has induced a smooth and win-win relationship between Nigeria and the European Union.

In spite of the limitations of EU—Nigeria relations, some viable and visible projects can be cited that have been funded by Brussels in support of Nigeria's developmental efforts. For analytical purposes, the history of EU assistance to Nigeria can be divided into two phases: the period before 1995, and the period since May 1999. In 1995, the EU closed all its projects and suspended its relations with Nigeria because of the country's human rights record under the regime of General SaniAbacha (1993—1998). From May 1999, Brussels resumed co-operation with Nigeria, following the restoration of democratic rule to the country. The legal framework for this recent relations is the Cotonou Agreement of 2000.

Statement of the Problem

EU and Nigeria had developed a good level of cooperation and as such, EU has made efforts through aid towards pursuing a reasonable approach to the developmental, security, human right abuse, poverty, corruption, etc. bedeviling Nigeria. (Arnold, 2016). This includes aid towards promoting democratic system of government as well as peaceful co-existence. This notwithstanding Arnold & Vlessonroot (2016) have rightly observed that the EU had some flaws in its developmental approach in Nigeria because the politics of aid as its initial mission was prompted by the desire to establish her presence in Nigeria (Arnold, 2016) succinctly stated that EU developmental Aid to Nigeria is a tool in the donors' hand. EU's aid assistance to Nigeria in the last decade was above €2.2 billion, of EU's commitment to the continued political and economic development and growth of the country, another €318.5 million was set aside to fund various activities relating to the 2019 general election and the humanitarian crisis of the country's North-east region and about €1.5 billion was committed to the Nigeria's development over the last decade, apart from about €200 million spent in 2015 alone, between 2015 and 2017, about €144.18 million was spent in humanitarian aid to victims of terrorist attacks in the North-east region of the country, including Borno State, while another €100 million went in support of the electoral process since 1999. Interestingly, €353.5 million was provided for water, sanitation and energy infrastructure towards improved living conditions of more than 4 million people in 14 states, about €1 billion spent on engagement with ECOWAS to support strategic national development activities in the region, trade between Nigeria and EU member countries in 2015 was above €25.3 billion. (NY Times, 2018) With all of these developmental aid from EU has Nigeria attained a good level of development? What has all of these achieved in national development?

Aim and Objectives of the Study

The aim of this study is to examine the Nigeria- EU relations and its impact in national development from 1999-2015. To this end, the objectives of the study are to:

1. examine the Nigeria EU relations
2. assess EU Nigeria relations and developmental impact from 1999-2015

3. evaluate the key five areas in EU developmental partnership with Nigeria

Methodology

The study is a qualitative survey which adopted descriptive analysis. The study made use secondary sources of data. Secondary sources such as information from textbooks, journals, online publications etc. The secondary data gathered were carefully analyzed after transcription to arrive at a valid conclusion.

EU-Nigeria Relations

The European Union (EU) is a regional organization based in Europe. Though the origin of EU dates back to 1951, its antecedent dated back to the 19th century(Okoli, 2008) though the movement towards the unity of Europe has a long history, the tentacles of the EU are far found on other regions of the world such as Africa, Asia and the pacific etc. Ola, (1998) stated that in a technologically driven world, the need for collaboration between Nigeria and EU becomes eminent for the benefit of the globalised world.

Bakare (2019) Nigeria's foreign relations with E.U. dates back to 1970's when it led a group of forty-six African Caribbean and states (ACP) during the negotiation between the European Economic Community (EEC) which led to the formation of the Lome convention of 1975. In his view the role of Nigerian leadership towards the creation of the Lome convention was a significant marker in its efforts to promote and advance economic integration between the ACP and EEC. And with the dawn of democracy in 1999 new multilateral diplomacy was embarked upon to foster constructively with the international community in respect to challenges of peace, security, development and democracy and thus, Nigeria has partnered with EU on this five areas good governance, regional security, trade, human right and energy amongst others.

EU- Nigeria Relations and Developmental Impact From 1999-2015

Following the return of Nigeria to civilian government in 1999, Nigeria has consistently repositioned itself in the EU to advance its national interests. For example, in 2009, the two parties signed the Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward which highlights guidelines for developmental co-operation; focusing on certain priority areas: peace and security, good governance and human rights, trade and energy (European Union Commission 2000). This is despite the fact that the logic of the EU partnership and interests in Nigeria since 1999 seems to be based on purely strategic objectives of the EU interests in Nigeria. The most far reaching and recent treaty on democracy and good government was the Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000 between the EU and the ACP. Article 9(1) of the Cotonou Agreement affirms that respect for human rights, democracy and good governance are anchored on the rule of law; "transparent and accountable governance is an integral part of sustainable development" [European Union Commission (2000)]. Similarly, the EU Africa Strategy 2005, which aims to provide a comprehensive integrated approach for EU-African relations, also emphasizes "good and effective governance" as a "central prerequisite for sustainable development" (Abidde,2017) . In contrast to this, however, previous analysis of the EU's commitment to the promotion of democracy and good governance ACP has suggested an inconsistent engagement with this principle by the EU (Adetula, 2008). In fact, the EU tends to prioritize its strategic interests when democratization processes and good governance in member States seem to clash and be asymmetrical with its own policy objectives. According to article 9, it stipulates that the partnership centred on reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the objective of sustainable development and the gradual integration of ACP countries into world economy. It makes human right an essential element and one the pillars of EU-ACP Partnership.

The Key Five Areas in EU Developmental Partnership with Nigeria

In 2009, the two parties: EU and Nigeria signed the Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward which highlights guidelines for developmental co-operation; focusing on certain priority areas: peace and security, good governance and human rights, trade and energy.

1. Democracy and Good Governance

The political dimension of the relations between Nigeria and the EU is articulated in Articles 8 to 13 - of the revised Cotonou Partnership Agreement. Article 8 in particular spells out the objectives and the key topics of the political dialogue.

Nigeria and the EU decided in 2008 to take their relationships to a new level through intensified dialogue and enhanced cooperation. Nigeria and the EU drew the main lines for a way forward to intensify their relations. For example, in 2009, EU and Nigeria signed the Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward which highlights guidelines for developmental cooperation; focusing on certain priority areas: peace and security, governance and human rights, trade and energy, although the logic of the EU partnership and rests in Nigeria since 1999 seems to be based on purely strategic objectives of the EU interests in Nigeria.

(Cotonou Partnership Agreement,2008)

The most far reaching and recent treaty on democracy and good government was the Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000 between the EU and the ACP. Article 9 (1) of the Cotonou Agreement affirms that respect for human rights, democracy and good governance are anchored on the rule of law; “transparent and accountable governance is an integral part of sustainable development”. Similarly, the EU- Africa Strategy 2005, which aims to provide a comprehensive integrated approach for EU-African relations, also emphasizes “good and effective governance” as a “central prerequisite for economic growth and sustainable development”. In contrast to this, however, previous analysis of the EU’s commitment to the promotion of democracy and good governance in ACP has suggested an inconsistent engagement with this principle by the EU. In fact, the EU tends to prioritize its strategic interests when democratization processes and good governance in Member States seem to clash and be asymmetrical with its own policy objectives. The EU’s continued relations, at various points, with several countries in Africa, including Ethiopia, Rwanda, Nigeria, Kenya and Chad, where dubious elections have taken place, demonstrates the EU’s inability, or disinterest, in upholding article 9, which specifies respect for the rule of law and good government. In respect to Nigeria, Khakee2010) noted that promotion of democracy and good governance tended not to be the top priority of EU-Nigerian relations, but rather oil and trade relations.

EU Democracy Support to Nigeria 1999 till date

EU Support	Amount
Democracy	Over 150 million
Innovation and jobs for youth in Nigeria	55 million
Cooperation facility	21.4 million

Covid	500 million
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eeas.europa.eu

Political problems including migration, Nigeria’s status as a regional power, the country’s weak internal political system and the EU’s own economic and political interests have also compromised the EU’s engagement in the promotion of Nigerian democracy. For example, the 2007 general election, which was considered by the international community as the most fraudulent election conducted in Nigeria, did not attract any suspension of aid or invocation of the Cotonou Agreement either by the European Commission, European Council or EU Member States. The constitutional amendment of the third term bid of former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2005-2007 though this did not scale through and the compromised position of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) cast doubt on how the EU treats undemocratic states (Bakare, 2019).

The EU has consistently accompanied electoral processes and deployed an EOM to Nigeria’s general elections since 1999, reflecting its long- term commitment to supporting credible, transparent and inclusive elections in the country.

2. Human Right

The EU relation with Nigeria “shall be based on ... shared values of respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance” (Council of the European Union, 2001). This is a way for the promotion and spread of European values – like human rights, the rule of law and peace – in case that the promotion and sharing of these values is valuable as it is obvious that these values produce relative gains for the EU in its relations with Nigeria.

One example of such an instance might be the promotion of peace through shared values. A peaceful situation in a country, regardless of the type of regime - democratic or military – creates a more stable political situation which also influences the economic stability. Also Fayissa. & Mohammed (1999), argue that the sharing values or principles commonly agreed upon might be conducive or indeed necessary in order to pursue strategic goals more effectively.

3. Security

The European Union (EU) has an inherent and considerable interest in a stable Africa and especially in Nigerian stability (George, 2018). European Union interests in the Nigerian security architecture describe Nigeria as an important regional economic partner for the European Union’s economic investments in Africa. The European Union (EU) is a major importer of Nigerian oil and gas exports (around 20% of crude oil and 80% of gas) and a major current and potential investor in Nigeria. (Calleja, 2013) The need to protect the Gulf of Guinea and to encourage stable regional partners for its own wellbeing is imperative for the EU and its member states. Threats to peace and development such as extreme poverty, climate change, frequent food crises, rapid population growth, fragile governance, corruption, unresolved internal tensions, violent extremism and radicalization, illicit trafficking (European Union 2016). This is coupled with illegal cross-border movements originating from Nigeria are potentially destabilizing for European security (George, 2018). The EU security interest in Nigeria further focuses on terrorist threats, including Boko Haram. (Resursi 2014) Given the above, two areas of co-operation have been crucial in the EU-Nigerian security relationship since 1999. The first focuses on sales of arms and the second focuses on the regional security architecture between Nigeria and the EU. Arms exports to

Nigeria from the EU were improved following the end of military rule in the country in 1999. The UK became the largest arms exporter, followed by Italy and Germany. In 2004, Nigeria was licensed to import aircraft, ground vehicles, and other categories of military equipment worth €82 million. (Khakee, 2007) On regional security co-operation, the EU seeks to work with key emerging African regional powers such as Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia to promote security in the Sahel (Zeniewski, et al. 2013). For example, on 25 October 2011, the EU Foreign Affairs created a European Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. The European Sector Social Dialogue (ESSD) was the first regional security approach designed by the European Union Commission (EUC) in Africa. The security approach also involves developing effective security strategies with regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the AU in the fight against terrorism and trafficking (Cathelin, 2011). Following the establishment of the ESSD, the Sixth Nigeria-EU Ministerial Dialogue was held in Brussels on 15 March 2016. The dialogue underlined the importance and key role of Nigeria in the promotion of peace and security within ECOWAS and the AU Peace and Security Council. The two parties agreed to strengthen efforts towards tackling the increasing security challenges emanating from Mali and Libya and the continuing instability posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). The parties expressed commitment to tackle security challenges such as terrorism, cross-border crimes, proliferation of small and light weapons, and human trafficking. (Bauer, 2000)

On the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria and the EU noted that maritime security is crucial for the growth and development of the region. To strengthen maritime security, Nigeria expressed its commitment to the established organisational security architecture and the “operationalization of Inter-Regional Coordinating Centre (ICC) and the appointment of a single focal point to address maritime security issues” (Eze, 2007). On the side of the EU, it affirmed its commitment to strengthening domestic legislations and facilitating effective synergy and dialogue between Nigeria and the EU (Adebanjo, 2007). According to EU statistics on arms, Nigeria is a beneficiary of arms trade with EU as also the EU has invested about 5 Billion Euro on arms to Nigeria for insecurity issues, (EU report 2015)

The EU “attaches great importance to the relationship [with Nigeria] in recognition of [its] pivotal regional and international roles, especially its contribution to peace-keeping activities...” (Council of the European Union, 1998). When the EU is expressing such interest in cooperation with Nigeria, the concern of securing strategic interests is reflected: Due to Nigeria’s regional importance, the EU might hope for advantages with regard to other African countries. Such advantages might be of direct nature, in case a more stable situation in Africa enables the EU to also cooperate closer with other African countries. However, the advantages might also be indirect on a more stable African situation which prevents the EU from negative consequences like migration-waves, increased spending of development aid or an insecure energy supply.

4. Trade and Economy

EU has remained Nigeria’s most important trading partner in exports and imports, representing about 40% of Nigeria’s total external trade. In terms of investments, EU foreign direct investment, stock in Nigeria stood at 38.4 billion EUWs in 2015 according to EUW cast, representing more than 50% of the overall FDI stock in Nigeria according to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Even during the period of recession in 2016, the stock of EU FDI in Nigeria stood at about 37 billion EUWs.

The stock of EU FDI in Nigeria shows that European companies have invested in the country, contributing to local growth and job creation. European companies do not come to Nigeria to make quick profit and leave. They do not content themselves with selling without investing in local production. The EU delegation and European Business Organization (EBO) Nigeria, a business group uniting leading European investors and corporate organizations in Nigeria that was launched last year at the 7th edition of the EU Business Forum in Lagos is currently preparing a study mapping the European businesses present in Nigeria.

Also, economic relations include also the support the EU provides to private sector development, business environment and trade facilitation in Nigeria and in the ECOWAS region. Under the 10th and 11th EDF, the EU is funding a number of regional programmes covering economic integration, private sector development, trade facilitation and competitiveness. Example is the Nigerian component of West Africa competitiveness programme, implemented by Giz (the German Development Cooperation Agency) which an 11 million EUW project seeking to improve competitiveness and exports through values chain development. This project is implemented in seven states and focuses on four value chains namely; tomatoes, ginger, leather and garments.

5. Energy

Another key area of EU strategic relation with the Nigerian state has to do with the energy sector and trade. The European Union's energy interests in Nigeria rest on three fundamental objectives: sustainability, competitiveness and security (Zeniewski, et al. 2013). Nigeria has the second largest oil reserves in Africa after Libya and is the second largest primary oil producer in Africa. In 2011, Nigeria's oil production capacity was around 3.23 million bpd (Campell, 2009). In fact, Nigeria's largest crude oil export destinations include Canada, France, China, Italy, etc. France still has a strong energy interest in Nigeria. On October 20, 2015, France donated \$170 million which was aimed at improving the power supply for the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The French government also signed an agreement with the Federal Government of Nigeria to build a 35 million Euro (N\$8 billion) 13 megawatts solar plant in Osun state, Nigeria (Brain, 2005). In addition, about 12% of the UK's crude oil imports currently emanate from Nigeria, with the UK Chamber of Commerce commenting on the increasing rate of piracy and threats in the region. The UK Chamber of Commerce argues that the levels of threats in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria heavily expose the UK economy to lawlessness off the coast of Nigeria [UK Chamber of Commerce (2014)]. Equally, German energy interests in Nigeria have been unveiled in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). Nigeria's quest to expand its Liquefied Natural Gas market into Europe was underpinned by a German delegation to Nigeria (Albert, Brain, & Palitha 2005).

Nigeria will continue to remain a global important producer of oil and natural gas for the EU. The oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria provides lucrative opportunities to the European Community and affects the world economic market, thus making Nigeria potentially one of the richest economies in sub-Saharan Africa, with lucrative and enticing market opportunities for the private sector in telecommunications, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals and defence (Adekeye, & Scanlon, 2006).

Conclusion

From 1995 until 1998, the EU is mainly concerned with the establishment of democracy and democratic principles in Nigeria. Evidence for this is to be found in the interests and goals expressed in the EU-documents. In 1995, for instance, the EU's main intention behind the imposing of sanctions is that the military regime should demonstrate "convincingly its intention to return to civilian democratic rule within a credible and rapid time-frame" (Council of the European Union, 1995). This

goal remains of major interest until 1998 when democratic elections are announced. With regard to this event, in the Common Position of 30 October 1998, EU interests can be identified as being free and fair elections, democratic governance and to encourage Nigeria to work further on the improvements achieved already, as for example to publish the draft constitution from 1995 or the release of political prisoners. What is however striking in this Position is that the EU also expresses other and new interests and “attache[s] great importance to the relationship [by expressing its] recognition of the pivotal regional and international role of this country” (Council of the European Union, 1998). This statement resembles the EU’s interest in strengthened EU-Nigerian relations, which possibly is driven by security political advantages, since it is especially recognizing Nigeria’s “contribution to peacekeeping activities” (Council of the European Union, 1998). In the EU’s Common Position from 2001, this trend is confirmed when the EU considers Nigeria “a key partner in terms of political, economic, trade and development cooperation” (Council of the European Union, 2001). The EU’s increasing emphasis on economic development in Nigeria is also observable with regard to the allocation of the European Development Fund, of which 220 € million are allocated to economic - as well as state - and local institutional reform, whereas only four million euro are allocated to the promotion of human rights and five million to the improvement of democratic elections (Nigeria & Commission, 2001). That the EU is interested in benefits from this economic cooperation with Nigeria is clearly expressed by the statement that the objective is to “strengthen the mutually beneficial relations” (Council of the European Union, 2001). However, despite the observed tendency of increasing economic interests it should not be overseen that the EU still is interested in consolidating democracy in Nigeria. In general, it can be stated that the EU’s main goals toward Nigeria become more diversified, ranging from the consolidation of democracy and human rights over institutional capacity building, to poverty reduction, economic development and to the enhancement of Nigeria’s capacity to contribute to regional integration, peace, security and development in West Africa.

Recommendations:

It is therefore recommended that:

- Nigeria should have a working developmental plans devoid of external influences when relating with states.
- Nigerian government should strive to be deliberate when relating with international organizations and other state actors in its developmental policies.
- EU should be developmental conscious and not just diplomatic in her relations with Nigeria.

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Life- Saving Equipment and Safety of Commercial Boat Passengers and Operators in Southern Nigeria

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Abstract

Non-usage of life-saving equipment while on water may increase disaster risk such as boat capsizing, injury, and drowning; studies find generally low levels of lifejacket wear among drowning victims and among some cultural groups. Considering this, the study examined the usage of life- saving equipment by commercial boat users and operators in southern Nigeria. The finding revealed that among the boat operators, 41.9% uses of life-saving equipment is always and 63.4% for the boat users. The determinant factor for the use of life- saving equipment among boat operators were compliance (38.7%) and compulsory for boat entry (27.4%) while for boat users it was prevention from drowning (44.4%) and safety (30.1%). Considering the usage of life-saving equipment along Nigerian waterways, the study concluded that commercial boat operators and users use life-saving equipment always and regularly. The study recommends the need for continuous training and awareness creation among commercial operators and users for consistent and proper usage of life-saving equipment.

Keyword: Life-Saving Equipment, Commercial Boat, Safety

Introduction

Safety is considered as the most important ingredient of any mode of transportation, water transport inclusive. Although overall safety knowledge can be considered good, some differences still exist between groups of passengers (Aiyegbaje and Deinne, 2021).

However, several studies have shown that safety is considered to be most important to transport users and managers. There have been diverse interests in the study of safety in water transport. Some studies have focused on the operational characteristics. Others focused on accidents, safety of the water bodies, and low investment in water transportation by the respective authorities. However, there still exists a paucity of information on the perception of passengers on safety as a factor responsible for low patronage of water transportation (Aiyegbajeje and Deinne, 2021). The work of Bayode and Ipingbemi, (2016) found that safety of water transport has been compromised due to operators' misbehaviors and government inattention.

Similarly, Sigurd et al., (2016) opined that younger passengers and passengers on shorter trips generally have less safety knowledge than older passengers and passengers on longer trips. Also, Nze (2013) analyzed the fatality rates of boat and ferry accidents on inland waterways in Nigeria and found that more fatal accidents occurred with the use of boats than ferries on the waterways. The safety of passengers and crew on boat is of paramount importance while ships are conducting their commercial activities. Therefore, boats must carry appropriate life-saving appliances, including lifejackets, and many others to be used by passengers and crew in case of emergency to protect their lives at sea (International Maritime Organization [IMO], 2019). The carriage of life-saving appliances is made mandatory as per the SOLAS Convention. The International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code provides more specific technical requirements for the manufacturing, testing, maintenance, and record keeping of life-saving appliances (IMO, 2019). The number, capacity and type of life-saving appliances differ from boat to ship and larger vessels depending on its size, shipping activity and voyage, and the LSA Code stipulates minimum requirements to comply to make a ship safe for its passengers and crew.

Aside for the consideration for life-saving equipment available to commercial boat users, Tosin (2014) noted that boat riders rely on their over-rated knowledge of the water ways to convey passengers and goods to different destinations without adequate training and certification in safety measures and navigational techniques. Identify various life-saving peculiar to Nigeria Inland waterways, Aiyegbajeje and Deinne (2021) noted that passengers are either not aware of the safety measures or fail to heed safety measure and mostly prefer not to use live jackets during journeys. According to Faud (2015), one of the important safety aspects of passenger vessels is the carriage of life-saving appliances that contribute directly to the safety of passengers. The examples of the personal life-saving appliances are life jackets, life buoys, and immersion suits.

Statement of the Problem

Every year, significant numbers of accidents are occurring in the inland waterways across Nigeria (Ukoji & Ukoji, 2015). As a result, a lot of commuters are being killed, getting injured and being reported as missing or drown. In many instances, commercial boats are overloaded with goods and passengers, a situation that compounds incidents of boat mishaps/accidents. The passengers on the other hand fail to heed safety measures and mostly prefer not to use any life-saving appliance such as lifejacket during journeys (Akpoghomeh, 2000; Akpudo, 2021).

Water transportation safety is not only determined by the competence and skills of the crew in accordance with applicable regulations (Malisan, 2013) but is also determined by the feasibility of the safety equipment on board and its usage. The safety of human life at sea essentially does not only depend on the condition of the ship, but also on the readiness of its safety equipment to be used at any time, especially in an emergency (Lestari, 2022). Considering this, the study examined the usage of life- saving equipment by commercial boat users and operators in southern Nigeria.

Literature Review

The theoretical framework guiding the study is *Theory of Reasoned Action-TRA*. Within the TRA framework, behavioural intention, which largely determines actual behaviour, is an additive function of two variables: attitudes (positive or negative evaluation of performing a behaviour), and subjective norms (perceived influences that others may have) (Nguyen et al., 2018). In general, an increase in attitude and subjective norms leads to a stronger intention to perform the behaviour such as the use life-saving equipment by commercial boat users. The theory suggested that individual will perform specific behaviour based on the *belief* (behavioural and normative). It based on individual belief the use of life-saving equipment that will enhance their usage. For instance, individual will use lifejacket and show positive attitude towards the usage if the individual belief the lifejacket will prevent drowning.

The conceptual of *Safety and Safety Culture* was adopted for the study. The term “safety culture” refers to the way that an organisation manages safety, and reflects the core beliefs and attitudes that guide behaviour and decision-making (Reason, 2016). In general, there are two broad elements of safety culture. The first are the policies, practices and procedures that the organisation has for managing safety. This first element is sometimes referred to as “safety climate” within the academic literature (Andrei et al., 2015). The second are the values, priorities, norms and motives held by people in the organisation. These two elements reflect the distinction between safety culture as something that the organisation *has* (i.e., policies, practices & procedures) and safety culture as something that an organisation *is* (i.e., people with a shared set of values and beliefs (Reason, 2016). Whilst the academic literature makes a distinction between safety climate and safety culture, these terms are used inconsistently, and are often interchangeable. Indeed, measures of safety climate and culture are highly correlated, and are not distinguishable for practical purposes (Casey, et al., 2017).

Aside for the consideration for life-saving equipment available to commercial boat users, Tosin (2014) noted that boat riders rely on their over-rated knowledge of the water ways to convey passengers and goods to different destinations without adequate training and certification in safety measures and navigational techniques. Also, the boat riders do not always follow the required maximum loading capacity of their boats and they usually overload their boats with goods and passengers, a situation that compounds incidents of boat mishap. Identify various life-saving peculiar to Nigeria Inland waterways, Aiyegbajeje and Deinne (2021) noted that passengers are either not aware of the safety measures or fail to heed safety measure and mostly prefer not to use live jackets during journeys. Toffoli et al, (2005) indicated that poor lighting systems can lead to severe risks, especially during bad weather, early evenings, or rainfall. This leads to accidents, especially when compounded by inadequate signs along major navigational routes. Neglecting in safety equipment fulfilment is one of the factors that cause fatal risks when ships voyage (Setiawan & Susanto, 2019). The study conducted by Setiawan & Susanto (2019) noted that there were positive and significant effects between safety equipment fulfilment and sailor ship safety. Moreover, safety equipment fulfilment had strong effects toward sailor ship safety with 0.753 coefficient correlation 55.3% contribution. Further, the other 44.7% was influenced by other variables. According to Faud (2015), one of the important safety aspects of passenger vessels is the carriage of life-saving appliances that contribute directly to the safety of passengers. The examples of the personal life-saving appliances are life jackets, life buoys, and immersion suits. Among the aforementioned, life jackets are the most important and carried for every person on board. According to Abiodun (2021), boat accidents are a frequent occurrence in Nigeria usually attributed to human errors. The safety of passengers and riders on boats is of paramount importance while conducting commercial activities to the maritime sector.

Methodology

Study Area

The study area is within the coastal region of Southern Nigeria. Nigeria has a coastline of approximately 853km facing the Atlantic Ocean. This coastline lies between latitude 4° 10' to 6° 20'N and longitude 2° 45' to 8° 35'E. The terrestrial portion of this zone is about 28,000 km² in area, while the surface area of the continental shelf is 46,300km² (Figure 3.1). The Nigerian coastal zone sprawls a total of nine coastal States; namely: Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, and Rivers State. The coastal areas stretch inland for approximately 15km in Lagos in the west to 150 km in the Niger Delta and 25 km east of the Niger Delta (Kadafa, 2012). The coastline stretches for 853km comprising inshore waters, coastal lagoons, estuaries, and mangrove especially in the Niger Delta (Lambert-Aikhionbare, et al, 1984).




Figure 1: Coastal region of Southern Nigeria
Source: Awosika (2001)

Study Design and Sample Size

The survey research method was adopted to carry out the study. This method was adopted because it is a suitable and efficient way of studying large population. To have proper coverage, the volume of daily passengers across the selected jetties based on the previous study conducted by Agava (2018) and Lagos State Waterways Authority (2017). The population was projected to 2021 at growth rate of 2.5% using Malthus Exponential Model (Table 1).

To get an optimum sample of the target population (1,773,696) the Taro Yamane (1967) formula for sample size determination was adopted.

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where: e= Level of precision (0.05), N= Population, n= Sample size, 1= Constant

Table 1: Study Population, Sample Size and Questionnaire distribution Across Jetties

States	Jetties	Volume Traffic (2017)	Projected Volume Traffic (2021)	Percentage Contribution (%)	Sample Size
Rivers	Nember/Bile	5,152	5,719	15.26	61
	Marine Base	2,980	3,308	8.82	35
Bayelsa	Nembe	3,440	3,818	10.19	40
	Akassa	2,016	2,238	5.97	24
Delta	Ovwian	2,120	2,353	6.28	25
	Igbudu	1,841	2,044	5.45	22
Cross River	Marina	2,640	2,930	7.82	31
	Ikang	3,550	3,941	10.51	42
Akwa Ibom	Oron Beach	2,325	2,581	6.88	28
	Effiat Waterside	1,938	2,151	5.74	23
Lagos	Falomo	2,847	3,160	8.43	34
	Liverpool	2,921	3,242	8.65	35
Total	12		37,485	100	400

$$n = \frac{37485}{1 + \frac{37485(0.05)^2}{37485}}$$

$$n = \frac{37485}{1 + 37485 \times 0.0025}$$

$$n = \frac{37485}{1 + 93.7}$$

$$n = \frac{37485}{94.7}$$

$$n = 396$$

For the study robustness and conveniences, the sample size was increased to 400. Therefore, the study total sample size was 400 respondents (Boat users and operators). Using proportionate sampling techniques, the distribution of the sample size (400) was based on the percentage of volume of traffic (projected) from each jetty which also determines the number of questionnaires that was administered among the jetties as indicated in Table 1.

Data Collection and Analysis

- i. *Data Collection:* Questionnaire was used to elicit information from respondents (boat operators and users). The questionnaire adopted for the study made use of closed-ended question format. The data required for the objective include life-saving equipment available to boat users (commuters) and the operators. The questionnaire was randomly administered to commuters and operators at various selected jetties for the study.
- ii. *Data Analysis:* The retrieved copies of questionnaire were coded using MS Excel (office 2016) before being transferred to the Data entry of Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for proper analysis. The data of the study were analysed through descriptive and inferential statistics (Analysis of Variance ANOVA). Using the SPSS window (Version 22), the descriptive statistics tool such as frequency counts and percentages of response and chats was adopted for the analysis. The use of such statistics allows the researcher to present the evidence of the study in a way that can be understandable and makes conclusion concerning the variables of study.

Result and Discussion

Socio-Demographic Details of the Respondents

The socio-demographic details of the respondents were presented in Table 2 for both the boat operators and users. For the boat operators, the analysis revealed that all the respondents were male (100%) within the age group of 18-35 (74.2%) and mostly single (58.1%). Also, most of the boat operators had primary level of education and they have been operation at the jetty in the last 2-4years (46.8%). Considering their type of boat for operation, the outcome indicated that most of the operators (40.3%) use wooden boats/ferries while 29.0% of the operators use motorized-medium power boats.

Table 2: Socio-Demographic Details of the Boat Operators and Users

Variable	Boat Operators		Boat Users	
	Frequency (n=62)	Percentage (%)	Frequency (n=306)	Percentage (%)
Sex of Respondents				
Male	62	100.00	157	51.3
Female	--	-	149	48.7
Age (years)				
18-35	46	74.2	87	28.4

36-50	15	24.2	125	40.9
51-65	1	1.6	76	24.8
Above 65	-	-	18	5.9
Marital Status				
Single	36	58.1	111	36.3
Married	23	37.1	188	61.4
Divorced	1	1.6	7	2.3
Widowed	2	3.2	-	-
Level of Educational				
None	7	11.3	56	18.3
Primary	35	56.5	116	37.9
Secondary	12	19.4	104	34.0
Tertiary	8	12.9	30	9.8
Primary Occupation				
Unemployed	-	-	73	23.9
Professional Occupation	-	-	107	35.0
Skilled/Managerial Occupation	-	-	73	23.9
Manual/Partly Skilled	-	-	36	11.8
Self-employed/Commerce	-	-	10	3.3
Student	-	-	6	2.0
Others	-	-	1	0.3
Years of Jetty Operation/Usage				
Less than 1years	15	24.2	92	30.1
2-4years	29	46.8	131	42.8
5-7years	17	27.4	70	22.9
9-12years	1	1.6	13	4.2
13years above	-	-	-	-
Responsibility at Jetty				
Boat Operators	62	100	-	-
Commuters (Boat Users)	-	-	306	100
Official (Regulator) for LGA	-	-	-	-
Official (Regulator) for NIWA	-	-	-	-
Others	-	-	-	-
Type of Boat Operating				
Utility-Fibre Boat	-	-	-	-
Wooden Boats/Ferries	25	40.3	-	-
Motorized-Larger Power Boats	19	30.7	-	-
Motorized-Medium Power Boats	18	29.0	-	-
Others	-	-	-	-

Source: Researcher's Filed Work, 2023

Among the boat users, 51.3% of those involved in the study were male while 48.7% were female within the age group of 36-50 (40.9%) and mostly married (61.4%). The outcome showed that most of the boat users hold a primary level education (37.9%) and engage in various professional occupations (35.0%). Considering the years they have been using the jetty, the outcome revealed that most of the boat users (42.8%) have using the jetty in the last 2-4years while 4.2% have been using the jetty in the last 9-12years.

Usage of Life- Saving Equipment by Commercial Boat Users and Operators

Details on the usage of life-saving equipment and determinant factors among the boat operators and users were presented in the Table 3. Among the boat operators, 41.9% indicated that the use

of life-saving equipment is always, 32.3% indicated to regularly use of life-saving equipment while 16.1% and 9.7% of the operators indicated that the use of life-saving equipment is often and never use it respectively. Among the boat users, 63.4% indicated that the use of life-saving equipment is always, 23.2% indicated to regularly use of life-saving equipment while 11.4% and 2.0% of the users indicated that the use of life-saving equipment is often and never use it respectively. The outcome revealed that commercial boat operators and users use life-saving equipment always and regularly. The outcome showed similarity the study conducted by Chung et al. (2014) which noted lifejackets usage was high among their interest group of their study interest. Viaurox and Gungor (2016) noted that lifejacket wear is one of the most important determinants that influence various water-related activities.

For the boat operators, the outcome of the analysis revealed that 38.7% of the operators uses the life-saving equipment due to compliance with work ethics, 4.8% due to safety, 21.0% uses the life-saving equipment to prevent drowning while 27.4% and 8.1% of the operators uses the life-saving equipment as its compulsory before entry and other factors respectively. Among the boat users (commuters), the analysis revealed that 3.9% of the commuters uses the life-saving equipment due to compliance with work ethics, 30.1% due to safety, 44.4% uses the life-saving equipment to prevent drowning while 20.9% and 0.7% of the commuters uses the life-saving equipment as its compulsory before entry and other factors respectively. The outcome revealed that the use of life-saving equipment among the boat operation was majorly due to the compliance with their work ethics and lifejacket wearing is also made mandatory for every operator before boat entry. The outcome corroborated with the study conducted by Spitzer et al. (2018) which asserted that boaters are aware of the connection between lifejacket use and compliance and are more likely to wear life jackets when boating in conditions perceived to be risky. In the case of the boat users, the outcome indicated the use of lifejackets among the boat users are influence by their awareness of the equipment to prevent drowning and for their safety. The outcome share similarity with the suggestion of Spitzer et al. (2018) which indicated that boaters are aware of the connection between lifejacket use and drowning prevention and are more likely to wear lifejackets when boating in conditions perceived to be risky. Similarly, Oporia et al. (2022) asserted that boaters attributed their lifejacket use to prior experience or witness of a drowning.

Table 3: Usage of Life- Saving Equipment among Boat Operators and Users

Variable	Boat Operators		Boat Users	
	Frequency (n=62)	Percentage (%)	Frequency (n=306)	Percentage (%)
Use Life-Saving Equipment				
Yes, always	26	41.9	194	63.4
Regularly	20	32.3	71	23.2
Often	10	16.1	35	11.4
Never	6	9.7	6	2.0
Factor Influencing the Use Life-Saving Equipment				
Compliance with Work Ethics	24	38.7	12	3.9
Safety	3	4.8	92	30.1
Prevention of Drowning	13	21.0	136	44.4
Compulsory before Boat Entry	17	27.4	64	20.9
Others	5	8.1	2	0.7

Conclusion

Non-usage of life-saving equipment while on water may increase disaster risk such as boat capsizing, injury, and drowning; studies find generally low levels of lifejacket wear among drowning victims and among some cultural groups. Considering the usage of life-saving equipment along Nigerian waterways, the study concluded that commercial boat operators and users use life-saving equipment always and regularly. Therefore, the study recommends the need for proactive approach to safety and proper training of waterways officials and ferry operators through workshops and seminars while adequate life-saving equipment awareness creation among the commuter to improve their usage for their safety is encourage.

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RESIDENTIAL HOUSING QUALITY AND RENTAL VALUES OF STATE CAPITALS OF SELECTED STATES IN THE SOUTH SOUTH REGION, NIGERIA

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Abstract:

The study investigated the residential housing quality and rental values in the Selected States capitals of the South-South region, Nigeria. Study participants included 80, 68, and 252 randomly selected from Uyo Calabar and Port Harcourt. Questionnaires were used to generate the data. Quantitative data were analyzed using (SPSS) whereas qualitative data was analyzed by establishing themes and conclusions drawn in line with the study objectives. The findings revealed a high satisfaction level with residential housing conditions in the study areas. The most in-demand housing types were detached buildings with two dwellings, semi-detached buildings, and residential buildings with 3-9 apartment. Key indicators of housing quality, such as access to neighborhood facilities, design suitability, and building floor quality, were highly rated by respondents. Also, the dwellers of the housing estate were satisfied with their dwellings and their environment (3.12, 3.51, and 2.90). The ordinary least square regression analysis revealed that building age, room size, number of bedrooms, construction quality, building features, type, proximity to work, security, and utilities significantly influenced rental values used by households. In conclusion, this study provides valuable insights into the factors affecting residential housing quality and rental values in the South-south region of Nigeria. The study recommended that Policymakers should prioritize infrastructure development, especially in Uyo, and also to address the electricity supply issues and improve overall housing conditions. This includes ensuring proper burglary-proof installations to enhance security.

Keywords: Residential housing, Housing quality, Rental values.

Introduction

As the urban population in the world's cities continues to grow, housing problems also continue to persist. Globally, more people live in urban areas than in rural areas, with 54 percent of the world's population residing in urban areas in 2015 up from 43 percent in 1990 (UN-Habitat, 2016). By 2050, 68 percent of the world's population is projected to become an urban area. (United Nations, 2018).

Residential property is very important because shelter is a basic necessity in life. Shelter improves the quality of life, gives people a feeling of well-being, boosts their lives, and is also a requirement for addressing their physiological needs (Nishani, 2016). The shelter is one of the best indicators of a person's standard of living and place in society. The need for shelter can be satisfied by either occupying your property or renting another person's property, thus, in terms of

value and quality, represents one of the most significant investment classes (Udoekanem et al., 2015). Residential property is an important component of the wealth of nations. Rent is a major cost for the tenants but an important source of income for the landlord ((Udoekanem et al., 2015) rental values in residential properties are important. According to Wickramaarachchi (2017), property rental value is a key parameter for measuring real property performance. Wickramaarachchi also describes the rental housing market as imperfect and inefficient. This is because housing products are long-lasting, fixed on a given site, heterogeneous, and controlled by extensive governmental regulation (Ibid). Furthermore, reviews of substantial empirical studies in different countries indicate that rental value is a result of the combined contribution of integrated components: property, amenities, and externalities. Understanding these integrated components of residential rental values is important for functioning property markets as well as for government institutions when deciding which services would provide the optimal value to businesses and society. Furthermore, they have received very little attention in the context of Nigeria. Like the rest of Africa, some selected states capitals are currently urbanizing at a rapid rate.

In the vast majority of countries, access to affordable land and housing is a critical contemporary challenge. While in different countries and regions, the specificities of the challenge vary, the universal truism is that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the vast majority of urban residents to obtain and retain adequate and affordable land and housing.” (UN-Habitat, 2011). Affordable land is critical to affordable housing provision because as Berto et al. (2020) observes the main obstacle to the supply of low-cost housing inaccessible in urban areas is the high cost of land.

The desire for adequate and affordable housing also has strong links to the need for security, safety, and proper socio-economic status of individuals and communities. Despite this widely acknowledged importance of housing and various efforts in making adequate and affordable housing available to the majority of people, a large proportion of urban residents in less developed countries do not have access to decent housing at an affordable cost (Tipple, 2016; UN-HABITAT, 2016). As a result, most urban residents in developing Countries live in housing conditions that are not fit to human dignity and come with appalling social, economic, spatial, and health implications (UN-HABITAT, 2016). Hence, inadequate housing condition has become an intractable challenge that has continued to receive attention from governments and individuals in many developing countries like Nigeria. In line with human tradition which seeks to investigate, describe, understand, and proffer solutions to ameliorate defects in human conditions, and enhance individual and collective well-being; both public and private sectors have continued to make concerted efforts at addressing the social and economic challenges posed by inadequacies in housing provision in many countries of the world. These efforts have informed legislation, policies, strategies, and reforms, which most often have culminated in various housing programs (Ajanlekoko, 2011; Sengupta, 2015; Sengupta and Sharma, 2018).

A review of the literature shows that between 1950 and 2000, governments in many developing countries engaged in different housing programmes and delivery strategies. For example, previous studies have shown that successive administrations in Nigeria have launched a minimum of seven public housing programmes in the last few decades in a bid to address increasing housing challenges in the country (Ogu and Ogbuozobe, 2011; UN-HABITAT, 2016; Akinmoladun and Oluwoye, 2017; Ademiluyi and Raji, 2018). However, substantial literature on public housing in developing countries has revealed three main streams of criticism (Mukhija, 2014). First, it is argued that most public housing schemes are inefficient and ill-conceived and

thus fail to meet the needs of the target population (Mba, 2012). Second, direct government involvement in housing provision is viewed as being negligible compared to the volume of housing provided by the informal private sector (UN-HABITAT, 2016). Finally, government intervention in the housing market to check the rising cost of housing is seen as counter-productive and an impediment to the smooth operation of the housing market and efficient housing delivery system (Mukhija, 2014). Consequently, many scholars and stakeholders have argued that the government has no business in providing housing for people, but rather government should act as a partner, enabler, and facilitator of the housing process by making available appropriate incentives, policies, and a good regulatory environment necessary for effective private sector participation in housing provision (World Bank, 2015).

Furthermore, one of the problems facing the planning of cities in Nigeria is the lack of plan discipline (Taylor, 2008). The phenomenon appears to have permeated the system from the highest level down to the lowest and largely explains the speed at which new projects are being introduced and the scope of existing ones varies with utter disregard for the rules and procedures laid down for effecting such changes. Indeed, a development plan is not supposed to be so rigid that reasonable changes cannot be accommodated specifically to take into account unforeseen contingencies.

Nigeria is the most urbanized and populated country in sub-Saharan Africa. She has about (10%) urban areas of the total area of the country but accommodates (28%) percent of the total population (Sule, 2014). This increasing urbanization is producing the need for urban and regional planners in Nigeria to develop policies and implement existing ones that can control and manage urban development. Nigerian states lack the requisite enforcement capacities for the implementation of the different policies for housing provision as documented in studies (Mabogunje, 2014). The disturbing trend is the pattern and speed of growth and development in cities which has resulted in the overpopulation of these cities, thus creating housing needs, and consequently the disparity in residential housing quality and rental values. It is against this background that this study seeks to examine residential housing quality and rental values in the State capital of the South-South region, Nigeria.

The Study Area




Figure 1: The South-South States of Nigeria with its Capitals

The State capitals of south-south Nigeria are located in the southern part of Nigeria and bordered to the south by the Atlantic Ocean and East by Cameroon. The south-south as distinct from the Niger Delta state is a geographical configuration and an integral part of Nigeria.

The South-South region of Nigeria comprises six states, each with its unique state capital. In Akwa Ibom, the state capital is Uyo, while Yenagoa serves as the capital of Bayelsa. Cross River's capital is Calabar, and Asaba is the capital of Delta. In Edo State, the capital city is Benin City, and Port Harcourt holds the position of the capital in Rivers State. The region is known for its lush tropical rainforests, mangroves, and swamps, and it experiences a tropical climate with high humidity and abundant rainfall throughout the year. The people of the South-South region are culturally diverse, with a rich tapestry of traditions, languages, and customs. Agriculture plays a significant role in the economy, with crops like cassava, yams, oil palm, and vegetables being cultivated, and fishing is also vital due to the proximity to rivers and the Gulf of Guinea. Additionally, the region's abundant oil and gas reserves make petroleum-related industries a major contributor to the economy, especially in Port Harcourt, which serves as a significant hub for oil and gas activities (NDDC, 2006). agriculture remains a crucial part of the economy, with fertile lands supporting the cultivation of staple crops and cash crops. Fishing communities thrive near rivers and the coastline, providing fresh seafood to locals and visitors alike (Musa et al., 2014). The South-South region of Nigeria boasts a harmonious blend of nature, culture, and economic significance. Visitors can explore the diverse landscapes, enjoy the warmth of the people, and experience the region's unique charm, making it a fascinating destination for both domestic and international travelers.

Methodology

The study adopted the cross-sectional research design. The descriptive design was based on a cross-sectional sampling of the opinions of individuals on the residential housing quality and rental values in the state capital of the South-south region, Nigeria. Both primary and secondary data sources were used. Primary data was obtained from household heads survey, interviews, and field observation. Secondary data were obtained from the 2006 Census as published by the National Population Commission (NPC). The total population of interest was 532,780 households, representing three state capitals Akwa Ibom, Cross River, and Rivers States (NPC,

2006). The sample size for the study was determined using the Taro Yamane formula to ensure equal opportunity of selection and reduce bias. As a result, approximately 400 households were selected as the representative sample (i.e., Uyo=80, Calabar =68, and Port Harcourt =252) based on the household population projected for 2023. Data was collected with the use of an interview schedule, structured questionnaire, personal observation, and focus group discussion. Ordinary least square regression analysis was used to identify the residential housing quality and rental value determinants used by households in the study area.

Four functional forms of the model namely linear, double log, exponential, and semi-log were estimated. A lead equation was chosen based on the appropriateness of signs, the magnitude of the coefficient of multiple determination (R^2), the statistical significance of the variables, and *a priori* theoretical expectations. The relationship between the dependent and each of the independent variables was examined using the four functional forms: linear, semi-log, exponential, and double-log.

Results

Table 1 The residential housing types

Items	Total per State					
	Uyo=80		Calabar=68		Port Harcourt=252	
	\bar{X}	Std	\bar{X}	Std	\bar{X}	Std
1 Single-room dwelling units (Face-to-face)	2.01	1.01	1.91	0.41	3.52	0.66
2 Self-contained	2.84	1.04	2.65	0.99	3.23	1.08
3 Two-room occupancy/bedroom and living room	2.44	1.02	2.56	0.78	3.28	1.01
4 Semi-detached flat (multi-flats of more flats)	3.06	0.89	3.21	0.72	3.27	1.03
5 Semi-detached (duplex, marionette)	3.14	0.76	2.62	0.77	3.20	0.98
6 Detached flats (bungalows)	3.21	0.91	3.15	1.01	3.23	1.08
Grand Mean (\bar{X}) & Std	2.78	0.94	2.68	0.78	3.29	0.97

Source: Researchers' Fieldwork, 2021.

Table 1 shows the common residential housing types across the sampled state capitals in the study areas. The result indicates that the respondents from the three sampled States agreed with items 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 which show high availability of these housing types in the study area. Items 1 was agreed by the Port Harcourt residents as one of the common housing types while the residents of Uyo and Calabar disagreed which means that single room dwelling units are not common in their location. The results show that there are all types of residential houses in these urban areas of Uyo, Calabar, and Port Harcourt as observed by the researcher.

Table 2 Respondents' Satisfaction Levels with Residential Housing Conditions

Components	Total per State					
	Uyo=80		Calabar=68		Port Harcourt=252	
	\bar{X}	Std	\bar{X}	Std	\bar{X}	Std
1 Electricity supply	2.04	0.83	3.71	0.62	1.93	0.86
2 Source of Water Supply	2.86	1.16	3.28	0.57	2.59	1.10
3 Good Access Road	2.80	1.05	3.27	0.86	2.52	0.88
4 Burglary proof Installation	2.03	0.93	2.75	0.89	1.98	0.98
5 Good Refuse disposal	2.61	0.72	2.91	0.66	1.81	0.89
6 Tiled toilet/kitchen	2.59	0.92	2.82	0.88	2.21	1.05
7 Good drainage system	2.76	1.09	3.54	0.66	1.82	0.75
8 Fenced	2.51	0.93	2.65	0.99	2.88	0.99
9 Availability of transport services	2.55	1.01	3.12	0.80	2.85	1.01
10 Adequate Noise Level	2.60	0.91	3.35	0.77	2.10	1.00
11 Security Measure	3.21	0.69	3.38	0.77	1.81	0.89
12 Friendliness	3.21	0.91	3.41	0.67	2.35	1.08
13 Aesthetic Quality	2.31	1.06	2.69	0.76	2.15	1.01
14 Surrounding/ Environment	3.06	0.89	3.65	0.48	2.83	1.04
15 Cleanliness	2.93	0.87	3.56	0.50	1.84	0.86
Grand Mean (\bar{X}) & Std	2.67	0.93	3.21	0.73	2.24	0.96

Source: Researchers' Fieldwork, 2021

Table 2 shows the respondent's Satisfaction Levels with Residential Housing Conditions.

The Uyo respondents were not satisfied with the electricity supply in their buildings. On the other hand, the respondents of Calabar and Port Harcourt were satisfied with the electricity supply in their buildings. This may be in connection with the recent transformation in the power sector in the country. This is followed by water supply, with the mean rating of 2.86 for Uyo, Calabar 3.28 and 2.59 of the respondents were satisfied with the water supply in their houses. The respondents across the three sampled State Capitals were satisfied with the good access road in their various areas with mean scores of 2.80 for Uyo, 3.27 for Calabar, and 2.52 for Port Harcourt. On the Burglary proof installation, the respondents were not satisfied with the level of Burglary proof Installation in their apartments across the three sampled State capitals. The Uyo and Calabar respondents were satisfied with the refuse disposal system, tiled toilet/kitchen, and the condition of the drainages abutting their rented residential property with the mean scores of 2.61, 2.59, 2.76 for Uyo respondents and 2.91, 2.82, 3.54 for Calabar respondents while the respondents of Port Harcourt were not satisfied with the same three items. However, on fenced and availability of transport services, 2.51, 2.55 of Uyo respondents, 2.65, 3.12 of Calabar, and 2.88, 2.85 of Port Harcourt tenants were correspondingly satisfied with the fenced and availability of transport services provided in their residential property. For the Noise Level, Security Measure, and Friendliness, the respondents of Uyo and Calabar were satisfied while Port Harcourt residents show a high level of dissatisfaction. In terms of the Surrounding/ Environment, the respondents from the three sampled state capitals show a high level of satisfaction. The Aesthetic Quality attracted satisfaction from the Calabar respondents and dissatisfaction from Uyo and Port Harcourt respondents.

Lastly, cleanliness attracted the satisfaction of Uyo and Calabar respondents and dissatisfaction from the Port Harcourt respondents. The overall results show that 93% of the entire sampled population was satisfied with the level of Residential Housing Conditions in the study areas.

Table 3 Respondents' perception of the Residential property's higher rate of demand

Items	Total per State						
	Uyo=80		Calabar=68		Port Harcourt=252		
	\bar{X}	Std	\bar{X}	Std	\bar{X}	Std	
1	Detached building with one dwelling	2.04	0.96	1.85	1.12	2.16	1.11
2	Detached building with two dwellings (one above the other)	3.10	0.95	2.57	0.98	2.81	0.88
3	Semi-Detached building (two attached dwellings)	3.19	0.73	3.16	0.84	3.14	0.97
4	Row (or terraced) building (with at least three attached dwellings, each with separate entrances)	2.00	0.90	2.35	0.93	1.99	0.91
5	Residential building with 3-9 dwellings	3.28	0.83	3.31	0.95	3.02	1.15
6	Residential building with 10 and more dwellings	2.69	0.79	3.22	0.79	3.12	1.04
7	Other residential building	3.34	0.71	3.54	0.61	3.10	0.97
Grand Mean (\bar{X}) & Std		2.80	0.84	2.86	0.89	2.76	1.01

Source: Researchers' Fieldwork, 2021

From the above table 3 the respondents across the three sampled State capitals are of the view that Detached buildings with two dwellings (one above the other), Semi Detached buildings (two attached dwellings), Residential buildings with 3-9 dwellings, Residential buildings with 10 and more dwellings and the other residential buildings (properties) have a higher rate of demand in their respective areas than that of the Detached building with one dwelling and Row (or terraced) (with at least three attached dwellings, each with separate entrances).

The findings above therefore, reveal that there is a higher demand for Detached buildings with two dwellings (one above the other), Semi Detached buildings (two attached dwellings), Residential buildings with 3-9 dwellings, Residential buildings with 10 and more dwellings and the other residential buildings (properties) than the Detached building with one dwelling and Row (or terraced) building (with at least three attached dwellings, each with separate entrances).

Table 4 Respondents' perception of the most rated housing quality indicators

Items	Total per State						
	Uyo=80		Calabar=68		Port Harcourt=252		
	\bar{X}	Std	\bar{X}	Std	\bar{X}	Std	
1	Water adequacy	3.06	0.70	3.54	0.50	2.80	0.95
2	Quality of building floor	3.25	0.77	3.27	0.66	2.75	0.97
3	Access to neighborhood facilities	3.49	0.64	3.65	0.48	2.92	1.01
4	Privacy level in dwelling	3.08	1.05	3.40	0.81	2.98	0.93
5	Adequacy of ventilation	3.05	1.03	3.62	0.69	3.14	0.92
6	Garbage disposal system	2.84	0.88	3.49	0.66	2.75	0.97
7	Window condition	2.89	1.09	3.40	0.76	3.00	0.99
8	Adequacy of lighting	2.96	1.17	3.66	0.48	3.02	0.95
9	Ceiling condition	3.18	0.98	3.43	0.72	2.74	1.14
10	Suitability of design	3.41	0.50	3.68	0.47	2.96	1.01
Grand Mean (\bar{X}) & Std		3.12	0.88	3.51	0.62	2.90	0.98

Source: Researchers' Fieldwork, 2021

Table 4 presents the analysis of data obtained from the respondents' perceptions of the most rated housing quality indicators in the study area. The indicators are ranked in order of pence and level of adequacy: In Uyo for instance, in terms of access to neighbourhood facilities being the most

ranked among the variables has a mean rating of 3.49, followed by the suitability of design with a mean score of 3.41, Quality of building floor (3.25) ranked 3rd, Ceiling condition (3.18) ranked 4th, Privacy level in dwelling (3.08) ranked 5th, water adequacy which ranked 6th with mean score of (3.06). Other most rated housing quality indicators included: Adequacy of ventilation with 3.05, Adequacy of lighting 2.96; Window condition 2.89, and Garbage disposal system 2.84 in that order.

In Calabar, Suitability of design ranked 1st with 3.68, followed by the adequacy of lighting at 3.66 2nd, Access to neighbourhood facilities at 3.65, Adequacy of ventilation; Water adequacy; Garbage disposal system; Ceiling condition; Window condition; Privacy level in dwelling and Quality of building floor were equally rated high. Residents of Port Harcourt rated all the indicators high with the Adequacy of ventilation ranked 1st, window condition ranked 2nd and the least ranked is Ceiling condition respectively. The overall results show that Calabar ranked 1st followed by Uyo with 2nd and Port Harcourt 3rd.

Table 5 Ordinary least square regression analysis of the residential housing quality and Rental Values used by households in the study area.

Coefficients						
S/N	Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	
	(Constant)	-5.235	.172		-30.473	.000
1	Age of the building	1.414	.113	.202	12.512	.000
2	Size of the rooms	.056	.141	.006	.396	.693
3	Number of bedrooms	.347	.096	.088	3.599	.000
4	Quality of construction	.609	.083	.147	7.349	.000
5	Features of the building	.442	.089	.122	4.934	.000
6	Types of the building	.673	.080	.220	8.429	.000
7	Nearness to a place of work	.551	.086	.134	6.392	.000
8	Security	.312	.103	.041	3.038	.002
9	Electricity/water supply	1.226	.124	.155	9.895	.000

Source: Researcher's Fieldwork, 2021

The table shows the results of the Ordinary least square regression analysis applied in identifying the residential housing quality and Rental Values used by households in the study area. The table shows that the Age of the building (Beta = .202, t = 12.512, df = 9 p< 0.05), Size of the rooms (Beta = .006, t = .396, df = 9, p< 0.05), Number of bedrooms (Beta = .088, t = 3.599, df = 9 p< 0.05), Quality of construction (Beta = .147, t = 7.349, df = 9 p< 0.05), Features of the building (Beta = .122, t = 4.934, df = 9, p< 0.05), Types of the building (Beta = .220, t = 8.429, df = 9 p< 0.05), Nearness to place of work (Beta = .134, t = 6.392, df = 9 p = 0.05), Security (Hectare) (Beta = .041, t = 3.038, df = 9, p< 0.05) and Electricity/water supply (Beta = .155, t = 9.895, df = 9 p< 0.05), is significant to the Rental Values used by households in the study area.

The result indicates that all the nine independent variables (Age of the building, Size of the rooms, Number of bedrooms, Quality of construction, Features of the building, Types of the building, Nearness to place of work, Security, and Electricity/water supply) correlated positively and statistically significant with rental values used by house seekers (households) in the study area.

The coefficient of determination Age of the building, Size of the rooms, and Number of bedrooms correlated positively with t-values of 12.512, .396, and 3.599 which was significant at 0.05 level. As regards the Quality of construction, one can say that the quality of construction attracts more value. The Features of the building correlated positively with a t-value of 7.349 which was significant at 0.05 level. This is an indication that the features of the building are the point of interest of most households.

The types of buildings correlated positively at a t-value of 4.934 which was significant at 0.05 level. Nearness to a place of work also correlated positively with a t-value of 8.429 at a 0.05 probability level. The Security was also found to positively correlate with a t-value of 6.392 at a 0.05 probability level. Electricity/water supply equally correlated positively with a t-value of 9.895 at a 0.05 probability level. The results show that the residential housing quality and Rental Values used by households are dependent on the above-listed variables in the study area.

Discussion of Findings

The study examined residential housing conditions and rental values in three State capitals: Uyo, Calabar, and Port Harcourt. From the findings, respondents from all three locations agreed on the high availability of certain housing types, such as detached buildings with two dwellings, semi-detached buildings, and residential buildings with 3-9 or 10 or more dwellings. However, single-room dwelling units were not common in Uyo and Calabar, as the respondents from those areas disagreed on their prevalence. The findings of this study align with previous research conducted by Olowu et al. (2019) in various urban centers across the country. Like Olowu et al.'s study, this study also identified a higher demand for detached buildings with two dwellings, semi-detached buildings, and residential buildings with multiple dwellings in Uyo, Calabar, and Port Harcourt. This consistency in housing preferences across different regions suggests that such housing types may have broader appeal and suitability in urban areas.

Regarding housing conditions, satisfaction levels varied among the three cities. Uyo residents expressed dissatisfaction with the electricity supply, while Calabar and Port Harcourt residents were satisfied. Access to good road infrastructure received positive ratings across the sampled locations, but respondents were generally dissatisfied with the level of burglary-proof installation in their apartments. Furthermore, the current study's results on housing conditions mirror those of Donald et al. (2020), who found that electricity supply was a common concern in rapidly urbanizing regions. Both studies highlight the need for infrastructure development, especially regarding electricity provision, to improve housing conditions and residents' satisfaction.

In the study's analysis, housing quality indicators were ranked based on respondents' perceptions. Access to neighborhood facilities ranked highest in Uyo, suitability of design ranked first in Calabar, and Port Harcourt residents rated the adequacy of ventilation as the top housing quality indicator. This study's findings share similarities with the research conducted by Daramola et al. (2020) in similar urban settings. Green et al. also reported that access to neighborhood facilities was highly valued by residents, indicating its significance as a crucial housing quality factor.

The study also conducted a regression analysis to identify factors influencing rental values in the study areas. The results showed that several factors were significant in determining rental values, including the age of the building, size of rooms, number of bedrooms, quality of construction, features of the building, types of the building, nearness to place of work, security, and electricity/water supply. These variables collectively explained the variance in rental values used

by households in the three State capitals. This study corroborates the findings of Olowu et al. (2021) in their investigation of rental values and housing factors in urban areas. Both studies identified the age of the building, size of rooms, number of bedrooms, and quality of construction as significant determinants of rental values. This consistency across studies suggests the robustness of these variables in influencing rental prices in diverse urban contexts.

In general, the study emphasizes the importance of understanding housing preferences, conditions, and rental values in urban areas. The findings suggest demand for certain housing types and highlight the significance of infrastructure, security, and amenities in determining rental values. Policy makers and urban planners can use these insights to enhance housing conditions, prioritize infrastructure development, and address the specific needs and preferences of residents .

Conclusion and Recommendations

The study examining residential housing conditions and rental values in Uyo, Calabar, and Port Harcourt has yielded valuable insights into the housing landscape of these state capitals. The findings shed light on the demand for specific housing types, with detached buildings containing two dwellings, semi-detached buildings, and residential structures with multiple dwellings being highly sought after across all three locations. However, it was observed that single-room dwelling units are less prevalent in Uyo and Calabar. The study also unveiled differing levels of satisfaction among residents regarding housing conditions. While Calabar and Port Harcourt residents reported good access roads and satisfactory electricity supply, Uyo faced challenges in electricity provision. Common concerns across all cities included the adequacy of burglary-proof installations.

Regarding housing quality indicators, each city showcased its distinct priorities. Uyo residents highly valued access to neighborhood facilities, while design suitability topped the list for Calabar residents. On the other hand, Port Harcourt residents emphasized the importance of adequate ventilation. Through regression analysis, it was revealed that various factors such as building age, room size, number of bedrooms, construction quality, building features, types of structures, proximity to workplaces, security, and electricity/water supply significantly influenced rental values in the study areas. This comprehensive study provides valuable guidance for policymakers and urban planners in addressing housing needs and improving living conditions in these state capitals.

Recommendations:

1. Policymakers should prioritize infrastructure development, especially in Uyo, to address the electricity supply issues and improve overall housing conditions. This includes ensuring proper burglary-proof installations to enhance security.
2. Given the high demand for certain housing types, efforts should be made to promote housing diversity. Encouraging the construction of different types of residential buildings can cater to the varied needs and preferences of the residents.
3. Based on the housing quality indicators, measures should be taken to improve the quality of construction and design suitability in all three cities. Adequate ventilation and access to neighborhood facilities should also be emphasized in housing development plans.

4. With security being a significant concern for residents, local authorities should focus on enhancing security measures in residential areas. This can be achieved through increased surveillance, community engagement, and collaboration with law enforcement agencies.
5. As rental values are influenced by various factors, policymakers should also consider measures to ensure housing affordability for residents. This can include the provision of affordable housing schemes and incentives for developers to construct more affordable units.
6. It is crucial to involve the residents in urban planning and housing development processes. Conducting surveys and seeking feedback from the community can provide valuable insights and ensure that housing initiatives align with the needs and preferences of the residents.

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KIDNAPPING AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

The paper examined kidnapping in Nigeria and national security. The paper argued that kidnapping threatens national security and socioeconomic development in Nigeria due to the state's nature and security architecture. The Anomie theory was used as analytical construct. One of the major assumptions of the theory is that society creates its own brand of crime and criminals by defining its goals, standards and values without providing corresponding legal opportunities for achieving them. Regrettably, the prescribed goals and means do not permit all members of the society to pursue only the success in legitimate ways. The paper relied on secondary sources of data and the paper noted that there are militating factors responsible for the causes of kidnapping which encumbers security and national development. The paper recommended inter alia, The Nigerian Government should take pragmatic steps to provide youths with job opportunities, security agencies properly funded and stricter penalty should be meted on those who commit crime of kidnapping in Nigeria.

Key Words: Kidnapping, National security

INTRODUCTION

The cankerworm called kidnapping has ravaged the nation. It has not only bedeviled the socio-economic development of the country but has manifested itself as a social problem affecting virtually every member of the Nigerian society in one way or the other and has a great devastating effect. Incessant cases of kidnapping have caused immense threat to the government, security agencies and stakeholders. The proliferation of kidnapping has brought along with it the problem of insecurity of lives and property and a general fall in the number of economic activities as a result of the fear of the unforeseen. In light of the foregoing, kidnapping and hostage-taking are among the terrorizing crimes that are common in the Southern part of Nigeria Uzorma & Nwanego (2014), and Monday (2015) buttressed further that the issues of kidnapping have taken an alarming dimension thereby creating anxiety among the populace, especially in southeastern Nigeria. It has reduced the economic activities, caused the influential to relocate out of the region, contributed to dwindling the major companies of production, caused insecurity in

the region, and reduced foreign investment amongst others. It is disheartening that despite the stringent laws promulgated (ranging from 10 years imprisonment to life imprisonment in some states), kidnapping seems to triumph unabated. According to Omoleye (2017), the nation witnesses, almost on a daily basis, the perpetration of such crimes as kidnapping, hence the need to question law enforcement on the upsurge of such a heinous crime. The term kidnapping is ambiguous and vague to define, however (Benjamin et al 2018, Linus 2015, Ugwoke 2011, Asuquo 2009,) defined kidnapping as the forceful seizure, taking away, and unlawful detention of a person against his/her will. However, John, (2020) opined that kidnapping is the crime of seizing, confining, abducting, or carrying away persons by force or fraud and often subjecting him or her to involuntary servitude in an attempt to demand a ransom or in furtherance of another crime. Kidnapping industries in Nigeria now thrive very well amidst concerted efforts by law enforcement agents to control the effect. The business is very lucrative in Nigeria where the perpetrators and the sponsors receive huge sums of money from their victims, sometimes the victims of kidnapping are murdered, raped, drugged, butchered, and even battered in the act whenever the amount of money demanded from them are not met in time or not redeemed. Moreso, the victims are most time kept in deplorable places, exposed to adverse harsh weather conditions. They are maltreated, ill-fed, emotionally and psychologically tortured. Access to medication becomes a serious challenge to the victim and many develop high blood pressure and lots of health challenges in the process. The kidnapers are careful in the acts to make sure they evade arrest, get their ransom, and enjoy their ill-gotten money un-noticed. Many have attributed the cause of kidnapping as unemployment, abject poverty, moral decadence/choice, greed, etc. (John 2020, Yusuf &Abudullahi 2020, and Linus 2015), however, John &Ubong (2013) also attributed the security agencies as the cause, most times they are seen aiding and abetting the crime, more so their ineffectiveness in carrying out their responsibilities is worrisome. What is at stake in this study, is to probe and investigate the effect of kidnapping on the security of Nigeria.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study adopted the Anomie theory. The anomie theory was propounded by Robert Merton and it seems best to explain the heinous crime called kidnapping which has ravaged the nation in recent times. The word “anomie” originated from the French language which means normlessness (lawlessness). It was synthesized and conceptualized in the 20th Century by Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), which he summarized as the absence or violation of norms (laws) and core values guiding human actions in society. Nevertheless, the anomie-strain theory of Emile Durkheim was modified to means-end paradigm by Robert K Merton in 1938. The anomie theory argues that society creates its own brand of crime and criminals by defining its goals, standards, and values without providing corresponding legal opportunities for achieving them. All societies, according to Merton (1938), have a cultural system that embodies socially approved values and goals and the institutionalized means for achieving them. Regrettably, the prescribed goals and means do not permit all members of the society to pursue success in legitimate ways. This exerts undue pressure on some segments of society in a non-conforming (criminal) way as they struggle to achieve the success goals and values. This happens when the goal of success is over-emphasized more than the acceptable ways of achieving it. Conversely, Merton acknowledges that not all people are deviants or criminals; this he did by identifying five adaptive ways people tend to respond when under structural strains. Merton’s typology of individual adaptations to structural pressures is referred to as the “plus-minus paradigm”, namely, Conformity: (+ +) conformity is non-deviants because they accept both the goals and the

means of achieving the goals. The other four are guilty of violating either of the cultural expectations: the goals or means, Innovation: (+ -) they reject the means and accept the goals, Ritualism: (- +) they accept means and reject the goal, Retreatism: (- -) they reject the means and the goals, and Rebellion: ($\pm \pm$) they decided to change both means and goals. The plus (+) sign stands for acceptance, the minus sign (-) represents rejection, and plus and minus ($\pm \pm$) signs signify a rejection of both the institutionalized means and goals and establish their own goals and means (Merton, 1938).

The theory explains why some individuals accept the culturally acceptable goals of the society (+) but reject the legitimate means of achieving them (-), which encourage kidnapping and adversely affect security and socio-economic development in Nigeria. Merton further posited that the “innovators” in particular belong to the lower class, in the class structure, hence the need to make both ends meet because access to legitimate means is limited and the “strain towards anomie” is most severe. It, therefore, means that those in the lower-class structure find it hard to meet their responsibility as a result of lack of access to it, hence the continuous frustration encountered on the way has given way to “innovation”. The theory is relevant to the present study as it gives a clearer picture of the reasons why people engage in kidnapping. Also, an analysis of the type of people kidnaped in Nigeria has shown that the majority of them are influential and wealthy except those kidnaped for rituals, and a cursory look at the perpetrators has shown according to John (2020), that they are unemployed, impoverished, used for political gain amongst others. The motivation for the acts is subsumed to be embedded in the hard economic means of achieving an acceptable goal and the means, hence the persistent increase in the atrocity with time, since Nigeria is witnessing a continuous economic meltdown.


CONCEPTUALISING KIDNAPPING

The term kidnapping has generated many controversies in definition and conceptualization. Aderibigbe (2014) defines kidnapping as the taking away of a person against the person’s will, usually for ransom or in furtherance of another crime. The furtherance of other crimes could be for organ harvesting, rituals, or political purposes amongst others. Asuquo (2009) however, argued that kidnapping does not have any straight definition as it varies from state to state and jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Onyejebu (2018) submits that it is the “forceful seizure, taking away, and unlawful detention of a person against his/her will”. In the opinion of Seigel (2002) it is a grievous crime and must be dealt with utmost seriousness. Moreover, Thomas & Nta (2009) posited that kidnapping is a “robbery of the highest rank”. They buttressed that “it is an organized and systematic robbery which is not deadly as armed robbery, but more profitable than the former” Nwaorah (2009) submits that kidnapping is an act of an aggrieved man who wants to take a person of value hostage, to be rescued by loved ones. Ogabido (2009) summarizes kidnapping to mean “to abduct, capture, carry off, remove or steal away a person” Bello & Jamilu (2017) added that it is usually motivated by political demand or financial gain. They further stated that political and traditional crimes can resort to the act of kidnapping to gain financial resources or have their request met. Based on the views above, one can submit that all the definitions are united in some factors which are; Kidnapping is a criminal act which involves the use of force which also violates the sole rights of the victims. However, all the authors believe that it is carried out to obtain ransom. However, the study borrows the submission of Nnam (2014) who defines Kidnapping as an “Unlawful and coercive taking away of a person or group of persons without their volition to an undisclosed hostile environment often to demand and obtain a ransom, or to settle a political score (political vendetta) before granting them freedom.

KIDNAPPING IN NIGERIA

The crime of kidnapping has assumed a new trend and has almost a daily phenomenon in recent times. During the colonial period, kidnapping was vicious in the form of slavery in the 18th and 19th centuries as noted by Kelechi (2011). He posited that modern-day kidnapping in Nigeria started in the Niger Delta as a means of projecting their aggression and frustration towards the environmental hazard and effects of oil spillage in the area. Furthermore, (Onyejebu 2018, Akpan 2010, Kelechi 2011) pointed out that the deliberate acts of marginalization, deprivation, and endless accumulation of natural resources and rents have been the driving force of the Niger Delta militants in the act of kidnapping. According to (John 2020, Onyejebu 2018, Okoli & Agada 2014, Ngwama 2014), the first well-known kidnapping after in the colonial era started in 2006 when the militants of the Niger Delta took Total staff hostage to protest the inequality in the Region. The kidnapping started with the expatriates and later condescended to men of God, their children, politicians, religious leaders, lecturers, and students, as it is today, everyone in Nigeria in one way or another is under threat of being kidnapped. Reuters (2009) in Ngwama (2014) reported that in 2008, a total number of 512 kidnapping cases were reported in Nigeria. Ngwama (2014) noted that most of the kidnapping occurred in the Southeast and Niger Delta regions, which contains most of Nigeria's biggest oil well and gas plant. However, he pointed out that the hostages were released after payment of ransom and they were not harmed. Okoli & agada (2014) noted that kidnapping has been used for different purposes ranging from political vendetta, rituals, and ransom amongst others. Furthermore, they posited that in the southeastern state, there was a decrease in armed robbery and other social vices with a persistent increase in kidnapping apparently because the majority of the perpetrators have taken to kidnapping. Kidnapping has increased in intensity and is perpetrated nationwide. The figures keep increasing each day, hence the need for concerted effort. The chart below shows the rate of persistent increase in kidnapping in Nigeria between 2015-2021. Between January- June 2021, the figure has doubled, humangle (2021).

Kidnapping in Nigeria between January and June 2021



	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
North-Central	25	42	46	51	228	613	942
North-East	515	38	172	313	180	392	211
North-West	6	68	40	383	597	1449	1405
South-East	16	8	9	17	25	86	77
South-South	68	134	149	161	271	201	140
South-West	27	57	68	61	85	119	169
Total	658	347	484	987	1386	2860	2944

Source: www.humangle.ng

CAUSES OF KIDNAPPING

Abject Poverty: The effects of poverty on the livelihood of individuals have been a serious discourse in the academic world. John (2020) postulated that one of the main causes of kidnapping in Nigeria is poverty. He buttressed that poverty encompasses not only deprivation of material possessions but moreso, other deprivation like unemployment, ill-health, lack of education, powerlessness, and social exclusion amongst others. However, Yusuf & Abdullahi (2020), believe the reason why people indulge in kidnapping is to “exit from the track of poverty to riches”. They added that the ransom paid for kidnapping makes the perpetrator rich, compared to their miserable poverty state. The high rate of poverty in Nigeria has really widened the class disparity between the rich and the poor, hence the consistent increase in kidnapping to breach the gap and live a flamboyant life. In addition, kidnapping helps reduce poverty and meets family needs. Bello & Jamilu (2017) posited that economic deprivation and a sense of desperation have laid the seed of desperation in communities and kidnapping is the alternative. Kidnapping has been a source of income for the perpetrators. They use the ransom to meet the family's needs, live a flamboyant life and join the affluents in the society. Poverty has been the primary reason many engage in heinous crime which is ravaging the nation and thereby affecting security.

Unemployment: The persistent increase in the high rate of unemployment has been attributed to the cause of kidnapping in Nigeria, especially Youth Unemployment. Inyang (2009) has described Youth Unemployment as the driving factor encouraging kidnapping just like the maxim “an idle mind is the devil’s workshop”. Bello & Jamilu (2017) argued further that unemployment among youths and adolescents plays a key role in the consistent increase in kidnapping. Abdulkabir (2017) pointed out that most of the kidnappers convicted confessed that they were unemployed graduates looking for a means of survival and if there are no societal-valued means, the alternative is the other means. Furthermore, he opined that many youths have erred in joining groups of criminal gangs because of unemployment and the search for jobs to earn a living. Ngwama (2014) added that if the level of Unemployment in Nigeria is not checkmated, soon the entire Nation may have to be ransomed at one time or another. He further added that the kidnappers who had no livelihood believed they should take their destinies in their hands and collect whatever they could using the arms at their disposal in the face of continuous embezzling, stealing, and political crisis in the country. Inyang (2009) reiterated that the proliferation of arms and ammunition as a result of godfatherism /patronage of those who were dumped after each election, may likely increase the spate or encourage kidnapping. The youths who were used and dumped by politicians after securing their winning ticket in the election are vulnerable to so many social vices and crimes and most have picked up their arms and engaged in kidnapping, especially, the politicians. The unemployment index in Nigeria is increasing each year, with the tertiary institutions turning up graduates each year without corresponding companies, organizations, and institutions to gainfully employ them. Many get frustrated after fruitless years of searching for jobs and could engage in different crimes to sustain livelihood. The government is not doing its part as most companies that would have employed the youths are moribund because of bad management.

Corruption & Political Leaders: The high rate of corruption in Nigeria's polity has been attributed to the causes of kidnapping in Nigeria. Yusuf & Abdullahi (2020) recounted that the advent of oil in the 1970s ignited heinous crimes in Nigeria, especially in the area of political office holders who were seen spending frivolously on government resources uncounted and the excluded minority in the area took kidnapping as an alternative. Bello & Jamilu (2017) buttressed that political kidnapping evolved as a result of corruption in politics, where kidnapping was used to further the political aim of a particular group or movement. In this case, ransoms are usually paid to fund their movement. Ene (2017) posited that government officials especially top management level loot and spend recklessly government resources which encourages some of the perpetrators of these heinous crimes to engage in it as a way of showing their dissatisfaction and also earning a living. Ogabido (2009) reiterated that social injustice, inequality, unfair distribution of resources, and neglect of the host communities are some of the militating factors of kidnapping. He further stated “He blamed the federal government for lack of equity and fairness in governance as well as lack of responsible leadership”. The high rate of corruption witnessed in the last two decades is alarming, especially since political officeholders embezzle money meant for the construction of roads, water, hospitals, etc. with impunity and justice has not been brought to bear on them, as many evade the criminal justice and are in control of the judiciary. It is this persistent report on abuse of power and continuous embezzlement of government funds while the poor masses suffer that has triggered the persistent rise in kidnapping in Nigeria. In the opinion of Yusuf & Abdullahi (2020), attributed the rise in kidnappings to politicians for ritual purposes and political assassination to attain an enviable height in the Nation’s politics. They further opined that at each election children, imbeciles, and

mentally deranged people are usually kidnapped for ritual purposes by politicians and officeholders to maintain their position or climb higher on the ladder. Okafor (2005) noted that the sum of 500 billion dollars has been robbed in the country through corruption from the sales of oil in the last 50 years which would have been used to develop the vibrant economy that would have provided jobs for the youths. Corruption in Nigeria has almost become a household name. The embezzlement by those in authority has motivated the masses to take law into their arms. No wonder the majority of the kidnapped victims are those of high status in society. The corruption is so pronounced that the roads are in a deplorable state, hospitals are not equipped, epileptic power supply amongst others, yet huge amounts of money have been voted to take care of all these issues in the nation. This continuous abuse of offices has made many engage in the crime of kidnapping to get their fair share of the national cake.

Lack of Societal Value/ Moral Decadence. The culture of love for human lives, friendliness, hard work, and receptiveness to foreigners has been mortgaged in exchange for Western and ostentation orientation Ngwama (2014). In a similar vein, Onovo (2009) correlated the persistent increase in crimes in Nigeria as a result of the celebration of fraudsters by leaders. He reiterated that the increase in crimes in the Southeast & South-South is caused by the quest for materialism and loss of societal values, people are ready to go the extra length to get wealth or material possessions at all cost, irrespective of whose horse is gored. Inyang (2009) posited that in Nigeria, nobody cares to question how one makes his/her wealth. He noted that anyone can show up with expensive vehicles and no one dares to question the sudden change in status/wealth. Onovo (2009) frowns at the appointment of indicted individuals as heads of various government agencies and parastatals. The above has a negative effect on the youths and poor masses who watch with eagerness and see how the government treasury is looted with impunity and political holders amassing wealth without fear of being arrested, the youths in turn also take law into their hands, hence kidnapping. Umez (2000), attributes the values system in Nigeria as causes of kidnapping. He further stated that Nigeria glorifies and endorses illegal and corrupt means of income as sufficient and necessary means of earning a living which in turn has reshaped most Nigerian's integrity, especially the youths which is a change in value system. No wonder the increase in cybercrime, kidnapping, and trafficking amongst others in society. Moral decadence has worsened in recent times giving room to different crimes in society. Those who perpetrate the cybercrime known as "YAHOO" are now celebrating their resourcefulness by obtaining money by false pretense and kidnapping is carried out in broad daylight.

EFFECTS OF KIDNAPPING

Effects/ Implication on Victims: The negative effects/implications of kidnapping on victims are devastating. Odoma & Akor (2019) averred that kidnapping affects not only the psychology of the direct victims and their families but also cuts across the economic investment by spreading fear which hinders economic productivity. The use of fear threatens the productive sector of the economy and it impacts negatively on the society. Bello & Jamilu (2017) added that the loss of contact has a traumatic effect on the parents of the victims and the victim. Moreso, they posited that victims may suffer from sexual abuse, especially the girl child, and could lead to the contraction of several deadly diseases. In addition, the victim's property may be disposed of to raise money for the ransom. Freeman (2006) buttressed that victims may suffer violence or torture from their perpetrators in the course of the abduction. Many victims have lost their lives as well as their livelihoods while the negotiation of ransom is ongoing. Sometimes, kidnappers end up battering and taking the lives of their victims. It is worthy to note that while in the custody of the perpetrators, the environments are usually hostile and victims suffer from hunger

due to lack of food and malnutrition. The aftermath effect of being kidnapped can weigh so much on the victims and relatives, according to Odoma & Akor (2019). They highlighted that victims suffer some psychological effects. There are occasions when victims have been asked to denounce their faith or face death in a (religious kidnapping). In another situation, victims may be forced to sign documents or assent to an agreement for them to live. No matter the kind of kidnapping, they all possess a great effect and implication for the life, health, and security of victims. In some circumstances, victims' vital organs are been mutilated and harvested, and some are held in servitude, forced marriage, and labor. These negative effects affect and shape the behavior of victims and could lead to health and cognitive disorders.

Effects on the economy and society: The economic effects of kidnapping could be direct or indirect. The direct cost could be in the form of money paid for ransom, or other economic properties lost to the kidnapping, Ene (2018). Victims' relatives pay ransom to secure the release of their loved ones. This ransom could involve lending money, sales of valuable property, and financial savings. The indirect cost could be finance lost to secure or acquire security for preventive measures. At the national level, kidnapping could result in excess budget/ expenditure on security, Ene (2018). The implications are also witnessed in the area of manpower that produces goods and services for consumption and exports. This can be visible in the closure of some companies/establishments most of which are oil and gas companies as a result of incessant kidnapping, Dave et al. (2019). Moreover, the persistent increase in kidnapping has deterred the industrialization of the nation and also rendered many jobless. This in turn has hindered foreign investments, and development in key sectors of the economy and has dented the image of the nation, (Ekpe 2019, Ene 2018, Inyang and Ibrahim, 2013). In addition, Ene et al. (2019) buttressed that the menace of kidnapping could hinder the capital and investment that comes as a result of foreign aid for natural development. Inyang & Abraham (2013) posited that the effects are manifest in the losses that the country experiences when an expatriate is kidnapped oil companies are attacked and the companies are shut down as a result of fear, which in turn reduces the national revenues generated. Bello & Jamilu (2017) averred that about five hundred million dollars [US\$500,000,000] are spent annually for ransom globally. Ngwama (2014) added that kidnapping is threatening the foundation of the Nigerian Economy and if not checkmated could lead the nation into recession. Yusuf & Abdullahi (2020) submitted that the Nation spent about (₦109.8billion) for security in the year 2019, and this money could have been diverted to economic growth but as a result of security challenges kidnapping tends to triumph amongst others has warranted unwanted expenditure. Also, the advent of kidnapping in Nigeria has made many professionals leave the country as a result of being kidnapped. These professionals with relevant skills in different works of life leave the nation in search of a secure and greener pasture. These professionals could have helped in their fields of endeavors. In recent times, Nigerian health workers have consisted of the majority of the professionals living on the shore of the nation in search of work. Ejiofor (2015) submitted that Nigeria became the third in the world in terms of internationally displaced persons. The menace of kidnapping affects the social life of many, as many promulgations made by the government to checkmate the act affecting the inhabitants of the society. The continuous use of curfew to contain the menace affects the social life of the inhabitants, more so, there is a heightened level of mistrust according to Inyang & Abraham (2013) who posited that very few people in the society extend their African hospitality to strangers as a result of growing awareness of the dangers of talking/sharing information with strangers, who could be kidnapers

Psychological effects: Kidnapping has lots of devastating effect on the victim and affect the psychology of the victim (Yusuf & Abdul 2020, Odoma & Akor 2019, Ene 2018, Bello & Jamilu2017). In addition, Soyombo (2016) pointed out that kidnapping barricades people's social life by restricting their movement. Yusuf & Abdullahi (2020) posited that kidnapping results in post-traumatic stress disorder because of the horrifying scenes of the acts. Movement in Nigeria has been restricted solely because of the persistent increase in kidnapping especially on some routes/roads. Wealthy influential people have to travel with lots of escorts and night movement has become so risky. Yusuf & Abdullahi (2020) added that house/ company owners disguise themselves as taxi drivers and okada man in a bid to move freely in society. Moreso, they are of the view that Landlords/Landlady present an unfinished view of their home displaying poverty. In another vein, family members, and relatives of the victims suffer lots of abuse verbally and psychologically in the course to get their loved ones free from the net of kidnapers. Sometimes, the kidnapers threaten to kill the victim or abuse them physically or mentally. The thought of a price tag on the head of the victim affects the victim and the family members.

NATIONAL SECURITY: National security has been viewed by different scholars in different ways, most of which emphasize the collective responsibility of the state. Position of Hartmann in Ebeh (2015) defined national security as “the total of the vital national interest of the state, and because a vital national interest is one of which a nation is willing to resort to force or war either immediately or ultimately, concept of national security will vary from state to state in direct proportion to their willingness risk either conflict or war at any given time” however, Brennan in Ebeh (2015) opined that national security is “the protection of national survival” Accordingly to Ehi (2009), “national security must include the capacity to provide the citizens with social, economic and political conditions conducive to happiness and relative prosperity. Thus, tranquility and well-being of a society are necessary components of national security”. However, Ray in Ebeh (2015) lent credence to it by portraying national security to be understood in terms of the desire and capacity for self-defense, hence the ability of the state to maintain its internal and external threats. In the opinion of Omotola (2006), national security is “the freedom from danger or absence of threats to the multidimensional elements that may affect the nation's ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and national interests, as much as promote and boost the well-being of its people”. More so, Peterside (2018) added that national security is “the freedom from actual and potential threats to national life that may arise as a result of human action or inactions, or from a disaster such as a flood, earthquake, famine, drought, disease and other natural calamitous events resulting in deaths, human suffering, and material damage”. Asad (2007) submitted “that national security cannot be narrowed down to exclusively military term. Similarly, Onuoha (2017) posits that national security is “the capacity of a state to promote the pursuit and realization of the fundamental needs and vital interests of man and society and to protect them from threats which may be economic, social, environmental, political, military or epidemiologic in nature”. However, Eme & Onyishi (2014) took a divergent view in the Nigerian setting. They highlighted that National security defined in terms of national survival in Nigeria is an illusion. It is an “illusion because it is an erroneous perception of the African reality”. They posited that national security in Africa especially Nigeria is used by the “milling elite as a fine transparent concept for deluding the populace into thinking that government policies in this regard represent actions designed actually to protect them from hunger, disease, injustice, and violation of human dignity and life”. In furtherance to their view, ‘national security gave rise to two dangerous doctrines of illusionism and militarism which is self-defeating. They argued, that national security in Nigeria refers to a “guarantee of peace and

stability determined by ethno-religious/communal harmony; peaceful coexistence; food security; sustainable socioeconomic development; and democratic development. Also, accounting for the security of the nation is strengthening the rule of law; creating a democratic political culture; nurturing civility, promoting good governance, transparency and structural reforms amenable to democratization.” However, the aforementioned are a mere mirage in Nigeria, as security is only words in the letter not in the practice of the nation. It is therefore misleading to equate national security with the security of the state because the Nigerian state is a capitalist state that uses the instrument for the preservation of socio-economic formation, which protects the interests of a privileged class of people, hence the poor masses suffer. National security is a welcome development if practiced to the letter. The security of the citizen remains paramount to the sole responsibility of the state, to ensure citizens do not suffer harm from external and internal threats and other social threats like hunger, famine, unemployment, and disease outbreak amongst others. The submission of the UNDP that security involves the people, not the state-centered military hardware has been brought to bear and remains a sine qua non for citizens' wellbeing.

KIDNAPPING AND SECURITY: The persistent effects of kidnapping have grossly affected the security architecture in the nation. The proliferation of kidnapping has brought along untold problems of insecurity of lives and property and a general fall in the number of economic activities as a result of the fear of the unforeseen. Peterside (2018), submitted that national security is “the freedom from actual and potential threats to national life that may arise as a result of human action or inactions, or from a disaster such as a flood, earthquake, famine, drought, disease and other natural calamitous events resulting in deaths, human suffering, and material damage”. However, the adverse effect of kidnapping has defied the efficacy of the state to guarantee the safety and security of the lives of her citizens. Monday (2015) buttressed further that the issues of kidnapping have taken an alarming dimension thereby creating anxiety among the populace in the society and the nation at large. It has reduced economic activities, caused the influential to relocate out of the nation, contributed to dwindling the major companies of production, caused insecurity, and reduced foreign investment amongst others. The nation has witnessed low patronage in foreign exchange and investment as a result of kidnapping which is treating the basic foundation of the nation. Odoma & Akor (2019) averred that kidnapping affects not only the psychology of the direct victims and their families but also cuts across the economic investment by spreading fear which hinders economic productivity. The use of fear threatens the productive sector of the economy and it impacts negatively on the society. In addition, the victim’s property may be disposed of to raise money for the ransom. In addition, Ene et al. (2019) buttressed that the menace of kidnapping could hinder the capital and investment that comes as a result of foreign aid for natural development. Inyang& Abraham (2013) posited that the effects are manifest in the losses that the country experiences when an expatriate is kidnapped oil companies are attacked and the companies are shut down as a result of fear, which in turn reduces the national revenues generated. Ngwama (2014) added that kidnapping is threatening the foundation of the Nigerian Economy and if not checkmated could lead the nation into recession. There is a heightened level of mistrust according to Inyang & Abraham (2013) who posited that very few people in the society extend their African hospitality to strangers as a result of growing awareness of the dangers of talking/sharing information with strangers, who could be kidnappers. Also, kidnapping has restricted movement/visitation as well as limited attendance to important ceremonies like marriage, funerals, birthdays, etc. (Dave et al, 2019). Ngwama (2014) posited that kidnapping could lead to a threat to industrial harmony and destabilization of the labour market which the long run falls

back on the society, which could manifest in unemployment, closure of factories/ companies producing goods and services, migration/movement of people to areas less prone to insecurity. It is evident in the commercial cities of Aba, Bauchi, and Kano amongst others which is characterized by lawlessness, prompting residents to flee the town in droves, while schools, banks, markets, and business premises have been shut down. These abandonments of commercial cities are witnessed in the nation as a result of a persistent increase in kidnapping and security threats. It also leads to the manifestation of other social vices which also increases insecurity in the nation. The main targets of these criminals are usually members of the upper and middle classes, including politicians and their children, business tycoons, lecturers, and professionals amongst others who could afford the ransom demanded of the criminals. These aforementioned would have helped to grow the economy of the nation and project the nation, but the security threat of the kidnapping has deterred them from engaging and investing in the nation. Ezugwu (2017) noted that because of the ravaging heinous crime of kidnapping for ransom, some state governors called for stricter penalties or laws that would put a stop to kidnapping. The kidnapping has crippled the economic activities, caused the closure of many Multi-National Companies, hindered foreign investment, increased insecurity in the nation, and accounted for so many other social vices which rampage the nation and this reverberate in increased spending on security, economic hardship, insecurity, restriction of movement, amongst others. Kidnapping is a security threat that has impacted negatively on the nation and persists amidst concerted efforts. The kidnapping of school students, Abayi, Dacchu, and Chibok amongst others also opened the eyes of the public on the danger and security threat inherent and the extent the criminal could perpetrate their wickedness. and this has led to many parents sending their children to a distance school or even outside the nation. Kidnapping has also dented the image of the nation in recent times and this has resulted in the nation being marked as a black spot by the Western world. The inadequacy of law enforcement agents to control kidnapping and maintain security has been a major concern for all and sundry. Kidnapping has undermined the power/capacity of the state to protect its citizens. Onuoha (2017) posits that national security is “the capacity of a state to promote the pursuit and realization of the fundamental needs and vital interests of man and society, and to protect them from threats which may be economic, social, environmental, political, military or epidemiologic in nature”. Based on the submission above, the prevalence of kidnapping in the nation has not only hindered the populace from pursuing and realizing fundamental needs but has become a threat to the lives, economic, social, and otherwise of the members of the society. Kidnapping has undermined security and has proved abortive to law enforcement, thereby causing a bridge in the security architecture of the nation.

THE WAY FORWARD

It is a general norm that the identification of a problem in a research work helps to proffer a solution to the problem. The scourge and epidemics of kidnapping that have threatened national security emanate from causal factors; poverty, unemployment, get-rich syndrome, and greed amongst others. These factors have necessitated the persistent increase in the crime of kidnapping and have impacted the security architecture, hence the security of lives and property which is the sole responsibility of the state has been undermined. The rippling effects are visible in all of the sectors of the economy. The need to provide job opportunities, capital investments, revitalization of abandoned firms/industry, and good governance amongst others is a sine qua

non for the eradication of kidnapping which affects security. Moreso, the security agencies are to be reformed, rebranded, retrained, equipped, and properly funded to wage the war on kidnapping. Also, the Nigerian State should review and vigorously implement laws/policies relevant to the criminalization of kidnapping, this will act as deterrence to the kidnappers. Political leaders and god-fathers using youths to achieve political aims and cause mayhem in society should be arrested and prosecuted. The construction of roads, provision of social amenities, rural development, and partnership with foreign companies to build industries should be the government watchword. The fight against corruption in Nigeria should be intensified and should cut across all the sectors of the nation. Rule of law should prevail, an egalitarian society free from nepotism and favoritism. And security should not be limited to the office holders but to everyone in the society.

CONCLUSION

Kidnapping has adversely impacted on the national security. Security therefore is a necessary element for peace and national development in Nigeria. The persistent increase in kidnapping in Nigeria has masterminded the peace, security and development. Kidnapping which has deterred foreign investors, crippled most of the firms, caused loss of lives and property seem to triumph unabated, hence the need to curtail the ugly situation in time. This would reduce kidnapping and the security threat that it breeds. Unfortunately, due to the insecurity in the nation as a result of kidnapping which is embedded in poverty, greed, political interference, and moral decadence amongst others, the security and development of the nation have been threatened and under siege. This has threatened and deterred foreign investment, affected the trade and even the educational institution amongst others. There is urgent need to contain and control kidnapping which affects national security in Nigeria.

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Apathy, Democratic Politics and the Media

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Abstract

This paper identifies some factors that make for apathy, and how the media can help curb rising apathy in democratic societies across the world. The essay is founded on two propositions. First, man is a political animal; he does not possess the capacity to realise his full potential outside the political society, and he contributes to political evolution, directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously. Second, democracy is a system that appreciates the value or worth of each individual, and it encourages the individual to consciously partake in the politics of society. The study employed the Agenda Setting Theory as its theoretical framework. It observed that political apathy is a vice in the life of the democratic polity because the vitality and the realisation of the cause of democracy rely on political participation. Political apathy will, however, be unmanageable unless there is a conscious effort to make the essence and importance of politics, democracy, and political participation common knowledge. It argues that even though man is a political animal, his conscious and meaningful participation in the political process is not automatic; man's participation in the political process would be more significant when he becomes more aware of his true relations to politics. The study recommends that to minimise apathy in democratic societies, there must be a conscious effort to cultivate the knowledge of man about politics and democratic ethos, so the individual may identify his interest within them. And it identifies the media as an effective tool for political education and mobilisation.

Keywords: Political Apathy, Media, Democratic Politics.

Introduction

The contemporary world rests on democracy. Democracy seems to have scored a historic victory over alternative forms of governance. Nearly everyone today professes to be a Democrat. Political regimes of all kinds throughout the world claim to be democracies (Held, 1993). Yet what these regimes do are often substantially different from one to another. Democracy bestows an aura of legitimacy on modern political life; laws, rules, and policies appear justified when they are 'democratic'. These realities have not only made the practice of democracy difficult but have also made it difficult to differentiate democracies from non-democracies.

Expectedly, there have been various ideas of democracy, so much so that it is hard to put them all in one bulk. What, however, seems to be the common denominator of many of them is the reference to the importance of participation in the political process. Although there is no agreement on the level of participation that is required to sustain the democratic system, it is widely acknowledged that the essence of democracy is political participation (Kornberg and Klarke, 1992; Powell, 1992; Barnes, et al, 1979; Fukuyama, 1992; Sodaro, 2008). As Sodaro (2008, p.231) puts it, 'to give democracy life, people must participate.' Without people partaking in the politics of their society, either directly or indirectly through their agents, the essence of democracy becomes defeated. This is why the description of democracy as 'the government of the people, by the people, and for the people' seems to have become a cliché in the literature of democracy. This is because it captures the general nature of democracy, namely, people's participation.

It is important to note from the outset, however, that non-democratic regimes also allow some forms or measures of participation in politics. This is partly why every nation in the world today may claim to be a democracy. The difference between a democracy and non-democracies, however, emerges from and settles on the *conscious effort* by the former to evolve institutions that not only allow but also encourage political behaviour and participation. It is in this sense that Bottomore (1979) rightly defines democracy as ‘a state of affairs in which citizens participate and are encouraged to participate, as fully as possible in the organisation and regulation of their whole social life’ (p.15).

Statement of Problem

The reason scholars like, Maxey (2010) believed that democracy is the final part of human political evolution is that the democratic system seems to be the best for allowing man to take charge of his destiny. To be sure, man has to partake in politics because politics helps him to realise his best potential. A man participates in politics because it thrusts his life and determines to what extent he realises the good life. In other words, the need for political participation arises from the need to react to the role of politics or government in the realisation of his full potential. Democracy brings all these to a culmination by allowing man to take the fullest possible control of politics. It is perhaps in this sense that Fukuyama (1992) designated democracy as the central value of the Last Man at the End of History. Although there are various reservations about his declaration of the end of history, Fukuyama rightly suggested that the purpose which politics seeks to fulfil throughout human history may now be realised under the democratic system; Man is now free to employ the potential of politics for his full development. He now bears, in his own hands, the power to decide his future.

Given the foregoing, it, therefore, seems strange to observe widespread political apathy – the withdrawal of people from political concerns – in the contemporary world which rests on the democratic ideology. If man is a political animal, if democracy is a system that encourages meaningful popular political participation, is it not strange that people are unconcerned about politics in many democratic societies? Why is there a decline in political participation the world over? Is it normal or healthy for democratic states to continue to experience increasing levels of apathy among their citizenry? What are the factors that make for political apathy in democratic societies? What are truly the benefits of political participation? What role can the media play in curbing apathy? These questions are what this piece tries to answer.

Aim and Objectives of the Study

This study aims to explore the factors that are fueling the growing level of apathy in democratic societies and the role the media can play in encouraging political participation. To realise this aim, the study will realise the following objectives:

1. Examine the meaning and essence of political participation
2. Highlight the essence and *raison d’être* for democracy.
3. Examine factors that fuel apathy in democratic societies.

4. Highlight the place of the media in democratic consolidation.

Theoretical Framework

The most appropriate theory for understanding the general ramifications of this paper is the Agenda Setting Theory. The Agenda Setting Theory, propounded by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw in 1972, is a political communication framework used to emphasise the extent of media effects, particularly how media contents influence political debates, behaviour and actions. It is believed that "In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue, but also how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its position" (McCombs and Shaw, 1972, p.1). The theory does not try to nullify the reality that people determine the best cause of action for their collective lives. The idea is that the repetition of certain issues in the news day after day and the strategic place of the media as a major source of daily information make very strong the influence of the media in setting public focus on issues.

The Agenda Setting theory insists the media influence society and tries to show the role of the media in determining and shaping public opinion (Lee and Hahn, 2014; Idid, 2017). The media are what set the agenda for public discussions and actions. Public opinion is formed and shaped by the transfer of important objects (issues or topics) from the media to the minds of the general public. The aspects of public affairs that are prominent in the news media become prominent in the public space. The salient pictures of the world in the media shape the pictures of the world in the minds of the people (McCombs, 1997; McCombs 2004).

The agenda-setting process is the manner in which the media "magnifies" and drags public attention to certain issues by filtering or leaving out some other news issues, thereby making the public perceive those magnified issues as more important than the others. The selection of news items, the determination of their relevance, the determination of the time and space allotted to news items, and the determination of language and tonality, all contribute to the agenda-setting process. Freelon (2005) has stated/observed that in the end, agenda-setting is about power, that is, the power to influence the public to see some issues as more important and therefore to be acted upon.

(By the way, there are two levels of the agenda-setting function of the media, even though in reality it is difficult to delineate them (Nollet, 2011). The first level of agenda setting, the original domain of the agenda-setting theory, is concerned with the transmission of issues or objects' salience. At this stage of the agenda setting, the media guides the attention of the public to a particular set of objects or issues. There is no conscious or subtle effort to highlight the features of the news objects or issues. There is no in-depth analysis of the characteristics of news items. To be sure, at the first level, the media tells the public what to think about only -but not how to think about them. The second level of agenda of the setting theory stretches the boundary of the agenda-setting function of the media to the transmission of objects' or issues' attribute salience. That is, focusing the attention of the public on certain attributes of news objects/issues. Weaver (2007, p.142) observed that the second level of agenda-setting focuses on "the relative salience of attributes of issues". The attributes of news objects are highlighted, which shapes how the public perceives these objects. A conscious effort is made to highlight the desired

attributes of news issues or objects. The public is told the attributes to concentrate on about the things they think about. That is, in addition to telling them what to think about, the media tell them how to think about media content.)

The theory is most suitable for this study for two related reasons. First, the theory highlights the power of the media. It shows the potential of the media in society as a tool for the moulding of social processes and conduct. Second, it shows the extent of media effects on public thought, opinion and actions. The combination of these two dimensions of the theory helps in the understanding of the role of the media in democracy and how the media can be used to curb apathy and strengthen democratic politics.

Political Apathy and Political Participation

Political apathy is simple to describe: it is the neglect of public concern, that is, a situation in which an individual is indifferent, not interested or even disinterested in political activities. A politically apathetic person is uninterested or indifferent to the course and cause of public policies; he is unconcerned with public welfare. To fully appreciate (the various dimensions of) political apathy and its implications for both the individual and the political community, however, it is important to properly conceptualise political participation and its benefits. This would make the endeavour of understanding apathy clearer, essentially because political participation is, in a very broad sense, the opposite of political apathy.

The foregoing notwithstanding, political participation is difficult to define (Allison, 2003). The difficulty in defining what it is to partake in politics stems from and rests on the fact that politics is a very complex phenomenon. Politics is a long complex set of activities, so to partake in it may take different forms. It stretches across the processes of resource distribution and utilisation, interest adjustments and readjustments, cooperation, review of social policies, and power relationships, among others. For this piece, however, politics shall be defined as the various means by which a political society adjusts and readjusts itself to the many problems that confront the satisfaction of the interests of its members. In other words, 'politics is the process by which individuals as members of a collective, directly or through their agents, act in concert with others to arrive at decisions and take actions concerning what best serves the interest of all parties in the collective' (Ekekwe, 2015, p.27).

Political participation may therefore be defined as the act of partaking in the formulation, implementation, and review of policies that affect members of a particular society. It is sharing in the political life of society; an action or behaviour that is directed toward public welfare. Finer (1972) rightly defined political participation as 'sharing in the framing and/or execution of public policies' (p.59).

The significance of political participation will be easily appreciated when attention is paid to the fact that man is by nature and nurture a political animal. All through recorded history, man has shown himself to be an entity cut out for organised social life. He continues to evolve one form of political structure after another. Indeed, at this point in human history, there is no need to argue about the truth in the thesis that man is a political animal. Aristotle is just simply right, for what other proof is needed to understand the nature of man if not his history and tendencies?

Social interaction without political authority would be uneasy. Although it may not turn out as horror-filled as Hobbes described it –solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short – the domineering and atavistic tendencies in man would make human interaction in the absence of political authority far more problematic than Locke (1965) makes believe. “Inconveniences,” as Locke termed them, would be a trivialisation of the nature of the situations that are bound to emerge. It is politics that ensures the absence of these problems – however their nature is imagined to be. Basically, the political society ensures the individual expresses himself, so he can realise his full potential. It ensures that the freedom of self-expression of one individual does not hamper the self-expression of the next man. In other words, it checks rights of freedom against one another, to ensure that even the individual with the faintest strength would lay claim to as much right of freedom as the strongest man in society. By contributing interests and wills into the common stock for decision-making, through politics, the good of each man is objectively realised.

Politics establishes and sustains order, and it cultivates the human spirit. It inculcates in man knowledge and virtues that are necessary for his full development. In other words, as Ndu (2016) rightly observed, it is the effects of politics that cultivate man’s (external) discipline. Politics tames man’s excesses and refines him for social living. The natural man has some rough edges that would put him in constant social conflicts. It is politics, as concretised in the state, that moulds him into a proper social being. This is why Aristotle (1979) submitted that any man who had no need for the political community was either an angel or he was a beast – an angel: pure and virtuous, thus requiring no cultivation or refinement of character. Or he was a beast: raw and vicious, with no potential to develop into a higher being. The question that begs for an answer is: if the political community is so decisive in the living circumstances as well as the aspirations of man, why should he not be eager to participate in its events and processes?

It is the decisive role of the political on the life of man that creates the need for political participation. To partake in the politics of one’s society is to contribute to the bulk of the resources and mould that forms the cast of one’s life; it is to have a part in deciding one’s future. Through participation, the citizen acquires ownership of his (social and political) destiny, and the freedom to guide it in the direction of his dreams.

There is no need to fear that if the ordinary man is allowed to partake in politics, he would bend the compass of political authority in the direction of his base, narrow and selfish interests. By partaking in politics man's interests become social; he becomes aware of the reality that his destiny is at some level or realm interwoven with those of his folks. At this realisation, his interest will become more consistent with those of his society. This is why many scholars – Mill (1990), Dewey (1924), Parry (1972), Chekki (1979), and Roper (1989), to mention but a few – agree that political participation is necessary for self-development, self-realisation and self-education.

It is in partaking in the political processes of a society that people come to realise and appreciate the nature of social configuration. Political participation does not only improve the individual's knowledge about political objects and processes, but it also improves man's general knowledge. Oludimu and Ayo (1995) somewhat observed this thus: 'Additionally, citizen participation inculcates in individuals interests in activities which enhance the quality of their existence and raises the individual's capacity to deal with [other] complex issues' (p.132-133). Politics relates to a lot of processes and activities; it is not merely the concerns of 'who gets what, when, and

how' as Lasswell (1936) argued. It cuts across all concerns that can affect the enjoyment of public life.

Political participation has an ethical base, that is, to partake in politics is to realise a moral cause. When one partakes in politics, he partakes in sustaining the power that sustains the universe. The Stoics were among the first to observe that the whole universe is a system, and everything that exists is an element working or playing its part in the maintenance of the object of creation. Although the network of interactions and the role of each element of the universe are complex and very delicate, so its explanation is almost impossible, the removal of an element certainly affects the natural functioning of the universe. Human society is a segment, a microcosm of the universe (the macrocosm). It contributes to the sustenance of the cosmic order. The human society is, however, also a macrocosm, a system of its own, that is, it has elements that work together to ensure its existence. Politics is one of those elements that guard and guide the life of human society; it ensures that human interactions are orderly, and humanity is preserved and realised. Just again, politics although a microcosm, in the sense described immediately, is also a macrocosm of its own. It contains elements (such as political participation, laws, mores, values and, so on) that ensure its continuous functioning. The most important element in politics is human participation. When humans do not partake in politics, the goal of politics becomes defeated. The defeat of the object of politics will affect the general interactions of humans, and consequently the matrix of the universe. Therefore, to partake in politics is to partake in the cause of creation. Conversely, political apathy is to be isolated from not just politics but the entire universe; it is to be ineffectual in the cosmic matrix.

Crick's argument in defence of politics slightly captures the social dimension of the point with which we are here concerned. "Politics is the public actions of free men; free men are those who do, not merely can live both publicly and privately. Men who have lost the capacity for public action, who fear it or despise it, are not free, they are simply isolated and ineffectual" (Crick, 1964, p.18). Every man must, thus, share in political power by partaking in politics if he is to fulfil his moral responsibility of preserving social order. Political participation is a social and moral duty. Political apathy is, therefore, an act of removing the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle of the arrangement of social power; it is to deprive the social process of activity and life.

The Essence of Democracy

Democracy, whatever the form, has to do with a sense of the appreciation of collective actions built on the ingenuity of the individual person. Democracy makes strong demands on citizens, leaders and institutions. It demands that all entities contribute their individual quota to the resources for the solution to societal problems (Riddle, 1966; Hyden, 1995; Kornberg & Clarke 1992). The effect/advantage of this demand is of a dual nature. "The 'democratic citizen' finds self-expression and self-fulfilment through participation. In turn, this helps to educate the individual in the ways of the democratic community [thereby strengthening or consolidating democracy]"(Roper 1989:209). The reason states like Belgium, Netherlands, and some parts of Australia and Switzerland have introduced the compulsory vote policy is that democracy relies on the contribution of members of the collective.

Ekekwe's declaration (2016) of the early demise of liberal democracy suggests not only the decreasing numerical strength of liberal democratic societies but also people's decreasing

propensity to partake in political activities. This interpretation of social reality is a product of the fact that, as Steed (1972) rightly observed, 'participation is the very essence of democracy' (p.80). Without participation, the entire structure of the liberal democratic arrangement collapses. Freedom, equality and fraternity, the credo of liberal democracy, rests on and can only 'function' when people partake in socio-economic and political activities.

For an appropriate appreciation of the effects of apathy in democratic states, it is good to mention that one of the ironies of democracy, whatever the form, is that it stands on two seemingly opposing forces, namely; freedom and common interest. Democracy believes in freedom, that is, the expression of free will, as much as it believes in collective will or action. Reality has, however, made it obvious that there are times when the interests of the individual do not fit into those of his community. Therefore, even though democracy relies on participation for state and policy legitimisation, because the individual is free to partake, he is also free not to do so. When he decides not to partake, when he exhibits apathetic tendencies, he is by so doing threatening the survival of the democratic state.

Yet, by democratic standards, he is not under any social obligation not to do so. In other words, he is free not to partake, even when his withdrawal negatively affects the survival of the democratic state. This situation may not be so dire for authoritarian regimes where the people may be coerced to partake in political activities deemed necessary by the government. Apathy, therefore, threatens a democracy more than it threatens other more restrictive forms of governance. The vitality of democracy vanishes when the society becomes inactive or passive; for as Kornberg and Clarke (1992) rightly observed, citizens' opinions, attitudes and behaviour are the fulcrum of the support process in a democracy.

Indeed, "unless the members of a society are really thinking and making rational decisions about significant problems which concern them, then, democracy does not really exist, despite the presence of democratic apparatus." (Mardiros, 1976, p.206). This points to why Bottomore (1979) avowed that democracy requires the encouragement of people to actively participate in political processes and events. The purpose of developing democratic institutions is to encourage meaningful political participation. The reason is that meaningful political participation is not automatic, even in a democracy (Mahler, 2013). It is not just the formal adoption of the democratic system that removes the issue of political apathy in the body of any society's politics. To check apathy, people must consciously be encouraged to lead politically active lives. One way to do this is through the institutionalisation of frameworks that encourage and orchestrate not just civilised behaviour but also political behaviour. (By political behaviour is meant those dispositions, attitudes, and sentiments that affect and contribute to the functioning of the political system). And this is where the media comes in as an effective institution in not just the education of people on their civic duties but also on the cultivation of their political behaviours.

Political Apathy in Democratic Societies

At this point, the question that begs for an answer is: why do democratic societies experience the problem of political apathy? The first answer to this question is that some men are just naturally indifferent to their surroundings – whether the social, the geographical, the economic, the

historical or the political environment. Hence, no matter the number of frameworks or structures that are established to encourage participation, some men would be disposed or rather predisposed to have an adverse or indifferent attitude to external affairs. One of the reasons why apathy is always present in democratic regimes is that despite democracy's appeals for political participation some citizens are just not sympathetic to politics (Lipset, 1960; Stouffer, 1965; McClosky 1969). These men view the political life of their society as either abstracted or not worth their time and other resources. While some may feel politics is too high, and thus, demands too much from them, some others may just fail to see the need for participating in political activities.

The notion of politics that is held by the populace is another thing that influences the level of apathy in society. "Politics" is among the most misunderstood phenomena in human history. Various atrocities have been perpetrated in the name of politics. In fact, for some, politics implies treachery, deceit and hegemony. People think, as Benn did, that "politics is the act of looking for trouble, finding it whether it exists or not, diagnosing it wrongly and applying the wrong remedy" (Cited in Mahajan, 2012:86). Hence, those that are not particularly trouble makers, and those who feel they are not driven by their basest instincts are inclined to keep off the domains of politics. Again, if politics is conceived, according to a Nigerian version, as a "Do-or-Die affair," would it not be proper and even virtuous for people to stay away from it?

For some people, politics is just one of those many frill activities that get in the way of the satisfaction of man's economic needs. Politics is therefore considered a fanfare; one of those activities that man may engage in at his leisure. As Parry (1972) puts it, "Politics is not for most people, freedom but simply one activity which may get in the way of other activities which they prefer" (p.31).

Third, man qua man is a rational being; he often checks his actions against his wellbeing. He calculates the utility of his actions against his purposes. When a man checks the ratio of his potential political inputs against his expected political benefits, and suspects that his investment or input would be greater than his benefits, he may lose enthusiasm for political activities. "If the individual thinks that the cost of a potential [political] action could be very high, and the benefits relatively low, she might not participate ... it is all a matter of cost and rewards calculated very objectively" (Mahler, 2013, pp.158-159). In other words, there must be a proportionate relationship between political costs and political benefits to promote active political behaviour. If a man thinks that what he invests by way of his sacrifices into the political system is not commensurate with what he receives in the form of projects and policies, apathy is inevitable. He only needs to understand the whole range of benefits he gets from partaking in politics.

Adherents to religious faiths believe that they are visitors or pilgrims of earth, and thus, they need not worry about (changing) the conditions of their current residence. They believe that eventually they shall be taken to paradise, a place where all the present problems of the material world do not exist. Their case is somewhat thus: why worry about temporary social problems, when in due season one shall be taken to a place of eternal bliss? Some religions even tend to suggest that social or political problems are some of the experiences that get one prepared for paradise. Adherents to some religious beliefs have come to suppose that engaging in endeavours that solve worldly problems is a contamination of the spiritual essence of man.

Generally, religion dulls the political consciousness of men, and helps in the promotion of political apathy. A religious man may not see the necessity of material affairs. His focus would most often be on how to please the Supreme Being and to get ready for the afterlife. Engaging in worldly affairs is often considered a distraction to spiritual development. Since "politics" is a material affair, most religious people may not see active political participation as necessary. The few who give attention to politics may not give it their all because they believe it is only concerned with human problems that are temporal. Ultimately, the social consequence of most religious beliefs is political apathy.

Traditionally, studies on political participation (and conversely, political apathy) have been tied to political culture. This is because political culture offers a general framework for determining the attitude, and sentiments of the people towards political processes and activities. Political culture is a people's framework for political behaviour in the determination of the nature and function of the political system. Almond and Verba (1963) were among the first to undertake a major study of the nature and pattern of political culture in different societies. In their study, political orientation was divided into three categories. The first is cognitive orientation which involves the beliefs and knowledge people have about their political system. It is the cognitive knowledge of the functioning of politics. The second category in political orientations is the evaluative orientation. This involves the critical evaluation or assessment of the functioning and activities of the political system. The third is the affective orientation which involves the feeling of loyalty, involvement or rejection of public policies and objects. The orientation of the people of a political society will determine the level of apathetic behaviours. If members of a society are satisfied with being just cognitive about political objects, apathy will be high in such a society, all things being equal. The case is that the realm of political orientation determines the level of participation.

Economic realities also influence people's willingness and ability to participate in political activities. Studies have shown that the thesis that politics is greatly influenced by the economic configuration of society is true, even for democracy (Lipset, 1960; Powell, 1992; Ake, 1996a; Ake, 1996b; Verhengen and Wenzel, 1993; Kapur, 1996). This is simply because man is first and foremost a material being, and thus, "the economy is the site of a society's most fundamental powers and individual's most deep-seated interest" (Pierson, 2004, p.240). In a democratic society where economic situations are harsh, meaningful participation in politics would naturally be low; people would not be disposed to react positively to political stimuli.

By the way, once in a while, an underdeveloped society would rise to the question of politics –in the form of "revolt." But usually, political apathy is higher in economically wretched democratic societies. And it is for three reasons. First, a man who is hungry (and poor) will be unable to see the use of politics; he will consider political participation as a distraction to his quest to settle the economic problems threatening his existence. A man who is struggling to get by would not be free to attend political rallies, except, of course, he hears that he is going to be paid for attendance. Second, because of the amorphous interests existing in society and the limited supply of nature's bounties necessary for their satisfaction, the inputs, the voices, the interests and the sentiments of the poor in political processes do not often amount to meaningful participation. Poverty is anti-democratic; a poor man is voiceless, powerless, helpless, and defenceless against the arbitrary use of power. Political participation is ineffective, inefficient and even meaningless under conditions of poverty. This ultimately leads to a loss of interest and enthusiasm for

politics. If the populace's contributions to the political processes and activities of the democratic society do not significantly affect the course and cause of public decisions, they will naturally develop apathetic tendencies. Why participate when it would not count? It is only when a person is economically empowered that he can meaningfully participate in the politics of his society. Third, meaningful participation in a democracy requires a certain level of stability, below which it cannot function. An economically underdeveloped society often lacks this feature, thus defeating the cause of democracy. To put it differently, instability arising from economic underdevelopment often scares or alienates people from political activities. Ake (1996a:18) succinctly puts it: "A society of beggars, parasites and parasites and bandits cannot develop, it cannot know peace, stability, and it cannot be democratic."

Trust, either the lack of it or the abundance of it, is another factor that makes for apathy in democratic states. On the part of the abundance of trust, there is the assumption or rather presumption that democracy is naturally a good system of social arrangement. That is, even without political participation democracy will deliver on its promises of freedom, equality, justice, fraternity, and so on. But as Fukuyama (2012:5) rightly observed "the mere fact that a country has democratic institutions tells us very little about whether it is well or badly governed."

Also, there is the assumption that only badly managed political societies should worry about increasing political participation. This again is false. Political participation is as beneficial to a well-governed society as it is to a badly governed one; if not for anything, to ensure that the well-governed state is continuously so governed. The reason Dye and Zeigler (2003:147) argued that, occasionally, mass apathy metamorphoses or gives way to mass activism, is that politics in well-governed states occasionally degenerates as a result of the absence of checks and supervision. The only sure check to political decay is the participation of people in the decisions that directly affect their social lives. (Although political participation is not without its troubles).

On the other hand, people become apathetic when they lack trust in the willingness or even ability of the government to serve their interests, especially when they believe that nothing may be done about it. As Newton and Van Deth (2010:188) observed, "Some people do not get involved (in politics) because they believe they have no influence in the system (low subjective efficacy), or think the political system is not democratic (system competence)."

Ignorance is the underlying force that gives impetus to the many causes of political apathy. Over the years, scholars have tried to show the link between political culture and education (Fukuyama, 1992; Roper, 1989). But it is important to observe that it is not just education that promotes a politically active citizenry. It is rather a specific type of education – political education (and/or socialisation). As Haines (1967: XI) rightly asked: "How many educated people seriously believe in their larger political and social roles?" For meaningful popular participation, the people must come to realise: (a) that politics is a decisive factor in the realisation of their potential; (b) that it is by consciously asserting themselves in the political processes that they would ensure politics serves their interests; (c) that it is through partaking in politics that they can, as Tillett (1963:465) rightly observed, "acknowledge and meet their duty to other members of their society," and (d) that every social institution including religion cannot function effectively outside the political community. Without adequate political education or socialisation, political apathy is inevitable even in a democratic society. People do not naturally

understand and partake in democratic processes; they have to be made to realise the rationale behind democracy and the benefits of partaking in it. And this is where the media comes in, as an institution for educating and developing the democratic culture.

Media, Political Apathy and Democracy

It is worth noting that the media is not merely an institution for the development of public opinion, but it is also a part of the structure vital for large-scale forms of social relationships on which contemporary politics is based. As Washbourne (2010, p. 148) rightly observed “Politics is extensively mediated in contemporary society: through press, radio, television and news media. Politics is also mediated -structured and made - through specific political institutions.”

Notwithstanding the different factors that promote apathy that have been identified in the foregoing section, apathy can be best managed when there is (a) a proper understanding of the value and consequences of politics, and (b) a knowledge of the reality that political participation is the only essence of democratic politics. Apathy will decrease when people get to know how politics affect every facet of their lives; when they get to know how political decisions and policies greatly impact their private lives, and when they clearly know how democracy gives them the rare opportunity to direct politics to align with their best interests and aspirations. As rational beings with a better understanding/knowledge of politics and democracy and how apathy would deprive them of the right to own their destinies, people would be less apathetic. And the media not only can but also have the duty to show people the consequences of apathy. Writing on *News, political knowledge and Participation*, de Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006) argued that citizens' participation is at the core of the democratic political culture, but the level of participation is chiefly influenced by the information, feelings, and skills citizens possess.

There is no doubt that the media is a vital part of the development of any country's politics. The media perform very critical roles of disseminating information, educating and articulating opinions regarding political affairs. Thereby, helping countries to evolve better systems of social organization. Nigeria, for example, has benefited so much from the media that the political history of the country cannot be complete without a detailed reference to the important contribution of the media. The media were the single most important instrument for the decolonisation of the country. The media fought the colonialist by educating and galvanising Nigerians' ideas into concrete demands for independence. (Matthew, 2016). The media was also an instrument in ousting the military from the country's politics. The media amplified voices and demands and gave people mediums for delegitimising military rule and the transition to civilian rule in Nigeria (Ngara and Esebonu, 2012). Now that Nigeria is a democracy, the media performs the important function of developing the political culture of the country and helping to articulate the interests and aspirations of the people into democratic policies. The efforts of the media ensure that Nigeria's democracy is active in terms of participation and the management of the problem of apathy.

By the way, it is important to reiterate that the implications of apathy, especially to democratic politics, are dire. As Tan (2012) has rightly expressed political apathy results in a decline in political involvement in a country which may seem initially harmless. But as participation and interests in politics decline the element of humanity is removed from governance, stripping politics of all its value for the common man. Without clear and audible expressions of people's

concern, democratic governments cease to be living entities of the people and become mindless machines. The result is a nation in shamble and a society that has been abandoned to ruins. The truest value of the media, as Onwubiko (2016) has rightly observed, is the fact that they contribute to entrenching a culture of accountability, transparency, good governance and democracy. This is why the media is considered the watchdog in a democracy. The watchdog role of the media is based on the assumption that, in a democracy, there must be a full and vigorous debate and scrutinisation of public issues and policies.

It is important to reiterate that democracy is a system in which people have control of the policies that shape their public life through contributing their opinions, ideas, interest and actions in the stock from which public decisions are made. This is why Sowant (2000) described democracy as a rule by discussion and debate among people of a group, as opposed to government by some parochial will and whim or the wish of an individual or of a few individuals. What Sewant tried to show in his definition is the fact that democracy is a system that is built on the active participation of people in discussing and deliberating about how best to serve their collective interests.

The way people control the policies that affect their lives is by expressing themselves via the many channels of communication of which the media is a major one. Without a proper framework that allows for the expression and articulation of the interests and opinions of people, the whole idea of democracy would be defeated. So, the concretization of the dividends of democracy is in the ability of the people to direct public policies. As Nyamnjoh (2005, p. 272) rightly noted, “to democratise means to question basic monolithic assumptions, conventional wisdom about democracy, media, government, power myths and accepted personality cults, and to propose and work for the demystification of the state, custom and society.”

The use of media in a democracy is very critical. No democratic society can function effectively without the media. This is because the idea of democracy is built on popular opinion and the expression of the will and interests of the people. Gunther and Mughan (2000) have rightly observed that the free flow of information which is hinged on the media is a fundamental aspect of democracy, as the media have the capacity to give the people as much information as is needed to make informed decisions about their public life. By the way, worthy to mention is the fact that with the rise of social media and its popularity, *freedom of the media* is becoming one and the same thing as *freedom of expression*. More and more people now exercise their *freedom of expression* through the media. So to encroach on the *freedom of the media* is to directly encroach on the *freedom of expression*. And as it is known *freedom of expression* is the mother of all freedoms.

Perhaps the real propelling factor for growing apathy is that the media is no longer performing its critical functions. Three issues may be identified with the ineffectiveness of the media in curbing apathy in today's democracy. First, the media coverage of politics is often skewed and the ordinary citizen often feels that his contribution to politics is not very meaningful. He does not feel like he is an active political force whose actions and inactions affect the course of politics. When politics is represented in the media as some distant activities of administrators, government functionaries or some select few, apathy would be on the increase. As Washbourne (2010, p.11) rightly observed, "The idea that politics could be concerned with how we organise ourselves collectively as local, regional and national or global political constituencies and create

conditions for our mutual creative co-existence is rarely the object of media coverage." Second, for some reason, the media often depict politics without its social values -more often as a struggle for the resources of society. Third, with the growth of new media (particularly social media), there is the possibility that there is the growth of Narcotising Dysfunction, which is a situation in which people consider passively reading and sharing ideas on media platforms as meaningful participation, thus narcotizing them from making important contributions to the public life of their states. The media's function is not just to inform and educate people about politics but to mobilise people to take important political actions and contribute *meaningfully and actively* to civic life.

Conclusion

This piece has demonstrated that man is indeed a political animal – first, in terms of contributing to the resources of politics; and second, in the sense of being cultivated by the many processes and consequences of politics. It observed, however, that his meaningful participation in political processes and events is not automatic, that is, for man to fully reap the benefits of politics, he must consciously express himself – his needs, sentiments, fears, aspirations and hopes in the political arena, either directly or indirectly through selected agents. The only system that guarantees the fullest expression of the "politicalness" of man is the democratic arrangement, hence, its designation by Fukuyama (1992) as "the end of history." The essence of democracy is the participation of people in the processes and events that shape their social life. Where and when the level of participation becomes reduced, the vitality and goal of democracy are reduced and defeated, respectively. This is why to sustain a democratic polity, there must be a conscious effort to cultivate an active society in which people feel the need to contribute to the solution of social problems. Structures, frameworks, and ethos that orchestrate participation and articulate interests and aspirations must not be only available but also be very functional. And this is where the media comes in as an essential institution for democratic consolidation.

The role of the media in curbing apathy and strengthening democracy goes beyond the mere sharing of information and educating people on democratic culture and practices. More importantly, it has the duty to show the levels of participation that are meaningful for political development in a democratic society.

This piece identifies the benefits of participation in a democratic political society to include: (a) the collation of the experiences and wisdom of a great many men to solve society's problems; (b) the education of man on the value and essence of social interactions; and (c) the cultivation of man's knowledge of a variety of things – socio-economic, political, historical, spiritual, religious and so on. Yet, the eradication of political apathy which is the neglect of political concern is impossible, even in a democracy. This is so for certain reasons, namely, the natural tendency of people to be indifferent to the political and social environment; the effects of religious faith; ignorance of the essence and value of politics; the weakness of the agents of political socialisation; political alienation; political orientation or culture; economic underdevelopment and so on. It was also observed that at the heart of the issue of apathy in democracy is the problem of ignorance about politics. If the people are made to come to terms with the genuine essence of politics, and the benefits of partaking in it, political apathy in democracies would be considerably reduced; conversely, meaningful political participation will increase.

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